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ABSTRACT 
 
This research project makes a contribution to the discourse on the theodicy problem 
by examining the position adopted by Gregory Boyd known as open theism. Boyd 
would argue that an open view of God is in a better position to deal with the problem 
of evil because the traditional understanding of God’s attributes fails to vindicate God 
of guilt or responsibility for evil and should, therefore, be abandoned in favour of the 
attractive openness model. Boyd claims that God cannot be held responsible for evil 
and suffering because the future cannot be known to God. He articulates this 
perspective from the process thought position that the future is not a reality 
therefore, cannot be known. Thus, God took a risk when he/she created human 
being with free will because any free will future actions and thoughts cannot be 
known by God. God is therefore surprised by the actions and sufferings of human 
being and therefore has to change his/her plans to meet with the free will actions of 
human beings. Boyd in articulating his open theism theodicy does so by 
reconstructing the classical understanding of the attributes of God namely: God’s 
omniscience, immutability, and omnipotence to give an answer to the theodicy 
problem. Evangelicals understand the attributes of God to be part of God nature, 
therefore any changes in the attributes of God means changes to God him/herself. 
Because of Boyd’s claim to be an evangelical, this project examines the attributes of 
God as reflected in the works of the early church father to the reformers and 
influential evangelical scholars in contrast with the work of Boyd. In presenting an 
evangelical understanding on God and suffering this study concludes that the 
position adopted by Boyd is a radical departure from evangelicalism and orthodoxy 
faith and is more consonant of a deistic presentation of God in his/her relation to the 
world. 
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An Evangelical discourse on God’s response to 
suffering: A critical assessment of Gregory Boyd’s 
open theism 
Chapter One 
Introduction  
 
“I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the 
answer. Before your face questions die away. What other answer would 
suffice? Only words, words; to be led out to battle against other words.” 
– C.S. Lewis, Till We Have Faces (1956) 
 
This research project will contribute to the Christian discourse on the classic 
theodicy problem, namely on the question why God allows so much (human) 
suffering if God is indeed both omnipotent and a God of love. Erickson 
(1998:125) states, “the problem of evil is real and serious. To see the 
destructiveness of nature is disturbing to one who believes in an all-powerful 
divine being”. Therefore, Hamilton (1966:25) observes, for many the 
contemporary human issue is not merely the absence of the experience of 
God. It is the experience of the absence of God.  
Within the long tradition of Christian reflection on this problem, different 
approaches have been adopted. This research project will focus on the 
discourse on the theodicy problem within an “evangelical” setting in North 
America and South Africa. More specifically, this project will focus on the 
school of thought within evangelical theology known as “Open Theism” of 
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which Gregory Boyd is one of the main exponents. Open theism is concerned 
with how God experiences the world. It asks and attempts to answer 
questions such as, “What does God know?” and “When does he/she know 
it?” The questions that open theists raise are not so much about how God 
knows the future, but if God knows it at all.1 In open theism God is portrayed 
as taking risks by allowing human freedom since God cannot predetermine 
the future actions of free moral agents. This implies that God is not directly 
responsible for suffering induced by humans themselves. 
This study will examine the position adopted by Gregory Boyd on the 
theodicy problem in publications such as God at War (2000), God of the 
Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (2000) and Satan 
and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (2001). I 
shall determine Boyd’s approach in terms of its ability to do justice to core 
themes in evangelical Christianity such as the divine foreknowledge, 
omnipotence and immutability. 
1.1 Context and relevance 
1.1.1 The reality of human suffering 
The reality of suffering is deeply rooted in the history of humanity. Suffering 
can be divided into two categories: namely, “personal suffering” and 
                                         
1
 M.J. Erickson (2003) outlined various ways in which the church has understood the 
foreknowledge of God. “Simple foreknowledge” is the idea that God simply “sees” the future 
as God stands outside of time looking on. “Middle knowledge” states that God knows not 
only all that will be, but all the other possibilities in every possible world. Then there are 
forms of Calvinism, which hold that God knows everything that will happen because God has 
chosen what is to occur and brings it about.  
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“solidarity suffering”. Pope John Paul II (2001:2) states, “Every individual, 
through personal suffering, constitutes not only a small part of that ‘world’, 
but at the same time that ‘world’ is present in him as a finite and 
unrepeatable entity”. Together with this, however, is the inter-human and 
social dimension. The reality of their suffering brings solidarity because 
people who suffer understand one another through the analogy of their 
situation, the tragedy of their suffering. Thus, although human suffering exists 
“in dispersion”, at the same time it contains within itself a singular challenge 
to communion and solidarity, which can be spoken of as the “world” of human 
suffering. Considering the “world” of suffering in its personal and at the same 
time collective meaning, one cannot fail to see the fact that suffering is a 
reality. This is seen in South Africa by the spread of HIV/AIDS and the 
intermittent xenophobia attacks. At the same time, human suffering becomes 
as it were particularly concentrated. This happens, for example, in cases of 
natural disasters, catastrophes, upheavals and various social scourges like 
World Wars I and II. Because of the human need for understanding and care 
in times of suffering, and perhaps, above all, to answer the persistent 
question of the meaning of suffering this calls for a response. 
 
1.1.2. Human suffering: The need for a pastoral response 
Medical science and technology have helped immensely with the caring of 
those who undergo “physical suffering” through various methods of therapy. 
This is only one response to human suffering. Humans suffer in different 
ways not always considered by medical science with all of its advancements 
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and specializations. A distinction may be made between “physical suffering” 
and “spiritual suffering”. This distinction is based upon the double dimension 
of the human being and indicates the physical and spiritual aspect as the 
immediate or direct subject of suffering. Physical suffering is present when 
“the body is hurting” in some way, whereas spiritual suffering is 
“pain/suffering of the soul”. The “suffering of the soul” occurs when a person 
asks “Why is God allowing me to suffer physically or where on earth is God 
during my pain?” Sarah H. Pinnock (2002:39-40) states that the practical 
problem posed by suffering first hinges on the question “How can faith 
survive suffering?” Second, “when does religious meaning in suffering raise 
the issue of the “eclipse of God”: the apparent absence of God in human 
suffering?” It is with reference to this spiritual suffering that a 
pastoral/theological response is required. Any theological discourse on the 
theodicy problem from within the South African context needs to come to 
terms with the immense (human) suffering, both physical and spiritual, that 
form part of the everyday experience of many South Africans.  
Archbishop Desmond Tutu2 states:  
The problem of evil and suffering is crucial and is not to be dealt with 
lightly. Our ability to do evil is intimately connected to our ability to do 
that, which is good. One is meaningless without the other. Empathy and 
compassion have no meaning unless they occur in a situation where 
one could be callous and indifferent to the suffering of others. Suffering, 
it seems, is not optional. It is part and parcel of the human condition, but 
suffering can either embitter us or ennoble us. I hope that people will 
come to see that this suffering can become a spirituality of 
transformation when we find meaning in it. 
                                         
2
 http://www.beliefnet.com/story/143/story_14326_1.html. 
  For the sake of presentation and fluidity in the reading process all internet sources   will be 
reflected as a footnote. 
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In an earlier article, I have suggested that the pastor’s task is to try to find out 
how a person understands God in their suffering (Harold 2005:97). What 
interaction exists between the person suffering and their expectation of God? 
The therapeutic aspect of faith is closely connected with the individual’s idea 
of God. According to Louw (1994:77), when people are experiencing 
suffering or pain, their understanding of God becomes distorted, and this 
distortion prevents a constructive application of their faith potential. Once a 
person’s emotional filters are blocked, their vision of God becomes distorted. 
Thus, the quest for meaning becomes primarily a problem of a dysfunctional 
belief system and it becomes a problem of perception. I agree with 
Kasambala’s statement that when one has a distorted image of God in times 
of suffering, this will lead to what he terms “pathological faith” (Harold 
2005:97). 
The task of the pastor is to help the sufferer understand and interpret God in 
the light of suffering and, conversely, to understand and interpret the 
individual’s experience of suffering in terms of God’s relationship with 
suffering. The person’s story must be put with God’s story and vice a versa. 
Where the two stories converge, the person may discover God’s fulfilled 
promises and then hope in God can emerge. When a person discovers God’s 
faithfulness and understands Christ’s resurrection in light of Christ’s suffering 
on the cross, this discovery results in a dynamic hope. When suffering 
disturbs this vision, hopelessness ensues. Hope is strengthened when a 
person’s concepts of God once again become constructive and positive. 
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Boyd (2000:13), in his best-selling work God of the Possible, states as one of 
the goals of his book: 
I also believe this issue is too important and too practically significant to 
be limited to academic circles ... I believe there is currently a need to 
present this issue in a manner that can include as many laypeople as 
possible. This book attempts to do just that. 
 
In this pronouncement, Boyd has outlined the agenda for this theodicy. 
Because of the negative reaction it received from most evangelical 
theological institutions, proponents of this theodicy have abandoned the 
realm of scholarly debate and councils and are now making their case with 
the church as a whole. Rather than hammering out the position and allowing 
for a decision in the ring of “academic circles”, Boyd has decided to put the 
brunt of his energy into getting the principles of his theodicy in its simplest 
and most attractive forms to the general populace. Thus, the purpose of this 
research project is to enable evangelical pastors in South Africa to become 
more familiar with the position of Boyd so that in dealing with the problem of 
evil and the realities of their suffering flock, pastors will not leave their 
members in a hopeless situation by misrepresenting God in human image. 
Such reflection on the relationship between God and human suffering has 
traditionally been addressed within the context of the theodicy problem. 
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1.2. The Theodicy Problem 
 
The word “theodicy” is derived from the Greek word Θεος (God) and δικη 
(justice). Theodicy is a word traditionally used for an argument to show that 
God is righteous or just despite the presence of suffering in the world. The 
classic problem that is addressed in any form of theodicy is why a God who 
is both loving and powerful would allow suffering to exist. In other words, if 
God does not want us to suffer so much and if God can do something about 
it, why do humans still experience so much suffering? Nash (1988:178), a 
theologian and philosopher, identifies specific challenges that have to be 
addressed in relation to the theodicy problem: 
 If God is good and loves all human beings, is it reasonable to 
believe that he/she wants to deliver the creature he/she loves from 
evil and suffering? 
 If God is all-knowing, is it reasonable to believe that he/she knows 
how to deliver his/her creatures from evil and suffering? 
 If God is all-powerful, is it reasonable to believe that he/she is able 
to deliver his/her creatures from evil and suffering?  
In an article entitled “HIV/AIDS and human suffering: Where on earth is 
God?” Conradie (2005) states: 
The theodicy problem is much easier to formulate than to answer. In 
fact, any brief overview of theodicy debates over twenty centuries of 
Christian theology soon reveals the disparateness and 
inconclusiveness of these debates. Some would conclude that this 
clearly indicates that the problem cannot be resolved – and that God 
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cannot and does not exist if there is so much suffering, or that God is 
absent, perhaps far away in heaven, or that history is controlled by fate, 
not God, or that God is either not powerful or not compassionate. 
Others would maintain that the conceptual problem is indeed irresolv-
able because human beings would never be able to comprehend God’s 
ways, given the finitude of our own knowledge, wisdom and power. Yet 
others would question the way in which the problem is formulated. Who 
are we to offer a justification of God’s existence? Should we not focus, 
instead, on God’s justification of us as sinners (God’s word of 
forgiveness)? 
  
One must acknowledge that, from its inception, Christianity has been 
continually challenged on the philosophical, theological and pastoral levels to 
provide an answer to the question as to how a good God can allow suffering 
to prevail in the world. Defences of God’s goodness and omnipotence in view 
of the theodicy problem are on record from the beginning of Christianity. The 
crucial problem that has to be addressed in such reflections on the theodicy 
problem is how to resolve a number of characteristics that Christians have 
attributed to God, with specific reference to God’s love and God’s power. 
Traditionally, God has been described in terms of characteristics such as 
absolute goodness, absolute power (omnipotence) and absolute knowledge 
(omniscience), including foreknowledge. Each of these concepts has been 
the subject of much debate, especially in the on-going Evangelical discourse 
on the problem of evil. In turn, the relationships between the characteristics 
of God have also elicited much debate, which constitutes the basis of the 
theodicy problem. 
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1.3. Responses to the Theodicy Problem: A brief survey 
 
Although many have suggested that the theodicy problem is one that, in the 
final analysis, cannot be resolved theologically since we as human beings 
cannot put ourselves in God’s position, this has not prevented theologians 
through the ages from providing comprehensive reflections in this regard. 
During the past few decades this has been the subject of numerous 
publications.  
An early development of a theodicy is found in the Book of Job. The 
underlying assumption that governed the period in which Job lived was that 
people lived in a universe that was created and sustained by God. The 
prevailing orthodoxy held that God had structured the world so that the 
righteous and wicked were respectively rewarded and punished according to 
their deeds. We know that the Book of Job struggles with this religious 
opinion, because it begins by insisting that our notion of the justice of God is 
not borne out by the reality of human suffering. In this way the book calls into 
question the prevailing interpretation of the nature and purpose of suffering in 
a divinely governed universe.  
In order to accommodate the discussion of the theodicy problem in the 
context of open theism in a wider perspective, it is necessary to present a 
brief overview of the history of Christian reflection on the theodicy problem, 
drawing on the contributions that follow below. 
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1.3.1. The Irenaean Theodicy 
St.  Irenaeus (130-202 CE) taught that the existence of evil actually serves a 
purpose. From his point of view, evil provides the necessary problems 
through which we take part in what Hick (1981:40) calls “person-making”. It 
follows that evil is a means to an end in the sense that, if it did not exist, there 
would be no means of spiritual development. So the foundational principle of 
the theodicy of Irenaeus is that we have been placed in a hostile environment 
in order to learn to become better people. Philosophers such as John Hick 
and Richard Swinburne have adopted the idea of Irenaeus in recent times. 
According to this view, the pains and sufferings of the world are used by God 
to serve as a method to build a truly good person. God could have created us 
perfect beings, but God is more interested in our choosing to become who 
God wants us to be (at some point), rather than forcing us to be this way (no 
matter how long this takes). Leibniz explained the reality of human suffering 
by saying that God allows it temporarily for the greater good (cited in Stumpf 
1989:257). Leibniz, like Plato and St. Irenaeus, maintained that everything in 
the universe was explicable, and God must indeed create the best while 
allowing suffering temporarily for the greater good of his creation (cited in 
Stumpf 1989:64-67). Another modern adherent to this position is Quinn. 
Quinn (1982:199-215), like Leibniz, argues that we cannot know the effect of 
removing certain evils in the world since we cannot see the world from an 
infinite perspective. Hick (1966), in his proposed “soul/person making” 
theodicy, views suffering not as evil but rather as a necessary stage in the 
development of a relatively immature creation into a more mature state. 
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Following St. Irenaeus, Hick does not consider that suffering in the world is 
because of the fall from a once-perfect state but rather emphasizes suffering 
as a process that will bring about a gradual improvement in the human race. 
Hick (1981:25) sees humans as endowed with a real but limited freedom that 
enables a relationship with God through which they can find fulfilment. This 
relationship gives meaning to our human existence “as long as the process, 
through which we are being created by our free responses to life’s 
combination of good and evil, ultimately leads to good”. The good that 
outshines all evil is not a paradise long since lost but a kingdom that is yet to 
come in its full glory and permanence.  
 
1.3.2. The Augustinian Theodicy 
St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) proposed a solution to the problem by 
blaming suffering on the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the Garden of 
Eden. From this perspective, humans are responsible for suffering by being 
led astray by Satan. To begin understanding St. Augustine’s theodicy, one 
first needs to examine his ideas in light of the two greatest influences in his 
life. Frend (1953:22-23) rightly observed that the first is Manichaeism 
(established by Mani, 216-76 CE), which St. Augustine was associated with 
for some time and which emphasised the duality (separation) of darkness 
and light. This duality was expressed in two eternal principles – matter and 
God – and both were opposed to each other. Escape from the bonds of the 
physical world (matter) was said to be the goal (or purpose) of humanity. 
Augustine eventually became disillusioned with Manichaeism, and as a result 
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began to reject the notion that evil is an independent and corrupt substance. 
The other key factor influencing him was the teaching of Plotinus (204-70 
CE). Geisler (1999:596-597) states that Plotinus was a Neo-Platonist who 
taught the goodness of creation and the chaotic nature of evil. For Augustine, 
God is the author of everything. He also believed the world had been created 
literally out of nothing (ex nihilo), according to the Divine will. This meant that 
as far as Augustine was concerned, everything in the world is created good 
or perfect. He also believed that, although there is an abundance of variety in 
the world, this is in fact ordered in varying degrees, according to the fullness 
of a creature’s nature. This means that there is no totally evil thing in the 
world.  
For St. Augustine matter is something essentially good, but it is also 
something that is able to deviate from what it should be. Thus for St. 
Augustine the notion of “evil” must now be understood as the privatio boni 
(“privation of good”), or that which occurs when a person renounces their 
proper role in the order and structure of creation. In other words, something 
becomes “evil” when it ceases to be what it is meant to be. St. Augustine (in 
Confessions 6.12 in NPNF Vol. II:101) further clarifies the relationship of 
privation to the good, by stating: 
Those things are good which yet are corrupted, which, neither were 
they supremely good, nor unless they were good, could be corrupted; 
because if supremely good, they were incorruptible, and if not good at 
all, there was nothing in them to be corrupted. For corruption harms, 
but, less it could diminish goodness, it could not harm. Either, then, 
corruption harms not, which cannot be; or, what is most certain, all 
which is corrupted is deprived of good. But if they be deprived of all 
good, they will cease to be. For if they be, and cannot be at all 
corrupted, they will become better, because they shall remain 
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incorruptibly. And what more monstrous than to assert that those things 
which have lost all their goodness are made better? Therefore, if they 
shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer be. So long, therefore, 
as they are, they are good; therefore whatsoever is, is good. That evil, 
then, which I sought whence it was, is not any substance; for were it a 
substance, it would be good. For either it would be an incorruptible 
substance, and so a chief good, or a corruptible substance, which 
unless it were good it could not be corrupted. I perceived, therefore, and 
it was made clear to me, that Thou made all things good, nor is there 
any substance at all that was not made by You; and because all that 
You have made are not equal, therefore all things are; because 
individually they are good, and altogether very good, because our God 
made all things very good  
  
Thus, if St. Augustine understood creation to be good, then this begs the 
question: Where then did evil originate? For St. Augustine, evil entered the 
world because of the wrong choices of free beings (free in the sense that 
there was no external force necessitating them to do wrong). In other words, 
corruption occurred because of the use of our free will. According to St. 
Augustine, (in The City of God 12.6 in NPNF Vol. II:229) when the will 
abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil – 
not because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is 
wicked. This not only absolves God of creating evil but also allows Him to 
show the world His love by bringing Christ into the world. A modern advocate 
of St. Augustine’s view can be found in Alvin Plantinga (God, Freedom and 
Evil, 1974), who claimed that for God to create a person who could only have 
performed good actions would have been logically impossible. 
St. Augustine’s theodicy is often associated with the supposed free will 
defence – which suggests that suffering is essentially a function of human 
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freedom and therefore, God cannot be blamed for such suffering. The logic of 
the free will argument may be described in the following way: 
 Evil is the result of human error. 
 Human error results from human free will (the ability to do wrong). 
 If we did not have free will we would be robots. 
 God prefers a world of free agents to a world of robots. 
 Evil is therefore an unfortunate although not an unavoidable 
outcome of free will. 
 For God to intervene would be to take away our free will. 
 Therefore, God is neither responsible for evil nor guilty of neglect 
for not intervening. 
Anthony Haig (2006), in summarising the free will view, states that the basis 
of free will theodicy is the claim that God created creatures who are 
genuinely free in some highly desirable sense, but who are also capable of 
choosing to be/do evil. It is then argued that the good that comes from 
creating such genuinely free creatures, outweighs the cost of the various 
evils that will result.  
 
1.3.3. Process Theodicy  
Process philosophy concerns itself with what exists in the world and with the 
terms of reference in which this reality is to be understood and explained 
(metaphysics). The task of metaphysics is, after all, to provide a cogent and 
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plausible account of the nature of reality at the broadest, most synoptic and 
comprehensive level. Moreover, it is to this mission of enabling us to 
characterize, describe, clarify and explain the most general features of the 
real that process philosophy addresses itself in its own distinctive way. The 
guiding idea of its approach is that natural existence consists of and is best 
understood in terms of processes rather than things or modes of change 
rather than fixed stabilities. Process philosophers see change of every sort – 
physical, organic, psychological – as the pervasive and predominant feature 
of the real.3 Process theologians, who derive their philosophical influences 
from process philosophy, attempt to understand God and the problem of evil 
from the premise that reality is changing and so God also changes or is 
developing, so God cannot be held responsible for sin or the problem of evil.  
1.3.4. Protest Theodicy 
The attempt to reconcile God’s existence with the presence of evil and 
suffering in the world, typically finds a person protesting to God, because 
God who is almighty and is fully able to intervene against evil, does not make 
that choice. The protest theodicy of Roth (1980:10) begins in agreement with 
Hegel: history is “the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of people, the 
wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed”. Protest 
theodicy of Roth challenges the “cost- effectiveness” of God’s decision 
because of the pain that is seen in human history. Roth (1980:10) stated that 
his theodicy sees God-as-economist, and the question posed above deals 
                                         
3
 See  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/ 
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with his/her waste. The point here is that as far as protest theodicy 
philosophers and theologians are concerned, God could and should do 
something to restrain evil and suffering from occurring in the world.  
 
1.3.5. Victim-Orientated Theodicy 
Surin (1986:142-153) opts for a kind of theodicy with “practical” (victim-
orientated) emphasis, such as those developed by Dorothee Sölle , Jürgen 
Moltmann and Peter T. Forsyth. Moltmann, in his seminal book The Crucified 
God (1993), has pursued this theme: the crucial issue of theodicy lies in 
God’s salvific activity to overcome evil. Moltmann characterizes God as a 
fellow-sufferer but, unlike Sölle (1975), insists that the deity takes our 
suffering into the very Godhead. God feels the misery that we produce and 
the unhappiness that we experience as well. Our history of suffering is taken 
up into his history of suffering. Like Moltmann, Surin (1986:142-153) calls for 
developing an adequate “grammar” of salvation, namely a way of 
communicating that God himself justifies through his suffering on the cross. 
Surin’s “practical” theodicy is an attempt to root his theodicy in the concrete 
realities of human suffering by developing solidarity with the victim of 
suffering through the cross. Gutiérrez (1988:103) argues: “Only if we take 
seriously the suffering of the innocent and live the mystery of the cross amid 
that suffering, but in the light of Easter, can we prevent our theology from 
being ‘windy arguments’ (Job 16:3).” Billing (2000) observes that the question 
of theodicy, and the life of the Christian, is lived between the suffering of the 
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cross and the increasingly penetrating light of Easter. As such, the question 
of theodicy remains open and anomalous rather than answered and (hence) 
forgotten. However, McCabe (1985:464-467) argues that it is not in the 
nature of God to be an “object” in history, a being alongside other beings, 
and so God cannot depend on his creatures in any way. It follows from this 
that God cannot suffer, though he does have the most intimate possible 
involvement in the sufferings of his creatures.  
1.3.6. Informed Consent Theodicy 
Anthony Haig4 a philosopher from Australia, developed what he calls an 
“Informed Consent” theodicy – which suggests that before God can make 
any free agent to become truly good, God must obtain their informed 
consent. Furthermore, given the momentous and irreversible nature of the 
transformation involved, such consent must involve thorough knowledge by 
acquaintance with the nature and consequences of the alternatives. Thus, 
informed consent theodicy can be used to argue that the pain, suffering, and 
death that we endure in this life constitute a necessary process of education 
in order for us to adequately understand the alternatives from which we must 
choose for eternity. In this regard, it has some similarities to the Irenaean 
approach to theodicy. Both theories emphasize that evil and suffering are 
justified by virtue of the fact that they have an educative effect upon those 
who experience them.  
 
                                         
4
 See http://www.ArsDisputandi.org. 
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1.3.7. Open Theism Theodicy 
In recent years another proposal regarding the problem of evil has gained a 
degree of recognition and acceptance among some evangelical theologians 
and philosophers. Theologians in the school of open theism have argued that 
the classical definitions of both divine omnipotence and omniscience are 
seriously problematic for addressing the problem of evil and suffering. Hasker 
(1994:152) provides the following explanation:  
God knows that evils will occur, but God has not for the most part 
specifically decreed or incorporated into his plan the individual 
instances of evil. Rather, God governs the world according to general 
strategies which are, as a whole, ordered for the good of the creation 
but whose detailed consequences are not foreseen or intended by God 
prior to the decision to adopt them. As a result, we are able to abandon 
the difficult doctrine of “meticulous providence” and to admit the 
presence in the world of particular evils God’s permission of which is 
not the means of bringing about any greater good or preventing any 
greater evil.  
 
Open theism derives its name from its view of the relationship between God 
and the future. On that view, God lacks exhaustive knowledge of the future; 
the future is thus “open” to him. Therefore, while God may have a good idea 
of what might happen, he does not know when it will happen. According to 
Boyd (2000:11), the future is “partly determined and foreknown by God, but 
also partially open and known by God as such. Divine uncertainty of the 
future results from God’s decision to grant freedom to some of his creatures. 
On this Pinnock (1994:7) elaborates:  
God, in grace grants humans significant freedom to cooperate with or 
work against God’s will for their lives, and he enters into a dynamic, 
give and take relationship with us. The Christian life involves a genuine 
interaction between God and human beings. We respond to God’s 
gracious initiatives and God responses to our responses. 
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The above statement is an accepted explanation for God granting humans 
significant freedom within the evangelical tradition, but Pinnock goes on to 
say that the freedom humans have in relation to God’s foreknowledge runs 
counter to the evangelical view of God’s foreknowledge. He (1994:7) states:  
God takes risks in this give-and-take relationship, yet he is endlessly 
resourceful and competent in working towards his ultimate goals. 
Sometimes God alone decides how to accomplish these goals. On 
other occasions, God works with human decisions, adapting his own 
plans to fit the changing situation. God does not control everything that 
happens. Rather, he is open to receiving input from his creatures. In 
loving dialogue God invites us to participate with him to bring the future 
into being.  
 
Hasker (1994:139) therefore confidently argues that the openness model is 
“in a better position than Calvinism or Molinism” in dealing with the issues 
brought about by the problem of evil. In particular, it is asserted that 
traditional Christian theism fails to vindicate God of guilt or responsibility for 
evil and should, therefore, be abandoned in favour of the attractive openness 
model of divine providence.  
Blount (2005:178) views the open theist knowledge of God as a God who 
takes risks and adapts his/her plans to changing situations. God’s doing so, 
results from the fact that he/she has created us as free creatures together 
with the assumption that he/she cannot know in advance what we will freely 
do. Such an understanding of the divine nature stands in marked contrast to 
traditional theism, according to which God not only exhaustively knows the 
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future, but also is timeless, immutable and passible rather than impassible, 
which leads to an entirely different understanding of the divine attributes. 
 
1.4. Demarcation and statement of the research problem 
 
This research project will focus on contributions to the theodicy problem 
emerging from within the school of thought known as “open theism” within the 
wider discussion of evangelical theology. The intention of this research is not 
to evaluate how mainstream academia deals with the problem of evil, but to 
examine the responses from evangelical scholars to the problem of evil and 
to open theism. More specifically, the position adopted by Gregory Boyd in 
this regard will be investigated and assessed. One aspect of his position will 
be investigated in particular, namely the implied understanding of the divine 
attributes embedded in his position. Three such attributes will be 
investigated, namely: divine foreknowledge, immutability and omnipotence. 
These three perfections of God are selected because the controversy 
regarding open theism centres on these three divine attributes. Boyd’s 
understanding of these three divine attributes will be investigated on the 
basis of whether this may be regarded as a fruitful extrapolation of an 
understanding of these divine attributes within the evangelical tradition in the 
USA and South Africa. 
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1.4.1. Historical Development of Open theism within Evangelicalism 
In this section, I shall first discuss the historical antecedents of open theism 
briefly and then focus on the formative period of open theism, roughly from 
1980 until 2004. Geisler (1999:526) defines open theists as those who hold 
to the “openness of God” view or “free will theism”, by which God is regarded 
as open to change while humans are deemed to have free will or 
incompatibilist (libertarian) freedom – freedom that is opposed to any divine 
determinism or control. Exponents of open theism view God as one who 
does not possess exhaustive knowledge as to how humans will use this 
freedom. 
a) Historical antecedents 
Jowers (2005:1-9) states that any theological tendency that minimizes God’s 
absolute immutability or sovereignty constitutes, in some sense, an 
antecedent of open theism. Open theist theologians and philosophers do, on 
the whole, seem principally concerned to ratify two doctrines: (a) That the 
future of human beings in time and eternity depends principally, if not 
entirely, on their own, autonomous decisions; and (b) That God freely 
renders himself exposed to his creation so that human beings can affect him 
for better or worse and collaborate with him in determining creation’s future. 
The first doctrine, Jowers (2005:1-9) claims, has the support of numerous 
theologians. The second doctrine has faced opposition from some of 
Christianity’s most influential thinkers like Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, 
Martin Luther, and John Calvin. Jowers (2005:1-9) argues that Hegel (1770-
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1831CE) is perhaps history’s most prominent advocate of divine mutability. 
Jowers (2005:1-9) lists three schools of thought that emerged within 
Christendom before the Hegelian revolution that explicitly denied the doctrine 
of divine immutability, namely: the Audians, the Socinians, and the 
Arminians. These antecedents of open theism will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
b) The Formative Period 
The willingness of open theists to conceive of God in less majestic terms 
than traditional theists, therefore, is by no means without precedent even in 
the pre-Hegelian era. In the post-Hegelian era, denials of divine immutability 
and impassibility became popular. Relatively few theologians and 
philosophers of religion in the period 1831-1980, however, publicly advocated 
open theism’s most distinctive and controversial claim: that God lacks 
comprehensive knowledge of the future. Support for fully fledged open 
theism, however, became relatively common after the publication by Richard 
Rice, the architect of modern evangelical open theism, of The Openness of 
God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will 
(1980). In the time between the first appearance of Rice’s book and the 
beginning of significant controversy over open theism in 1994, six figures 
emerged as prominent advocates of open theism within evangelical 
theological circles, namely Richard Rice, Clark Pinnock, William Hasker, 
David Basinger, Gregory Boyd, and John Sanders. During this period, the six 
wrote several essays and three books in support of open theism. One of the 
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books, moreover, gained significant critical acclaim, namely Hasker’s God, 
Time, and Knowledge (1989). During this period, nonetheless, the 
evangelical public, with the exception of some vigilant philosophers and 
theologians, was largely unaware of open theism. 
c) Themes addressed in Open Theism 
In the widely publicised manifesto of open theists, The Openness of God: 
A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (1994), Pinnock 
(et.al.), Basinger in chapter five concludes the book by identifying five claims 
about God as integral to open theism: 
 God not only created this world ex nihilo, but God can also (and at 
times does) intervene unilaterally in the affairs of the earth. 
 God chose to create us with incompatibilistic (libertarian) freedom, 
freedom over which God cannot exercise his/her total control. 
 God so values freedom, the moral integrity of free creatures and a 
world in which such integrity is possible, that God does not normally 
override such freedom, even if God sees that it is producing 
undesirable results. 
 God always desires our highest good, both individually and 
corporately, and thus is affected by what happens in our lives. 
 God does not possess exhaustive knowledge of exactly how we will 
utilise our freedom although he/she may at times be able to predict 
with absolute accuracy the choices we will freely make. 
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d) The leading exponents of Open Theism. 
Since the publication of The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the 
Traditional Understanding of God, a volume of essays by Rice, Sanders, 
Pinnock, Hasker, and Basinger in 1994, open theism rose from obscurity into 
the Evangelical arena, thus accomplishing the purpose of that publication, 
which was to promote open theism to the broader public, one beyond the 
confines of professional philosophers. In 1996, Basinger published The Case 
for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment. Boyd in 1997 published 
another book on behalf of open theism, God at War: The Bible and Spiritual 
Conflict, in which he made open theism the centrepiece of an attractive 
theodicy. In 1998 Sanders published his work, The God Who Risks: A 
Theology of Providence, followed in 2000 by another publication by Pinnock 
in support of open theism entitled, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s 
Openness, and Boyd’s 2000 publication God of the Possible: A Biblical 
Introduction to the Open View of God. In 2001 Boyd published a sequel to his 
God at War (1997) namely, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy. In 2003 Boyd published Is God to Blame? 
Beyond Pat Answers to the Problem of Evil, a popularization of his earlier 
publication, Satan and the Problem of Evil (2001). For the purpose of this 
dissertation, I shall focus on the publications of Boyd. 
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1.5. Gregory Boyd 
 
1.5.1. The life and work of Gregory Boyd  
Boyd is an evangelical pastor, Christian theologian, and author. He is Senior 
Pastor of the Woodland Hills Church in St. Paul Minnesota, United States. 
Boyd graduated with a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the University of 
Minnesota, earned his master’s degree (cum laude) from Yale University 
Divinity School and a doctorate (magna cum laude) from Princeton 
Theological Seminary (Strobel 1998:110). He was Professor of Theology at 
Bethel University for sixteen years. There he became acquainted with the 
process theology of Charles Hartshorne, whom Boyd considered “essentially 
correct” in the philosophical and theological understanding of the nature of 
God and the future. His book Letters From a Skeptic (1994) contains much 
Hartshornian thought that was later expanded in the book God of the 
Possible (2000) in which he described his view of God, or open theism: the 
view that the future is open and therefore known to God partly as a realm of 
possibilities. Boyd’s (1995) publication, Cynic Sage or Son of God? 
Rediscovering the Real Jesus in an Age of Revisionist Replies, was a critique 
of the liberal perspective of Jesus within the Jesus Seminar (Strobel 
1998:110). 
While there are over fifteen books published by Boyd since 1992, and his 
works range from philosophy to politics, his most prolific writings are blended 
with philosophy and theology as seen in the books that directly deal with the 
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problem of evil. For the purpose of this research project I shall engage these 
individual works (dealing with the problem of evil) specifically: 
 Letters From a Skeptic: A Son Wrestles with His Father's Questions 
about Christianity (1994).  
 God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict (1997).  
 God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of 
God (2000).  
 Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy (2001).  
 Is God to Blame? Moving Beyond Pat Answers to the Problem of 
Evil (2003).  
1.5.2. The significance of Boyd’s work  
The belief that God does not know the future decisions of his creatures is the 
theological revolution, while God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the 
Open View of God by Boyd (2000) is the revolutionary book that rallies 
evangelicals to join open theism’s assault upon “the majority view in the 
church”. Boyd initially advocated open theism in Letters from a Skeptic 
(1994) that eventually incited conflict within the Baptist General Conference 
(BGC), the denomination that founded Bethel College where he was 
Professor of Theology. As his book gained wider popularity, it also won 
notoriety. Concerned pastors in the BGC began to analyse his open theist 
views as unorthodox according to Scripture, their “Affirmation of Faith”, and 
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beliefs accepted among evangelicals throughout church history. Responding 
to criticism, especially from John Piper and many others, Boyd composed 
various replies from which he wrote a manuscript that he distributed within 
the BGC and later published as God of the Possible. His efforts in the BGC 
secured both his roles as professor at Bethel College and as pastor of a BGC 
church. With the publication of this book, Boyd brings his theological 
revolution to a wider audience within evangelicalism.  
 
1.6. Statement of the research problem 
 
In terms of the discussion thus far, the problem, which will be investigated in 
this research project may now be formulated in the following way: 
How should Boyd’s position (within the school of thought known as 
“open theism”) on the classic theodicy problem be assessed within the 
wider context of evangelical discourse?  
More specifically, may Boyd’s understanding of three divine attributes, 
namely divine foreknowledge, immutability and omnipotence, as these 
relate to his position on the theodicy problem, be regarded as a fruitful 
extrapolation of the consensus position in the evangelical tradition in the 
United States of America and in South Africa on these three divine 
attributes? 
This formulation of the research problem requires further clarity on the 
following:  
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1.6.1. Why these three attributes? 
Since evangelicals hold to a high view of God’s providence (which affirms 
God’s exhaustive knowledge, omnipotence and immutability), any other 
understanding of these terms would not be considered evangelical.  
 Divine omnipotence 
Omnipotence may be defined as the perfect ability of God to do all things that 
are consistent with the divine character; thus God’s power is not always 
coercive, but may honour the freedom of creatures. When Boyd (2001:51-84) 
ascribes “incompatibilistic” freedom to human beings he means to say that 
human actions are free in the sense that it is always within the power of 
human beings not to perform any action that they actually perform. Such 
freedom is “incompatibilistic”, because it is incompatible with divine causation 
of everything that occurs. Boyd has an incompatabilist understanding of 
human freedom. This contrasts with the compatabilist understanding of 
human freedom that is typical of evangelical theology. It is appropriate to 
note that those who oppose Boyd’s claim do not, as a rule, consider human 
freedom illusory. Rather, they ascribe “compatibilistic” freedom to human 
beings, i.e., the freedom to do whatever one wants. Freedom of this sort can 
coexist with divine omnicausality, because it entails neither that human 
behaviour can deviate from God’s eternal plan nor that the future is in any 
sense indeterminate. According to the compatibilist perspective, human 
beings can do what they want, but God knows what they will do in advance. 
Freedom of this sort is not empty, because a being that enjoys compatibilistic 
freedom never suffers divine obligation to act in a manner contrary to his 
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desires. While Boyd sees God as a person who is omnipotent but at the 
same time vulnerable to the free will decisions of humans. Thus, Boyd sees 
God’s omnipotence as limited. This is in contradiction to the Evangelical 
Tradition, because Evangelicals believe God’s influence upon the world is 
unlike any other mode – unlimited in capacity. Thus human freedom is 
grounded in, permitted by and derived from the power of God. Human 
freedom can assert itself against God’s power, but only in limited and 
fragmentary ways that can never alter or dispute the power of God.  
 Divine Immutability 
According to the Evangelical tradition, God is unchangeable in his/her being, 
perfection, purposes, promises; yet God does act and feels emotion, and 
acts and feels differently in response to different situations. Boyd (2001: 51-
84) asserts that God’s wishes may be frustrated by the decisions of human 
beings and that human beings, consequently, can effect changes in God. 
Boyd seems to confuse God’s immutability with God’s mobility. By mobility, I 
mean that God is active and enters into relationships with changing 
humanity. Human beings, according to open theism, possess the power to 
inflict suffering on God or to give him/her pleasure. While such an approach 
may seem to allow for a fuller presence of the intrinsically valuable aspects of 
emotion in God, it is necessary to note that, at least according to the 
perspective of classical theism, the view that God is passible does not 
diminish his/her immutability. Open theists seem to incorporate the 
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impassibility5 of God as an attribute that is in conflict with God’s immutability. 
Since open theism sees God as dependent on the world in certain respects, 
the question emerges whether Boyd’s approach can do justice to the 
affirmation of God’s immutability as maintained in much of evangelical 
theology.  
 Divine foreknowledge 
According to the evangelical tradition, God is infinite in knowledge. God 
knows him/herself and all other beings perfectly from all eternity – whether 
they are actual or merely possible, whether they are past, present or future – 
in one simple eternal act. Thiessen (1996:81) asserts that God knows things 
immediately, exhaustively, and truly. The fact that God knows all things 
possible can be deduced from God’s full understanding of him/herself, which 
includes all things that are possible. Swinburne (2008:6) explains 
omniscience as God having all true beliefs about everything, and in God they 
constitute not just beliefs but infallible knowledge. Boyd (2001:85-115) on the 
other hand asserts that God lacks exhaustive foreknowledge of human 
actions and can at best accurately predict a great number of them. This claim 
has a number of disturbing implications for evangelicals who see prophetic 
utterances in Scripture as being true, and trustworthy and authoritative to life 
and faith. Thus, Boyd’s affirmation of divine ignorance implies that God’s 
expectations may at times be mistaken. Boyd understands God as having 
limited knowledge about the future actions of men – which contradicts Psalm 
139:1-2 that speaks of God having intimate knowledge of our lives, both 
                                         
5
 God is not subject to passion and emotions. 
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actions and thoughts. The question is therefore whether Boyd can do justice 
to this divine attribute as affirmed in the Evangelical tradition. 
 
1.7. What is meant by evangelical theology or evangelicalism? 
 
It is generally accepted that evangelicalism as a modern movement started in 
the eighteenth century with the spiritual awakening that is usually associated 
with John and Charles Wesley. Although evangelicalism is customarily seen 
as contemporary phenomena, the evangelical spirit manifested itself 
throughout church history. The commitment, discipline and missionary zeal 
that distinguish evangelicalism were features of the apostolic church, the 
fathers, early monasticism and the reformers. The term “evangelical” is 
derived from the Greek word euangelion (good news) and is used by 
historians in continental Europe as a synonym for “Protestant”. Evangelical 
scholars claim that the movement was firmly based upon the principles of the 
Reformation. In this sense, it is believed that evangelicals are true heirs of 
the reformation. At the Reformation the name “evangelical” was given to the 
Lutherans, who sought to redirect Christianity to the gospel and renew the 
church on the basis of God’s authoritative word. However, this spiritual vigour 
was lost due to the church being ruled by civil leaders. Therefore, the 
Reformation root is essential in understanding the development of 
evangelicalism.  
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The recovery of spiritual vigour sprung up again in the eighteenth century 
through German Pietism, Methodism and the great awakening. These 
movements were rooted in Puritanism that had a strong emphasis on biblical 
authority, divine sovereignty and human responsibility. The nineteenth 
century was clearly the evangelical age; figures like the Lord Shaftesbury and 
W. E. Gladstone occupied central positions in public life. Baptist preacher C. 
H. Spurgeon and the Christian Plymouth Brethren reached many with the 
gospel. The YMCA, founded by George Williams, and the Salvation Army, 
founded by William and Catherine Booth, was born out of the evangelical 
presence in Britain in the nineteenth century. 
In America, the eighteenth century Great Awakening, as an indigenous 
movement  spread extensively under the preaching of Wesley and Whitefield, 
not only resulted in evangelical ascendancy in churches but also dominated 
American culture, politics, science and education. McLoughlin (1968:1) 
claims that the story of American Evangelicalism is a story of America itself. 
By the 1870s the American movement was declining, but evangelical zeal 
and missionary vision fuelled the outreach that spread to most parts of the 
world. Evangelicals were at the forefront of the nineteenth century missionary 
advances into Africa and Asia.  
Worldwide evangelicals now total well over 500 million, making up the bulk of 
Protestantism, almost 25% of Christendom, and 8% of the total world 
population. Growth has averaged over 5% annually, with the highest growth 
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in the emerging economies of the world. A recent survey6 reports that while 
the number of people who are actively committed to the Church of England is 
in decline, the proportion of churchgoers who are serious about their faith – 
and its implications for private and public life – is growing. The report also 
reflects on Peter Brierley, a collector of statistics on faith in Britain, 
assessment that 40% of Anglicans attend evangelical parishes these days, 
up from 26% in 1989. 
The word “evangelicalism” usually refers to a broad array of religious 
orthodox7 beliefs, practices, and traditions found among Protestant 
evangelical Christians and some evangelical Catholics where conformity to 
the basic tenets of the faith and a missionary outreach of compassion and 
urgency is emphasized. A person who identifies with it is an “Evangelical” – 
one who believes and proclaims the gospel of Jesus Christ. Evangelicalism 
has both a theological and historical meaning.  
Theologically, it begins with the sovereignty of God, the transcendent, 
personal, infinite being. God is a Holy Being in whom there is no sin, yet 
he/she is one with love and compassion for sinners. God actively identifies 
with the suffering of his/her people, is accessible to them by prayer, and by 
his/her sovereign free will has devised a plan whereby humanity may be 
                                         
6
 http://www.economist.com/node/21549943 
7
 Packer (1984) “The English equivalent of the Greek othodoxai (from othos, “right” and 
doxa, “opinion”), meaning right belief, as opposed to heresy or heterodoxy. The word 
expresses the idea that certain statements accurately embody the revealed truth content of 
Christianity and are therefore in their own nature nominative for the universal church. This 
idea is rooted in the New Testament insistences that the gospel has a specific factual and 
theological content (1 Cor. 15:1-11; Gal. 1:6-9; 1 Tim. 6:3; II Tim. 4:3-4; ect.), and that no 
fellowship exist between those who accept the apostolic standard of Christological teaching 
and those who deny it (I John 4:1-3;II John 7-11).”  See “Orthodoxy” in the Evangelical 
Dictionary of Theology . 
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redeemed. Although this plan was foreknown, God allows humanity to 
cooperate in the attainment of his/her objectives and bring their wills into 
conformity with his/her will through evangelism. Thus, evangelicalism is 
typified by an emphasis on evangelism, a personal experience of conversion, 
biblically oriented faith, and a belief in the relevance of Christian faith to some 
cultural issues. It stresses a more intimate relationship with God at the 
individual level, as well as activism based upon one’s biblically based beliefs. 
Evangelicals believe the Bible as true, trustworthy and reliable, and the final 
authority on matters of faith and practice. The doctrines of sola scriptura and 
sola fide are central. Evangelicals are reluctant to give up certain crucial 
claims, including the belief that all truth is from God, that God is perfectly 
good, omniscient, omnipotent and that the Devil is a devastating (personal) 
reality. 
While evangelicals are always associated with fundamentalism in America 
and in South Africa, this is not true in most Evangelical churches.  While 
some evangelicals are fundamentalist and many fundamentalists are 
evangelicals, a large number of evangelicals, while claiming to hold to 
fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith, would reject the title 
“fundamentalist”, limiting its use to a relative small party within 
evangelicalism. Tidball (1994:17-18) citing John Stott lists eight significant 
differences between fundamentalists and evangelicals:  
 Fundamentalists are suspicious of scholarship, while 
evangelicals are open to it. 
 Fundamentalists deny, while evangelicals recognize the human 
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and cultural dimensions of the Bible. 
 Fundamentalists revere the Authorized King James Version of 
the Bible, while evangelicals believe that there are more accurate 
translations. 
 Fundamentalists are strongly separatist, while evangelicals are 
more open to other Christians. 
 Fundamentalists interpret the Bible considerably more literally 
than do evangelicals. 
 Evangelicals are more critically aware that their beliefs are 
influenced by their culture than are fundamentalists. 
 Fundamentalists are less concerned about the social implications 
of the gospel than evangelicals. 
 Fundamentalists insist on premillennial views of the second 
coming of Jesus Christ, while evangelicals hold a variety of 
eschatological views.  
Although evangelicalism is a movement without a confession, it has 
theological interests and a theological ethos. One expects evangelical 
theologians to hold to sound teaching and contend for the faith once 
delivered, though in a trans- denominational way. Differences can be 
expected, given the ecumenical character of the movement and experiments 
in theological reform in which new ground is broken. The movement is not 
stagnant theologically-new light still emanates from God's holy Word (even in 
conservative circles), and at least a little room exists for theological creativity. 
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Thus evangelical theology can be conservative and contemporary but never 
unorthodox in its affirmation of how God is as revealed in the Holy Scriptures. 
So while evangelicals have no confessional statement, it has held to the 
traditional view of God’s attributes as passed down through the ages.   
 
1.8. Research Hypothesis 
 
I propose that, desirous of maintaining libertarian, or contra-causal, freedom 
on the part of the creature, as well as absolving God of all responsibility for 
evil, open theists have radically reconstructed the doctrine of God by stating 
that:  
 God often changes his/her mind and experiences regret regarding 
some of his/her decisions.  
 God does not know the future actions of free moral agents and 
therefore is surprised at the abuses of creaturely freedom.  
 God is, to one degree or another, temporal, or bound by the 
constraints of time, as God interrelates with his/her creatures. 
Thus, the research problem may be elucidated by the following hypotheses: 
That Boyd’s understanding of divine power, divine mutability and divine 
foreknowledge is essentially different from how Evangelicals understand 
these terms. Evangelicals hold to the classical/ traditional views on God’s 
attributes and therefore position themselves within the orthodox historical 
understanding (often referred to as classical or traditional theism) of the 
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attributes under investigation. The position of Boyd should be considered 
therefore, as a deviation from the evangelical tradition and not as a fruitful 
extension of this tradition. 
 
1.9. Research Procedure 
 
What then are the sources of this theological reflection? Before engaging in 
this theological quest to understand the relationship between open theism 
and evangelicalism, a word about the theological method employed in this 
study might serve to be helpful. Every theological investigation employs a 
certain methodology in its exploration. Methodology includes the operations, 
processes and procedures by which one comes to ascertain the essence of a 
matter. In the case of this study, the method employed is one which draws 
from the Early Church Fathers to the Reformers, the work of evangelical 
scholars and Boyd in order to investigate whether Boyd’s position is a move 
away from evangelicalism. 
According to Cooper (1988:104-126) “a literature review uses as its database 
reports of primary or original scholarship, and does not report new primary 
scholarship itself. The primary reports used in the literature may be verbal, 
but in the vast majority of cases reports are written documents. The types of 
scholarship may be empirical, theoretical, critical/analytic, or methodological 
in nature. Second a literature review seeks to describe, summarise, evaluate, 
clarify and/or integrate the content of primary reports.” This research project 
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will adopt the latter by critically and comprehensively engaging and analysing 
the works of Boyd, namely: God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict 
(2000); God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God; 
and Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy (2001) comparing the views of God’s attributes through the 
scholarly works of Wayne Grudem, Millard Erickson, Bruce Ware and 
Norman L. Geisler. These scholars are chosen because of their influence 
within evangelicalism. Grudem, who is a New Testament scholar turned 
Systematic theologian, author is Research Professor of Bible and Theology 
at Phoenix Seminary, Arizona. He earned a BA from Harvard University, an 
MDiv from Westminster Theological Seminary, and a PhD from the University 
of Cambridge. In 2001 Grudem moved to Phoenix Seminary after having 
taught at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School for more than twenty years where 
he was also the chairman of the Department of Biblical and Systematic 
Theology. Grudem served on the committee overseeing the English Standard 
Version translation, and in 1999 he was the president of the Council on 
Biblical Manhood and Womanhood. He is the author of Systematic Theology: 
An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (1994).  Erickson is Distinguished 
Professor of Theology at Western Seminary, Portland, and the author of the 
widely acclaimed systematics work Christian Theology (1998) along with 
more than twenty other books. He was professor of theology and academic 
dean at Bethel Seminary for many years. He earned a B.A. from the 
University of Minnesota, a B.D. from Northern Baptist Seminary, an M.A. 
from the University of Chicago, and a Ph.D. from Northwestern University. 
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Erickson, an ordained Baptist minister, is a fairly conservative Evangelical. 
Bruce Ware is an evangelical theologian and author. He is currently 
Professor of Christian Theology and Senior Associate Dean of the School of 
Theology at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Formerly, he taught at 
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School where he served as Associate Professor 
and Chairman of the Department of Biblical and Systematic Theology. Prior 
to this, he taught at Western Conservative Baptist Seminary and at Bethel 
Theological Seminary.  Ware has written numerous journal articles, book 
chapters, and books and Norman L. Geisler is an evangelical scholar 
Christian apologist and the author/co-author of over fifty Christian books 
defending the Christian faith by means of logic, evidence, and philosophy. He 
has also authored many scholarly articles on a wide range of theological and 
philosophical topics.  Geisler has taught at the university and graduate level 
for over forty years. Geisler's work Baker Encyclopaedia of Christian 
Apologetics (1999) has been well received and is considered a systematic 
and comprehensive work of Christian apologetics to ascertain whether 
Boyd’s understanding of the attributes of God align with that of 
Evangelicalism. An overview of the views of the Early Church fathers through 
the Reformers on the three attributes will also be undertaken  to show that 
the Evangelical understanding of these attributes namely: God’s 
omniscience, immutability and omnipotence is in keeping with the classical 
view about God. 
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1.10. Chapter Outline   
 
Chapter One has provided an introduction to the scope of this thesis. It 
clarifies the scope by providing the background to this study and the planned 
methodology it applies to this study.  
Chapter Two will focus on a historical investigation of the problem of evil. I 
shall use the works of Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, Ante-
Nicene Fathers (1978) and Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 
(1979) to trace the development of the theodicy problem within the early 
church from the perspective of the early church fathers namely: St. Augustine 
and St. Ireneaus  In this chapter, I shall outline a summary of the historical 
development of different versions of theodicies and investigate how they 
address the question of the reality of suffering and evil. This will also set the 
foundation for the investigation of how contemporary theologians have 
integrated these classical views to develop their own contemporary 
theodicies. 
Chapter Three provides a general overview of the movement open theism in 
the context of the larger evangelical history. This chapter will glance through 
the works of Whitehead and other process theologians to examine the impact 
that process theology has on the development of open theism and finally on 
evangelicalism.  
Chapter Four, Five and Six will comprise the focus of this research project by 
investigating the question as to whether Boyd offers a legitimate 
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improvisation on such traditional discourse or whether he departs from the 
critical and fundamental convictions within the evangelical tradition. Using the 
works of Boyd mentioned under the heading Research Procedure, this 
section will engage Boyd’s work comprehensively and critically to determine 
Boyd’s position on the three attributes of God under consideration. Boyd’s 
position will then be compared with other Evangelical views on the three 
attributes of God. A historical literary analysis on the aforementioned 
attributes will be undertaken by using the works of Roberts and Donaldson 
Ante-Nicene Fathers (1978) and Schaff Post-Nicene Fathers (1979). 
Standard textbooks by Evangelical systematic theologians such as Millard 
Erickson’s Christian Theology (1999) and Wayne Grudem’s Systematic 
Theology (1994). These texts are chosen because they are widely used in 
evangelical theological seminaries as primary texts for the study of 
Systematic Theology.  Other works of prominent Evangelical scholars such 
as Norman Geisler’s, Battle For God (2001) and Bruce Ware’s, God’s Lesser 
Glory (2001) that critically engage open theism will also be used. The results 
will allow for the consideration as to whether Boyd’s position may be 
considered a deviation from or a constructive innovation within the 
evangelical tradition. 
Chapter Seven, having considered the most important doctrinal areas central 
to and definitive of the open theism and evangelicalism as to God and  
his/her relation to the world in Chapter 4-6. This chapter will focus on how 
evangelicals understand and respond to the problem of evil. The purpose is 
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to asses open theist’s proposal as it relates to the evangelical understanding 
of evil and suffering. 
Chapter 8  
This chapter serves as a conclusion for the entire project. 
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Chapter Two 
 
An Historical Investigation of the Problem of Evil 
 
Introduction 
 
The church has always been challenged by the problem of evil. In this 
chapter, I shall undertake a study examining how the early church fathers 
dealt with the theodicy problem, specifically St. Augustine and St. 
Irenaeus. In this section I have deliberately limited the focus to a more 
detailed evaluation of the theodicies’ of St. Augustine and St. Irenaeus. 
This is because of their dominance within Christianity and also the claims 
made by open theists that their understanding of God puts them in a 
better position to deal with the problem of evil than that of St. Augustine 
and St. Irenaeus. It is because of this claim of a “better position” that a 
review of open theism needs to be undertaken. This chapter will also 
briefly focus on the Protest Theodicy of Roth, because of Roth’s 
affirmation of the omnipotence of God – which open theists deny. To give 
a better historical and theological understanding of open theism, an 
investigation of process theology needs also to be undertaken because 
open theism is considered to be a “child” of process thought.  
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2.1. The Augustinian Theodicy 
 
St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) proposed a solution to the theodicy 
problem by blaming suffering on the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the 
Garden of Eden. From this perspective, humans are responsible for suffering 
by being led astray by Satan. To understand Augustine’s theodicy, one first 
needs to examine his ideas in light of two significant influences in his life. 
Frend (1953:22-23) rightly observed that the first is Manichaeism 
(established by Mani 216-76 CE), which St. Augustine was associated with 
for some time and which emphasises the duality (separation) of darkness 
and light. This duality was expressed in two eternal principles – matter and 
God – that were opposed to each other. Escape from the bonds of the 
physical world (matter), was said to be the goal (or purpose) of humanity. 
Eventually St. Augustine became disillusioned with Manichaeism, and as a 
result began to reject the notion that evil is an independent and corrupt 
substance. The other key factor influencing him was the teaching of Plotinus 
(204-70 CE). Geisler (1999:596-597) states that Plotinus was a Neo-Platonist 
who taught the goodness of creation and the chaotic nature of evil.  
 
2.1.1. Platonic and Neoplatonic influences on St. Augustine’s understanding 
of God 
Because of a Neoplatonic conception of reality, St. Augustine arrived at a 
new understanding of God. As discussed in Chapter One, St. Augustine’s 
initial conception of God was rooted in his nine-year association with the 
Manichees that posited the existence of two gods, one good and the other 
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evil. These gods, according to Manicheanism, are corporal in nature and 
seemingly mutable, as good and evil are engaged in a constant struggle or 
battle for domination. When the evil god wins, evil occurs; when the good god 
wins, good occurs. With the influences of the Platonic and metaphysical 
perception of reality, St. Augustine however was able to return to a new 
understanding of God and being. St. Augustine (in The City of God in NPNF 
50.10 Vol. II:462) accepted the Platonic view of the simple Good: that “there 
is a Good, which alone is simple, therefore, immutable”. This simple Good for 
Augustine is God. From God, all other good was created. God is the author 
of everything. He also believed the world was created literally out of nothing 
(ex nihilo), according to the Divine will. This meant that as far as St. 
Augustine (in Confessions 12.7 in NPNF Vol. I:177) was concerned, 
everything in the world was created good or perfect but it was mutable. He 
also believed that, although there is an abundant variety in the world, this is 
in fact ordered in varying degrees, according to the fullness of a creature’s 
nature. St. Augustine (in City The City of God in NPNF 10.1.16 Vol. II:190-
191) states that  metaphysical hierarchy divides all existing creatures into 
three layers of reality. At the top of the hierarchy is God; in the middle are 
created spirits, such as angels and human souls; at the bottom are living and 
non-living objects such as bodies, plants and rocks. Thus, St. Augustine (in 
Confessions 7.5.6 in NPNF Vol.1:103) came to the realization that that which 
is incorruptible is better than that which is corruptible, and therefore God 
being incorruptible is perfect and the most Good, God. St. Augustine’s (in 
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Confessions  7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 in NPNF Vol.1:103-104) discussion on the 
topic can be outlined in the following way: 
 God is Goodness itself, utterly and entirely better than the things that 
he/she has created.  
 To be corrupted is not good.  
 Therefore, the substance that is corruptible cannot be God. 
Thus, the goodness of God implies incorruptibility. From Platonius, St. 
Augustine was able to develop his understanding of God, by establishing a 
metaphysical perception of reality based on his understanding of creation 
that formulates a basis for a solution to the problem of evil that God cannot 
create evil. 
However, many tackle the problem of evil by addressing the origin of evil 
through promoting the following syllogism, (i.e. a process of logic in which 
two general statements lead to a particular conclusion):  
 God created all things.  
 Evil is a thing. 
 Therefore, God created evil.  
If the first two statements are true then the formulation, if sustained, is 
devastating for Christianity. God therefore cannot be good if he/she 
knowingly created evil. 
St. Augustine realized that the solution to this problem was not to ask where 
evil originated but rather what is evil? The correct procedure, as he explains, 
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is first to discover the nature of evil and then to investigate its origin. In 
proceeding to question the nature or the “what” of evil, St. Augustine (in 
Confessions  7.5.7 in NPNF Vol. I:19) asks more specifically: What is the 
metaphysical nature of evil? Does evil exist as a separate entity and does it 
have being? If so, what is the nature of the being which evil might possess? 
Is evil a substance, perhaps an immaterial substance? Or is it something 
entirely without substance, perhaps the opposite of substance, and hence, 
the negation of Being itself, as Plotinus thought?  Thus St. Augustine’s 
preference for inquiring into the “what” before the “whence,” can seemingly 
be traced to the Enneads of Plotinus. Plotinus (In Ennead 8.1)8 writes:  
Those enquiring whence Evil enters into beings, or rather into a certain 
order of beings, would be making the best beginning if they established, 
first of all, what precisely Evil is, what constitutes its Nature. At once we 
should know whence it comes, where it has its native seat and where it 
is present merely as an accident; and there would be no further 
question as to whether it has Authentic–Existence. 
  
Using this as a starting point, Plotinus (in Ennead 8.4)9 characterizes the 
“what” of evil, as the privation of good and a pure lack of it. Adding to the 
challenge of responding to the question of the origin of evil is the obligation 
for St. Augustine, as a Christian, to preserve the traditional attributes of God, 
especially God’s omnipotence and immutability, as well as the goodness of 
creation. 
The syllogism above stated that evil is a thing. However, for St. Augustine 
evil is not a "thing" because “things” require creating. For St. Augustine, then, 
                                         
8
 http://www.davemckay.co.uk/philosophy/plotinus/plotinus.php?name=enneads.08 
9
 http://www.davemckay.co.uk/philosophy/plotinus/plotinus.php?name=enneads.08 
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evil did not require creating. Therefore, St. Augustine’s understanding of the 
source of evil will take another direction. For St. Augustine God is good and 
because God is good he/she is incapable of creating evil. In order to show 
how St. Augustine comes to the understanding that God did not create evil, 
one must begin with the premise that God created all things good meaning 
perfect and evil is not good. It therefore can be stated in the following ways:  
 All things that God created are good. 
 Evil is not good. 
 Therefore, God did not create evil.  
Second:  
 God created everything. 
 God did not create evil. 
 Therefore, evil is not a thing.  
St. Augustine thus sees evil as not a created thing but rather a deviation from 
that which is good – which he refers to as the privation of good, as will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.1.2. Privation of Good 
For St. Augustine matter is something essentially good, but it is also 
something that is able to deviate from what it should be. Thus for St. 
Augustine the notion of “evil” must now be understood as the privatio boni 
(“privation of good”), or that which occurs when a person renounces their 
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proper role in the order and structure of creation. St. Augustine thus frames 
his discussion about evil within the context of the nature of God and creation. 
As indicated earlier, for St. Augustine (in Confessions 7 2.3, 5.7 in NPNF Vol. 
I:103-109) God is Goodness itself, and the highest or most pure being, who 
is immutable and not susceptible to corruption or degradation. All other things 
that existed according to St. Augustine (in Confessions 12.7.7 in NPNF Vol. 
I:177) were created by God ex nihilo. According to St. Augustine, (in 
Confessions XII. XII.15 in NPNF Vol. I:179) this by no means infers that 
creation is derived out of God’s own substance. This then would mean that 
creation would be equivalent to God. Nor does Augustine imply that there is a 
substance called “nothing” from which God created. Unlike humanity, God 
does not require any material out of which to create; God is omnipotent and 
as such He is able to create out of nothing from that which had no existence 
at all. St. Augustine (in Concerning The Nature Of Good, Against The 
Manicheans in NPNF Vol. IV:351) articulates the immutability of God very 
clearly by stating:   
The highest good beyond, that which there is no higher is God and 
consequently he/she is unchangeable good, hence truly eternal, truly 
immortal. All other good things derive their origin from him/her but are 
not part of him/her. For what is of him/her is him/herself. And 
consequently if he/she alone is unchangeable, all things that he/she has 
made is changeable because he/she made them of nothing. For he/she 
is so omnipotent that even out of nothing, that our of what is absolutely 
non-existent, he/she is able to make good things, great and small, 
celestial and terrestrial, spiritual and corporeal. Because he/she is also 
just, he/she has not those things that he/she made out of nothing  on an 
equality with that which he/she begat out of him/herself.  Because, 
therefore, no good things whether great or small through whatever 
gradation of thing can exist except from God (italics added). 
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For St. Augustine (in Confessions 12.7.7 in NPNF in Vol. I:177) God created 
everything out of formless matter, and this formless matter was created out of 
nothing. Therefore (in Confessions 12.7.7 in NPNF in Vol. I:177), because 
one good God brought everything into existence, everything created by God 
is also good. However, according to St. Augustine, things are not created out 
of God, but by God out of nothing. Therefore creation cannot be equal to God 
or to his supreme goodness but they approximate to the supreme good. This 
then begs the question: If all things are created good, how can one speak of 
evil?  
The answer for St. Augustine (in Enchridon 11 and 12)10 resides in the nature 
of the created being, the absence of good.  Based on his Neoplatonic 
understanding of the nature of God, God is the only being that is perfectly 
good, eternal and unchangeable. Because created beings are but an 
approximate of the Good, they are capable of decreasing and increasing 
because their created nature is susceptible to change. It is this change from 
a state of goodness which a created being was intended to possess – a 
degree of goodness with which it was created – to a lesser state of goodness 
that St. Augustine defines as evil or the privation of good.  
St. Augustine (in Confessions 7.10.18 in NPNF Vol. I:110) further clarifies the 
relationship of privation to the good, by stating: 
And it was made clear unto me that those things which yet are 
corrupted, which, neither were they supremely good, nor unless they 
were good, could be corrupted; because if supremely good, they were 
corruptible, and if not good at all, there was nothing in them to be 
corrupted . For corruption harms, but unless it could diminish goodness, 
                                         
10 http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1302.htm 
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it could not harm. Either, then, corruption harms not, which cannot be; 
or, what is most certain, all which is corrupted is deprived of good, they 
will cease to be. 
 
So far, then, St. Augustine’s interpretation of the “what” of evil can be 
outlined as such: 
 God is supremely and unchangeably good. 
 God created all things. 
 Because the things created by God are created by him/her (out of 
nothing), as opposed to being created from him/her (from his 
nature) they are good, but they are not supremely nor 
unchangeably good. 
 Since created things are not immutably good, the good in created 
things can be diminished and increased. 
 Evil is the diminution (deprivation, corruption, etc.), of good in a 
created thing. 
So one can conclude that if things are deprived of all good, they cease 
altogether to be; and this means that as long as they are, they are good. 
Reiterating this point that evil is not a thing, St. Augustine (in Confessions 
3.7.12 in NPNF Vol. I:63) explains that evil is nothing but the removal 
[privation] of good until finally no good remains. Thus, for St. Augustine evil is 
not a thing or a substance because God created everything and it was good. 
It can also be stated then that God made everything good and that there is 
no evil thing. The evil that exists does not exist in and of itself but rather as a 
corruption or privation of good things, which was made by God. Therefore, 
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St. Augustine ( in On the Nature of Good 6)11 concludes: “But if corruption 
takes away all measure, all form, all order from corruptible things, no nature 
will remain. And consequently every nature which cannot be corrupted is the 
highest good, as is God. But every nature that can be corrupted is also itself 
some good; for corruption cannot injure it, except by taking away from or 
diminishing that which is good.”  
Thus stating that evil is a privation is not the same as saying that it is a mere 
absence or negation of good; or that metaphysical evil is not a mere negation 
or unreality as assumed by Griffin (2004). From these passages, one can 
conclude that: 
 Every actual entity is good; a greater good if it cannot be corrupted 
(God), and a lesser good if it can be (all created being). 
 Only those things that are good (but not supremely good) can 
become corrupt or evil. 
 Where there is evil, there is a corresponding corruption of the good. 
 Where there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. 
 As long as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it 
is being deprived. 
 If, however, the corruption comes to be total, there is no good left, 
because it is no longer an entity at all. 
                                         
11
 http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1407.htm 
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 Corruption, then, cannot consume the good without also consuming 
itself. 
If God is the creator of all things good, then where did the privation in human 
nature come from? What or who caused the corruption of these natures? St. 
Augustine’s answer to this question is twofold. 
First, God is supreme, incorruptible and good. St. Augustine (in On The 
Moral Of The Manichees. 9.24 in NPNF Vol. IV:73) states that God cannot 
create anything evil because God is the source and standard of all perfection, 
and God cannot be less than fully perfect. God is simple perfection, and an 
absolutely simple being cannot be destroyed. Since God is infinite and 
without composition, he/she cannot be torn apart or decompose – but this is 
not so with creation. Therefore, every created thing is composed and thus by 
nature decomposable. For St. Augustine (in On the Nature of Good 1)12 
anything of God is good, and there is only one that is good, God. All other 
things are from God but not of God. “The highest good, than which there is 
no higher, is God, and consequently He is unchangeable good, hence truly 
eternal and truly immortal. All other good things are only from Him, not of 
Him.” So creation is not out of God (ex Deo) but rather out of nothing (ex 
nihilo). Thus, creation makes evil possible (but not a necessity) since 
anything that is created can be destroyed or deprived. But the precise nature 
of God is such that he/she cannot be the author or cause of evil. 
Second, St. Augustine argues that evil entered the world because of the 
wrong choices of free beings (free in the sense that there was no external 
                                         
12
 http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1407.htm 
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force necessitating them to do wrong). In other words, corruption occurred 
because of the use of our free will. According to St. Augustine (in The City of 
God 12.6 in NPNF Vol. I:104), when the will abandons what is above itself, 
and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil – not because that is evil to which 
it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. This not only absolves God 
of creating evil but also allows him to show the world his love by bringing 
Christ into the world.  This articulation of St. Augustine’s approach 
emphasises the use of free will claims that for God to create a person who 
could only have performed good actions would have been logically 
impossible. He goes on to say that God created free creatures, but he/she 
cannot cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if God does so, 
humans are not free after all as reflected (in Confessions 7.5 in NPNF Vol. 
I:105): 
Some people see with perfect truth that a creature is better if, while 
possessing free will, it remains always fixed upon God and never sins; 
then reflecting on men’s sins, they are grieved, not because they 
continue to sin but because they were created. They say: He should 
have made us such that we never willed to sin, but always to enjoy the 
unchangeable truth. They should not lament or be angry. God has not 
compelled men to sin just because He created them and gave them the 
power to choose. Such is the generosity of God’s goodness that he/she 
has not refrained from creating even that creature which, he foreknew 
would not only sin, but remain in the will to sin (italic added). 
 
Therefore, God is neither responsible for evil nor guilty of negligence for 
not intervening. St. Augustine acknowledges the reality of his own will in 
the Confessions. Here, in attempting to determine the cause of evil, St. 
Augustine (in Confessions 7.5 in NPNF Vol. I:104) states: “I directed my 
attention to discern what I now heard, that free will was the cause of our 
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doing evil.”  Not only is St. Augustine certain that he has a will, but when 
he chooses to do something that can be characterized as either bad or 
good, he knows that it is his will that is the cause of his bad or good 
action. 
This acknowledgement that will is freely able to choose between sin and right 
action, happiness or unhappiness, is the starting point for St. Augustine’s 
explanation of the origination of evil. Geisler (2003:157) states that one of the 
clearest definitions St. Augustine provides for what he means by the word 
“will” is in On Two Souls, Against the Manicheans. Here, in attempting to 
defend the freedom of the will against the Manichaean view that human 
beings sin necessarily because of the evil element trapped within their 
bodies, St. Augustine (in On Two Souls, Against the Manichean in NPNF Vol. 
IV: 103) defines the will as a movement of mind, no one compelling, either for 
not losing or for obtaining something. St. Augustine clarifies his definition by 
stating that when we will something, our mind is moved toward it and we 
obtain it or we do not obtain it. If we do obtain it then we will to retain it and if 
we do not obtain it then we move to acquire it.  
Thomas Aquinas (in Summa Theologica, 1.2.79.3)13 also speaks of this 
recurrent theme of human action: 
But sin can be called a being and an action only in the sense that 
something is missing. And that missing element comes from a created 
cause, i.e. the free will in its departure from the First Agent who is God. 
Accordingly, this defect is not ascribed to God as its cause, but to free 
will, just as a limp in a cripple comes from his deformity and not from 
the power to move even though this power enables him to move.   
                                         
13
  http://newadvent/summa/2079.htm 
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What then is the metaphysical origin of evil? For St. Augustine there is none. 
Metaphysical evil is nothing and therefore requires no cause. However, 
Griffin (1992:210-211) seems to imply that St. Augustine’s privation of evil 
results in making evil an illusion. He goes on to say that St. Augustine denied 
the existence of genuine evil. For St. Augustine the metaphysical problem is 
moral. Free choice is the source of the corruption of the good that God made. 
Since human beings are finite and have the freedom to choose, they are 
capable of choosing evil. This wrong use of freedom brings about evil. 
Plantinga (1974) justifies God’s permitting of evil by reiterating the views of 
St. Augustine. Neither the sins nor the misery are necessary for the 
perfection to the universe, but souls as such are necessary, which have the 
power to sin if they so will, and become miserable if they sin. If misery 
persisted after their sin had been abolished, or if there were misery before 
there were sin, then it might be right to say that the order and government of 
the universe were at fault. Again, if there were sin but no consequent misery, 
that order is equally dishonored by lack of equality 
He states that a good universe requires the existence of free thinking and 
moral agents; and some of the free creatures that God created made wrong 
choices. Thus, a universe containing free creatures and the evil they commit 
is better than a universe that contains neither free creatures nor this evil. 
Thus, attempting to explain “God’s way to man”, Plantinga (1974) states that 
St. Augustine claims that God could create a better, perfect universe by not 
permitting evil to occur and that he/she could by refusing to do so. This 
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shows that God is just in permitting evil. In keeping with the Augustinian 
tradition, Anthony Haig (2006) states that the essence of free will theodicy is 
the claim that God created creatures who are genuinely free in some highly 
desirable sense, but who are also capable of choosing evil. It is then argued 
that the good that comes from creating such genuinely free creatures 
outweighs the cost of the various evils that will result.  
Geisler (1978: 49) states that it is worthwhile to ask how evil arose. For St. 
Augustine, evil is the corruption that arises when that which is good but 
potentially corruptible turns away from the infinite good of the Creator to that 
which is lesser. Thus evil is not metaphysically caused, but metaphysical evil 
arises when a creature considers his/her own finite good more important than 
the Creator’s. It then can be concluded that free choice is good, but the 
misdirection of free choice is evil. Evil therefore is not the striving after the 
evil nature but the abandonment of the better nature. While evil is not 
metaphysically caused, I conclude that metaphysical evil comes about when 
moral pride occurs, because human beings considered their own finite good 
more important than the Creator’s. 
 
2.2. The Irenaean Theodicy  
 
 
Despite the dominance of the Augustinian theodicy within the Catholic and 
Protestant (which includes Evangelicals) Christian traditions, there has been 
a minority that holds to an Irenaean theodicy. St. Irenaeus (130-202 AD) 
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taught that the existence of evil actually serves a purpose. The Irenaean 
tradition is older in its development than that of the Augustinian theodicy, 
while at the same time newer because of the reformulations of this theodicy 
by philosophers like John Hick over the last century. John Hick (1981: 217-
218) states that in the past myth and theology have been closely intertwined, 
making it difficult for theologians to separate myth from history and science. 
The Augustinian theodicy that continued substantially unchanged within the 
Roman Catholic Church was also adopted by the Reformers and went 
unchallenged within Protestant doctrine until one hundred years ago. This 
distinguishing of myth from history had a profound impact on St. Augustine’s 
theodicy. Hick (1981: 219) believes that the creation narrative including the 
fall of man is a myth; a myth as understood by Hick “only functions to illumine 
by means of unforgettable imagery the religious significance of some present 
or remembered experience”. Thus, when this pictorial presentation is taken 
as fact to solve the problem of evil, the solution, Hick (1981:219) believes, 
“suffer(s) from profound incoherencies and contradictions”. Hick (1981: 220) 
states that the incoherence of St. Augustine’s theodicy begins with evil 
having its origins in the fall of humanity, which is inconsistent with the 
eruption of sin in the supposedly perfect angels. Hick (1981:220) goes on to 
argue that God had in effect predetermined Adam and Eve’s rebellion by 
withholding from them the assurance of eternal bliss which he/she had given 
the angels, who did not sin. Thus he states that the myth mistakenly 
understood as serving as a theodicy brings in another concept: that of 
absolute divine predestination. For Hicks this only leads the Augustine 
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theodicy to contradict itself. Hick elaborates that the original intent of 
Augustine’s theodicy was to blame evil upon the misuse of free will. But this 
abuse of free will is said to fall under God’s divine predestined decrees, 
which collapses the theodicy into radical incoherence. Thus there is a 
necessity according to Hick for another and better way. Irenaean theodicy 
does not regard humans as having been created by God in a finished state, 
as finitely perfect beings fulfilling the divine purpose for their human 
existence and then falling disastrously away from this. Instead, it understands 
human beings as still being in the process of creation. Using Genesis 1:26, 
St. Irenaeus (in Against Heresies 5.6.1 in ANF Vol. I: 531) comments that 
when God said “Let us make man in our own image, after our own likeness”, 
this suggests a distinction between image and likeness. He views humans as 
personal and moral beings who already exist in the image of God, but have 
not yet come into the likeness of God. According to Hick (1981:223), St. 
Irenaeus means by likeness “something more than a personal existence as 
such; he means a certain valuable quality of personal life which reflects 
finitely the divine life”. This theodicy is both developmental and teleological. 
This represents the perfecting of humans, the fulfillment of God’s plan for 
humanity through a hazardous adventure in individual freedom (Hick 
1981:225). This journey within the life of each individual comes into 
perfection through the doing of evil as well as good. From his point of view, 
evil provides the necessary platform through which we take part in what Hick 
(1981:40) calls “person-making”. It follows that evil is a means to an end in 
the sense that, if it did not exist, there would be no means of spiritual 
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development. So, the foundational principle of the theodicy of St. Irenaeus is 
that we have been placed in a hostile environment in order to learn to 
become better people. According to this view, God uses the pains and 
sufferings of the world as a method of producing a truly good person. God 
could have created us perfect beings, but God is more interested in our 
choosing to become who God wants us to be (at some point), instead of 
forcing us to be this way (no matter how long this takes). Leibniz explained 
the existence of human suffering by saying that God allows it temporarily for 
the greater good (cited in Stumpf 1989:257). Leibniz,14 like Plato and St. 
Irenaeus, maintained that everything in the universe was explicable, and that 
God must indeed create the best while allowing suffering temporarily for the 
greater good of his creation (cited in Stumpf 1989:64-67). Another modern 
adherent to this position is Philip Quinn. Quinn (1982:199-215), like Leibniz, 
argues that we cannot know the effect of removing certain evils in the world 
since we cannot see the world from an infinite perspective. Hick (1966), in his 
proposed “soul/person making” theodicy, views suffering not as evil but 
rather as a necessary stage in the development of a relatively immature 
creation into a more mature state. Following St. Irenaeus, Hick does not 
consider that suffering in the world is the result of a fall from a once-perfect 
state but rather sees suffering as a process that will bring about a gradual 
improvement in the human race. Hick (1981:25) sees humans as endowed 
                                         
14
 Leibniz has been considered the foremost spokesman of optimism and rationalism. His 
view of evil as an instrument to work for cosmic good is known as the “best-of–all-possible-
world” solution. God is the best of all possible beings. The best of all possible being cannot 
do less that His best. God’s nature at best demands that he makes the best possible world (if 
He wills to make one). This world is the world that God made. Therefore, it is the best of all 
possible worlds  (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/). 
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with a real but limited freedom that enables a relationship with God through 
which they can find fulfilment. This relationship gives meaning to our human 
existence “as long as the process, through which we are being created by 
our free responses to life’s mixture of good and evil, ultimately leads to 
good”. This then is the point for St. Irenaeus/Hicks’ theodicy, in trying to apply 
the realities of sin and suffering to the perfect goodness and love of the all-
powerful Creator. This theodicy is eschatological in its outlook. Instead of 
looking to the past for answers to the origin of evil, it looks to the future as its 
position to provide a solution to the problem of evil. Understanding the divine 
purpose working through the affairs of humanity, towards the fulfilment that 
lies in the future, this theodicy finds the meaning of evil in the outworking of 
that purpose that leads to a better person. The good that outshines all evil is 
not a paradise long since lost but a kingdom that is yet to come in its full glory 
and permanence, and that has been revealed in and through Christ Jesus 
(Hick 1981:229). 
 
2.3. Protest Theodicy  
 
The Protest theodicy of John K. Roth15 has been largely shaped by the 
Jewish response to the Holocaust. Roth is influenced by the works of Elie 
                                         
15
 “John K. Roth is the Edward J. Sexton Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and the Founding Director 
of the Center for the Study of the Holocaust, Genocide, and Human Rights (now the Center for Human 
Rights Leadership) at Claremont McKenna College, where he taught from 1966 through 2006. In 2007-
2008, he served as the Robert and Carolyn Frederick Distinguished Visiting Professor of Ethics at 
DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana. In addition to service on the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Council and on the editorial board for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, he has published 
hundreds of articles and reviews and authored, co-authored, or edited more than forty books, including 
Genocide and Human Rights: A Philosophical Guide; Gray Zones: Ambiguity and Compromise in the 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Wiesel, a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust, who, like Moses, acknowledges 
God’s sovereignty but argues with him and for the sake of his people puts 
God on trial. Thus, this theodicy attempts to reconcile God’s existence with 
the presence of evil and suffering in the world, by asking: Why doesn't God 
do something? The starting point of this theodicy engages that God could 
and should do something to prevent evil and suffering from occurring in the 
world. For John Roth, the problem of evil and suffering begins here. As far as 
Roth is concerned, God’s (traditionally) supposed sovereignty (control over 
everything) and omnipotence (power to do anything) means God could and 
should be able to do something about evil and suffering, but must clearly not 
want to. In fact, Roth goes so far as to say that God's persistent inactivity 
means that God is directly responsible for evil and suffering occurring, and 
that the only reasonable response from us should be to protest to God that 
enough is enough. Roth (1981:10-11) also believes the wrong image of God, 
which suggests that God is benevolent (all-good) and always available to do 
the best for us, must be reconsidered in light of the “horrendous historical 
consequences”. Roth states (1981:11): “W the slaughter-benches (make) 
God’s luxury wasteful. No matter what horn of the dilemma is seized, any 
way in which God could rationally justify his/her economy purely as cost-
effective in pursuing goodness that humans can appreciate W well, those are 
                                                                                                                   
Holocaust and Its Aftermath; and Ethics During and After the Holocaust: In the Shadow of Birkenau. 
With Peter Hayes, Roth is currently editing the Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies for the Oxford 
University Press. Roth has been Visiting Professor of Holocaust studies at the University of Haifa, 
Israel, and his Holocaust-related research appointments have included a 2001 Koerner Visiting 
Fellowship at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies in England as well as a 2004-05 
appointment as the Ina Levine Invitational Scholar at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. In 1988, Roth was named U.S. National 
Professor of the Year by the Council for Advancement and Support of Education and the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching”.  
http://www.paragonhouse.com/manufacturers.php?manufacturerid=174. 
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beyond imagining. This result testifies that such a wasteful God cannot be 
totally benevolent” (italics added). As far as Roth is concerned, God has 
done too little for too long, especially when one considers the numerous and 
extensive atrocities committed by humanity to humanity over the course of 
history. This will bring into focus how Roth views evil. 
 
2.3.1. Evil as waste   
While most Christians see evil as that which works against the intended 
purposes of God, Roth defines evil as waste. In relation to the understanding 
of the problem of evil and suffering, Roth (1981:8) understands evil as 
“activity and sometimes, inactivity and therefore it is the manifestation of 
power. Evil power displays are those that waste. That is evil happens 
whenever power ruins or squanders, or it fails to frustrate those results”. Roth 
considers the amount of “waste” in the world to be the standard by which one 
can assess the level of good and bad in individuals, societies or even God. 
The greater the amount of evil and suffering, the greater the amount of 
“waste”. Roth does not see evil or suffering as bringing out the greater good 
as projected by St. Irenaeus and Hick. For Roth the senseless deaths and 
suffering during the Holocaust were just the senseless waste of human life. 
This is how Roth defines the notion of evil. For Roth there has been too much 
waste over the years, and as the perpetrator of such waste, God must be 
held liable. 
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2.3.2. Omnipotence of God 
Roth (1981:16) believes in an omnipotent God: “W that is God is bound by 
his/her will. Nothing except it determines what he/she shall do or become.” 
All possibilities to change the course of history and the ability to stop this 
“waste” is within the reach of God, but it seems that God is not interested in 
doing anything other than allowing misery to inflict this world. Although God 
has the ability to intervene at any point in present history, he/she chooses to 
allow freedom to work its own course as it lives in individuals and 
communities. Thus, Roth (1981:16) sees “God’s plan as virtually no plan at 
all”. He (1981:16) goes on to state that while God could determine the future 
he/she declines to do so, thus making human freedom reality. God also 
commits him/herself to that which took place in the past, being bound by 
his/her own lack of intervention to that which has taken place. And so 
everything hinges on the fact that God, who is all-powerful, fails to use 
his/her power well enough to intervene in history to make the course less 
wasteful. Thus, in spite of God’s sovereignty, Roth (1981:16) concludes that 
“God is everlastingly guilty”. Protest theodicy therefore presents us with the 
choice of either a God who is deprived of some power, or one who is less 
than good; a God who is innocent but ineffectual, or one who is all-powerful 
but less benevolent. Roth favours the latter version of God, for the simple 
reason that, like Job, the one suffering can be said to have an opportunity to 
state his/her case before God in the hope that God will change things 
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around. Thus for Roth a finite God has nothing to offer in making things 
better.  
2.3.3. An evaluation of Roth’s theodicy 
Roth states that most theodicies have a fatal flaw, i.e. “legitimate evil”, 
because they suggest that either suffering is deserved, or that all things are 
working towards some greater good. Roth rejects both these approaches, 
and in doing so regards his theodicy of protest as more of an anti-theodicy. 
For him, nothing can justify all the evil and suffering going on in the world, 
and the responsibility for it all lies squarely with God. Therefore, as Roth sees 
it, for too long now there has been an emphasis on the love of God at the 
expense of a real response to the problem of evil and suffering.  
Roth’s protest theodicy affirms the traditional understanding of God’s 
omnipotence and omniscience, he digresses from the classical 
understanding of a perfect God when he revises or limits the attribute of 
God’s goodness, thus calling into question the perfection of God. Davis 
(1981:22) states that Roth’s theodicy involves giving up something that is 
central to Scripture and Christian tradition, namely the belief that God is 
perfect, morally good, just and holy. To limit God’s moral goodness portrays 
God as having a dark side that allows or causes evil. Since Roth, believes in 
a God who is all-powerful with all possibilities within his reach, he has yet to 
give an answer as to why redeeming evil is not a possibility that will be 
achieved by God or whether one day God will indeed redeem all evil. The 
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hope of the Christian faith lies in the affirmation that in the future God will 
intervene and restore and redeem humanity from all evil. 
 
2.4. Process Theodicy  
 
The idea that God changes in diverse ways as a result of his/her relationship 
to the world is the main distinctive of process thought. The founder of this 
movement, philosopher Alfred North Whitehead distinguished the two 
aspects of divine nature. He understood the nature of God as being 
“dipolar”16  
Process philosophy concerns itself with what exists in the world and with the 
terms of reference in which this reality is to be understood and explained 
(metaphysics). The task of metaphysics is, after all, to provide a cogent and 
plausible account of the nature of reality at the broadest, most synoptic and 
comprehensive level. In addition, it is to this task of enabling us to 
characterize, describe, clarify and explain the most general features of the 
“real” that process philosophy addresses itself in its own characteristic way. 
The guiding idea of its approach is that natural existence consists of and is 
best understood in terms of processes rather than things – of modes of 
change rather than fixed stabilities. Process philosophers see change of 
every sort – physical, organic, psychological – as the pervasive and 
                                         
16
  This will be further discussed in Chapter 3 under Alfred North Whitehead. 
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predominant feature of the real17 that Charles Hartshorne refers to as “neo-
classical metaphysics”. This is metaphysics not of “being” or “substances” but 
in which events are leading to ultimate reality that is in a state of dynamic 
process. The basic unity of reality is an individual unit of becoming, or a 
process of feeling or an actual entity. It is this interplay between actual 
entities that forms the “process” as expounded by Whitehead, the system 
behind the intuition that the cosmos is “alive”. Things change in the world and 
everything is on the move. God, the envisioner of possibilities, brings this 
process into being. The nineteenth century absolute idealist philosopher 
Hegel (1967:789-808) suggests that God developed consciousness through 
dialectical movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. This result is a 
breakdown of the divine transcendence into the phenomenological realities of 
the historical process. For absolute idealist philosophers of the nineteenth 
century, God cannot be conscious of something that does not exist. For 
consciousness to be possible there must first be an object of consciousness. 
Thus the question is asked, how can God know the future if the future does 
not exist as an object of consciousness? Thus, according to the Hegelian 
tradition God is in some respects conditioned by the elements of temporality 
we call the “future” (Bush, 2008:780).  God is therefore understood as a 
cosmic individual whose consciousness dawns and progresses as God 
experience the present reality. Theologians who derive their philosophical 
influences from process philosophy attempt to understand God and the 
problem of evil from the view that reality is changing and that God also 
                                         
17
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/ 
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changes or is developing. According to Diehl (l996), another common 
argument from process theology includes, the notion of God’s “dipolarity” 
(God has two natures) and the notion that God is integrally involved in the 
endless process of the world. God has a “primordial” or transcendent nature, 
God’s timeless perfection of character; and God also has a “consequent” or 
immanent nature by which God is part of the cosmic process itself. This 
process is “epochal”, i.e., not according to the motion of atoms or changeless 
substances but by events or units of creative experience, which influence one 
another in temporal sequence. Process theologians argue that the reality of 
God is not fixed and that God is still developing.  
Whitehead in Process and Reality (1978:31) views God as “bipolar” – a term 
that is used to describe God as having two “poles”: one mental and one 
physical, or one eternal (potential) and one temporal (actual). The potential 
pole (mind of God) is the order of all that can be, and the actual pole (his 
body) is the order of all that is. The potential pole is both absolute and 
eternal, but the actual pole is relative and temporal. God is then actually finite 
but potentially infinite. Thus, process theologians see humanity as “created 
co-creators” with God. The creation itself is seen as a co-operation between 
God and all other beings. Thus they can be considered panentheists18. For 
them God is in the world attaining perfection successively and endlessly 
because of his/her interaction with humanity. As a result, God is limited by 
conditions from the outside. While process theists affirm divine love, they 
                                         
18
 Panentheism must not be confused with pantheism. Pantheism means all is God, but 
panentheism means “all in God”. For a summarized explanation on panentheism see 
Bakers Encyclopaedia of Christian Apologetic 576-579. 
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reconstruct divine power because the concept of the omnipotence of God 
leads to considerable difficulties. Griffin (2004:298) states that process 
theodicy is based upon a perception that there are metaphysical principles 
that are beyond even divine decision. According to Whitehead (1978:32-33), 
this metaphysical principle is itself the “principle of limitation” as God relates 
to the actual (metaphysical). The conclusion here is that God’s perfect power 
is best conceived in relation to human beings. Thus God is limited, at least to 
some degree, by others who possess power of their own. Because of the 
limitation of God’s divine power, process theists do not believe that God is 
accountable for failing to prevent evil or suffering but rather see any suffering 
in creation as also undergone by God.  
 
2.4.1. An Evaluation of Process Theodicy 
The process theism of Whitehead and Hartshorne does indeed deal with the 
problem of evil, but to the extent of limiting God’s power and knowledge. The 
process theist critic of classical theism possesses its own challenges. If God 
lacks the power to actualize his/her own end in the world, how can process 
theists be certain that the good will eventually be achieved? If God’s power is 
curtailed in order to absolve him/her of responsibility for evil, then the 
guarantee of the ultimate triumph of good is also jeopardised. Madden and 
Hare (1968:117) elaborate on this more clearly: 
According to the process theist natural events do not thwart (God) but 
are occasions for God to exercise his/her creative power, but they still 
must admit that on this view the matter of God is still limited in the 
sense that God neither creates nor wholly controls actual occasions. 
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Moreover, if God does not wholly control actual occasions, it is difficult 
to see how there is any real assurance of the ultimate triumph of good. 
The two elements of traditional theism reinforce each other. The 
unlimited power of God insures the triumph of good, and the latter 
requires the notion of God’s unlimited power. The mutual reinforcement 
however is wholly lacking in Whitehead’s system. The absence points 
up a fundamental difficulty with this quasi theism. 
 
Thus, Madden and Hare implies that divine power is coercive. This coercive 
power directly influences the outcome, since the process must conform to its 
control. According to the process theist, persuasive power operates more 
indirectly, for it is effective in determining the outcomes only to the extent that 
the process appropriates and reaffirms for itself the aims envisioned in the 
persuasion. Thus, God’s control is limited by the existence of evil in the 
world. Process theists conclude that God possesses no coercive power; only 
God’s persuasive power will be actualized because of his limited knowledge 
of the actual decision that will be taken by the creature. Thus unlimited power 
and knowledge is incompatible with divine perfection. Whitehead (1978: 342) 
argues that traditional theism has fashioned God into the image of the 
Egyptian, Persian and Roman imperial rulers. He goes on to complain that 
the church gave in to the attributes of God that belonged exclusively to 
Caesar, which he sees as a deeper idolatry. However Sontag (1982:123) 
argues against Whitehead, holding that Greek thought influenced classical 
theism and that it is process thought or theodicy that takes us back to an 
ancient notion of a limited God. This is necessary because one of the major 
discussions of process theodicy has been the supposed borrowing of Greek 
notions by early Christian theologians to develop the divine perfection of 
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God. The early church fathers held to the omnipotence of God and rejected 
Plato’s limited deity. 
According to Ford (1992:249), God’s persuasive power, maximizes human 
freedom, respecting the integrity of each creature in the very act of guiding 
that creature’s development towards greater freedom. According to process 
theologians, the image of God as a craftsman, the “cosmic watchmaker” 
must be abandoned. They see God as a gardener in the vineyard of the 
world, fostering and nurturing its continuing evolutionary growth throughout 
ages. God is seen as a companion and friend, who inspire us to achieve the 
very best within us. Thus, God creates by persuading the world to create 
itself. And so the process theists reason for a broader understanding of 
persuasive power, because a lack of this understanding will lead either to 
divine determination or pure chance.  
The respective role of God as far as his/her knowledge is concerned can be 
now summarized as follows: God is omniscient, by knowing as actual 
everything that is actual and knowing as possible everything that is possible. 
However, process theologians state that God cannot know as actual what is 
not actualized or possible. This perception has ramifications in theology 
where God’s foreknowledge and immutability is limited in favour of creaturely 
freedom (Shaw, 2000:440). 
Evil is therefore recalcitrant, and no final victory over it is possible. Whitehead 
(1978:341) concludes:  
In our cosmological construction we are, therefore left with the final 
opposites joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction- 
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that is to say, the many in one- flux and permanence, greatness and 
triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the World. 
 
Since God is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, even God does not know 
how the world process will eventuate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have set the stage to show the development of open theism 
by discussing the approaches taken in trying to articulate a theological 
response to the problem of evil and ending with process thought or process 
theodicy. Process theodicy is not a solution to the traditional problem of evil, 
but rather a denial that there is such a problem, because one cannot 
reconcile the fact of the problem of evil with faith in a God who is limited in 
power.  Process theologian understand the omniscience and power of God 
differently from evangelicals. Process theologians view God as being who is 
conditioned by events and is essentially temporal. God in this view then does 
not have the power to deal with the problem of evil because as God 
influences the world, the world also influences God.  The next chapter deals 
with philosophical influences that gave rise to open theism (which is the child 
of process thought) within evangelicalism. 
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Chapter Three 
Overview of  Open Theism 
Introduction 
The question of the influence of open theism on the evangelical theological 
dialogue is a crucial one. It is acknowledged that open theism is a debate 
about divine foreknowledge initiated by the belief that God does not know the 
future fully. This limiting of God’s knowledge is a reworking of historic and 
orthodox theology. However, because open theists oppose the exhaustive 
knowledge of God, it is imperative to focus on the precursors who held to the 
view that God’s knowledge is limited. Therefore, this section will focus on the 
various schools of thought in philosophy and theology over the centuries 
(more specifically process theology and process philosophy) that influenced 
the open theists’ understanding of God’s knowledge against the long tradition 
of a positive affirmation of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. This chapter will 
endeavour to prove that the limiting of God’s knowledge does not have its 
origins in orthodox Christianity but is influenced primarily by philosophers 
outside of Christianity. Evangelicals traditionally hold to the view that God is 
infinite in knowledge. 
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3.1 Precursors to Open Theism  
3.1. 1. Aristotle 
 
 
 
The parallel between the teachings of Aristotle and open theism for this 
investigation is a critical position to start at. In On Interpretations19 Aristotle 
considers the truth status of various kinds of propositions. A proposition must 
be either true or false, according to what has been labeled the law of the 
excluded middle. When it comes to an analysis of propositions about the 
future, however, there is a problem. For if it is the case that a certain result 
will occur or not occur, Aristotle (in On Interpretation 9)20 states:  
There would be no need to deliberate or to take the trouble, on the 
supposition that if we adopt a certain course, a certain result would 
follow, while if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may 
predict an event ten thousand years before hand, and another may 
predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the 
past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time.  
 
For Aristotle if these predictions are correct, then the occurrence is a matter 
of necessity. This for Aristotle21 leads to an impossible conclusion:  
For both predictions and actions are causative with regards to the 
future, and that, to speak more generally, in those things which are not 
continuously actual there is a potential in either direction. So such 
things may either be or not be; events may either take place or may not 
take placeW. For in the case of that which exists potentiality in either 
direction, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists 
actually does not hold good. 
 
                                         
19
  http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.1.1.html 
20
 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.1.1.html 
21
 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.1.1.html 
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While there have been a variety of interpretations of Aristotle’s argument 
about the future, most philosophers take this as a reductio ad absurdum. 
Kenny (1979:2) explains this as follows:  
If the future-tensed propositions about singulars were already true, then 
fatalism would occur. But fatalism is absurd; therefore, since many 
future events are not yet determined, statements about such events are 
not yet determined; statements about such events are not yet true or 
false, although they will later be. 
 
 Aristotle (in Metaphysical 12.8)22 anticipated in his own doctrine of God as 
“thought thinking itself.” Aristotle (in Metaphysical 12.9)23 could not conceive 
how God could know the world, since the world is an ever changing reality.  
Aristotle viewed God as a closed circle in which no distinction could be made 
between “thought” and “thinking.” Thus Aristotle could not conceive of a God 
who could think thoughts simultaneously.  If this is the case, then one can 
conclude that Greek tradition has influenced the way open theists consider 
the future. 
 
3.1.2. Celsus 
 
Celsus was a second century Platonist philosopher who attacked Christianity 
and Christian belief. He wrote a book in about 178CE entitled True 
Discourse. Origen uses the work True Discourse to analyse Celsus’ 
understanding of God and the Christian faith in the eight books of Against 
Celcus. Concerning the issue of foreknowledge, Celsus contends that this 
                                         
22
 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html. 
23
 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html. 
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must result in the loss of human freedom, “for being God He predicted these 
things, and the prediction must by all means come to pass”. While Celsus 
seemed to have held the view that the disciples invented accounts about 
Jesus, at other times he appears to have held that they were deceived. 
Origen (in Against Celsus 2.20 in ANF Vol. IV: 439-441) argued, using the 
betrayal of Jesus as an example, that the fact that God foreknew and 
predicted this betrayal of Jesus does not mean that he caused it. Celsus 
imagines that an event predicted through foreknowledge comes to pass 
because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who 
foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would 
happen – but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not 
predicted, afforded the occasion to him who was endowed with 
foreknowledge of foretelling its occurrences. Origen’s understanding about 
God’s foreknowledge was that, while God knows that an event might occur, 
this does not make him/her the cause of the event, but rather because it is 
going to happen God knows of it before it happens. Erickson (2003:113) 
notes that Celsus’ rejection of divine foreknowledge was part of a much 
larger criticism of Christian theology. Celsus also rejected the idea of the 
divinity of Jesus Christ as inconsistent with his poverty and suffering. His 
rejection of the traditional view of foreknowledge came from outside the 
Christian faith.  
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3.1.3. Marcion 
 
Marcion, who considered himself a Christian, lived in the second century and 
was excommunicated from the church because he distinguished between the 
Creator, the Old Testament God whom he saw as the author of natural evil, 
and the New Testament God of love. He therefore rejected the Old 
Testament and developed his own canon. The influence of Gnosticism on 
Marcion impacted his understanding of God and is seen in how Marcion 
viewed God’s omniscience in relation to the problem of evil. If God is good, 
he/she would seek to prevent evil, and if he/she is all-powerful, then he/she 
should be able to prevent evil. He goes on to state that, if God is omniscient, 
God should have known that when he/she created human beings they would 
fall into evil. Since however there is evil in the world, God must be lacking in 
one of these qualities, and Marcion therefore rejected the teaching of God’s 
foreknowledge. To this Tertullian (in Against Marcion in ANF Vol. III:301) 
replied: 
But what shall I say of his/her prescience, which has for its witness as 
many prophets as it inspired? After all, what title to prescience do we 
look for in the Author of the Universe, since it was by this very attribute 
that he/she foreknew all things when he/she appointed their places, and 
appointed then their places when he/she foreknew (italics added). 
 
Tertullian further refutes Marcion’s case, arguing that nothing evil could come 
out of God and it was human choice to sin. Thus, for God to use his 
foreknowledge to stop Adam from sinning would have been an assault on 
his/her own character. Tertullian (in Against Marcion 2.7,4.41 in ANF Vol. 
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III:303) argues that this foreknowledge of God in no way interferes with God’s 
gift of human freedom of choice, even if humans perish through their choice 
to sin. Like Marcionism, open theists cannot see the compatibility of human 
freedom with God’s foreknowledge, and thus elevate human freedom at the 
expense of limiting God’s foreknowledge. 
 
3.1.4. The Socinians 
 
Probably the best-known group to oppose the orthodox view of God’s 
exhaustive knowledge was the seventeenth century Socinians, a late 
Reformation group that was more radical in its theology than were other 
Reformers. Faustus Paulo Sozzini (Socinus) was disturbed by the doctrine of 
predestination, which was an essential part of the theology of both Luther 
and Calvin. He felt that if predestination were true, then the very foundations 
of religion could be denied or rejected. Hodge (1995:400-401) testifies also to 
the universal Christian affirmation of the exhaustive definite foreknowledge of 
God with the primary exception of the Socinians: 
The Church W in obedience to the Scriptures, has, almost with one 
voice, professed faith in God’s foreknowledge of the free acts of his 
creatures. The Socinians, however, and some Remonstrants, unable to 
reconcile this foreknowledge with human liberty, deny that free acts can 
be foreknown. As the omnipotence of God is his ability to do whatever 
is possible, so his omniscience is his knowledge of everything 
knowable. But as free acts are in their nature uncertain, as they may or 
may not be, they cannot be known before they occur. Such is the 
argument of Socinus. 
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One of the important factors in this difficulty is the role of divine 
foreknowledge. In order to understand Socinus’ approach to God’s 
foreknowledge, it is necessary to evaluate his understanding of the 
relationship of God with time. He rejected the atemporalist approach 
according to which God holds all time in one simultaneous moment. Instead, 
Socinus saw God as knowing all events past, present and future according to 
their respective natures. Fock (cited in Erickson 2003:114) elaborates that 
the future for Socinus consists of either what must necessarily occur, or what 
only will possibly occur, or under certain conditions and contingently may 
occur. On the latter hangs all acts of human freedom. Since God know all 
things as they are, accordingly he/she knows the necessary future as such 
and the contingent future also as such. If it were otherwise, God would not 
know things as they are, for the truth is the congruence of knowledge with its 
object. Socinus insists, however, that if God knows the future as determined 
from all eternity, then there can be no human freedom. There is also no 
divine freedom, since from all eternity God could only act as he/she actually 
does act. One serious problem with Socinian’ view was, of course, prophecy. 
The basis of his understanding of prophecy was that everything has been 
decreed by God. Common evidence of foreknowledge was the appeal to 
prophecy. Socinus did not think this evidence to be of value, as noted by 
Toulmin (1777:230): 
There are many other sacred testimonies, which seem to establish the 
notion of divine foreknowledge, to all which he will be able to easily 
return an answer who will weigh and consider what we have observed. 
From which these for rules may be inferred and laid down: Firstly if any 
passage speak of good works foreseen, God himself hath undoubtedly 
decreed them. Secondly, whether it speaks of good or evil actions, the 
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predictions may be founded only on probabilities and on this are 
enquiring. Thirdly, that it may be rather an admonition to do good, or to 
avoid that what is evil. Fourthly, that if it be certain predictions of an evil 
work, this work was indeed decreed by God, but not the malignity of 
heart. 
 
Most who today abandon the traditional view of foreknowledge are reluctant 
to claim the precedent of Socinianism. In his Trinity and Process, Boyd 
(1992:296-97) frankly acknowledges: “W until the time of the Socinians, the 
belief that God’s omniscience included all future events was not generally 
questioned”. Yet in his later publications, God of the Possible and Satan and 
the Problem of Evil, he makes no mention of Socinus at all, but mentions 
several other people who do not hold the traditional view. The reason for his 
reluctance to associate with Socinianism as a predecessor to open theism 
may arise from the Socinians’ unorthodox view on a number of other 
essential doctrines: viz, their denial of the deity of Christ. The relationship 
between open theism and Socinianism is that they share the same 
convictions and arrive at the same conclusions concerning the relationship 
between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. Socinus denied that God 
either determines or eternally knows our free acts. Rather, humans 
determine the acts, and God knows them only after the fact or as they occur. 
This approach implies real novelty in the divine consciousness; it means that 
human beings can cause changes in God24. In this bold break with the 
                                         
24
 This will be covered in the next chapter dealing with God’s immutability. 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
traditional understanding of God’s knowledge, Socinus germinated the 
thought that led to the development of the present process theology25.  
While many open theists react strongly against any association with 
Socinianism, the impact it has on the movement is noted. 
 
3.1.5. Jules Lequyer 
 
 
One whose ideas on free will anticipated much of the current debate was the 
nineteenth century Frenchman Jules Lequyer (1814-1862). Lequyer had a 
major influence on Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne and Reese (2000:227) 
state that “about one hundred years ago the reasoning of Socinus concerning 
God’s omniscience and time reappeared in the French philosopher Leguier”26 
. In the foreword of Translation of the Works of Jules Lequyer  (1998) edited 
and translated by Donald W. Viney, Robert Kane (1998:xiii) argues in the 
Foreword that Lequyer not only anticipated the theological debate over the 
openness of God, but made a significant contribution to that debate through 
his Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate. Lequyer was not a 
philosopher or theologian. He taught French composition and mathematics. 
His death in 1862 by drowning at the age of 48 may have been suicide. Kane 
(1998: xi) observes that had it not been for his friend, the celebrated French 
philosopher Charles Renouvier, the work of Lequyer may have never been 
                                         
25
 http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/Hartshorne/6newworld.html 
26
 The name can be spelt in various ways. See Viney DW, “Jules Lequyer : Bold Traveler in 
the Worlds of Thought,” in Translation of the Works of Jules Lequyer for a discussion on the 
variant spellings. 
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known at all. Kane (1998: xi) contends: “It is now generally acknowledged 
that Lequyer anticipated many of the themes of the twentieth century process 
philosophy and process theology, associated with the later works of Alfred 
North Whitehead and especially the work of Charles Hartshorne.” 
Central to Lequyer’s thought is the concept of will. Rejecting the compatibilist 
understanding of freedom as the absence of constraint, he defined freedom 
as a creative act that brings “a new mode of being” (1998:46). Using an 
incident from his childhood in which he decided to pluck a leaf from a 
hornbeam tree, Lequyer (1998:45-47) illustrates this concept of “a new mode 
of being”. When he reached for the leaf, he startled a bird hidden in the tree, 
which flew away and was killed by a sparrow hawk. The boy Lequyer had 
created an event that would have otherwise not occurred. Thus, Lequyer 
(1998:127) distinguishes between epistemic possibility and ontological 
possibility or indeterminacy. Freedom requires indeterminacy: “If it is a 
question of a free action, we know that it is certainly possible not to do it.” 
Erickson argues (2003:117) that Lequyer’s problem with foreknowledge 
arises from his conception of human freedom because Lequyer argues in 
The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Rebrobate (1998:127) that “it is 
clear that freedom taken with this simplicity, and reality, excludes all prevision 
of the act that it determines”. This is not actually a limitation on God’s 
omnipotence, however, for such a supposed foreknowledge would be like 
omnipotence requiring God’s ability to make a triangle in which the sum of 
the three angles was not equal to the sum of two right angles. Therefore, 
Lequyer (1998:128) argues that the principle of the excluded middle does not 
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apply to a future tense proposition: “W between the contingent past things 
and contingent things to come there is the difference of two contradictory 
affirmations concerning contingent things to come, neither one nor the other 
is true, both are false.” This position creates a problem for Lequyer 
concerning prophecy. Some to be sure are conditional prophecies, such as 
the destruction of Nineveh. Of the absolute prophecies, however, some 
pertain to events that are the outworking of casual factors. There are events 
that God unilaterally and directly causes but in the instances like Peter’s 
denial, God knew that the denial was an inevitable result of Peter’s self-
determined character, and then God withheld divine help at the very crucial 
moment. Thus, for Lequyer Peter’s actions created a “new mode of being”. 
Like Renouvier, William James, and the existentialists who followed him, 
Lequyer was critical of determinism and defended a concept of freedom as a 
creative act. Lequyer also explored the ramifications of his ideas on freedom 
for philosophical theology. He (cited by Donald Wayne Viney in “Philosophy 
after Hartshorne”) spoke of his belief in “God, who created me the creator of 
myself”. His views have affinities with process theologies and with open 
theism. 
 
3.1.6. Otto Pfleiderer 
 
 
Born at Stetten in the region of Württemberg in Swabia on 1 September 
1839, Otto Pfleiderer was a New Testament specialist, who was influenced 
by the German idealists who preceded him, but more so by Hegel. Pfleiderer 
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understands the working out of God’s purpose through the revelation of God 
in nature and history, which leads him to reject miracles and the supernatural 
intervention of God in the world. This interaction with the world changes 
God’s ability to know everything exhaustively. Pfleiderer (1888:296) rejected 
the classical view of God’s omniscience as immediate, eternal and immutable 
and adopts a panenthestic view of God. Pfleiderer (1888:296) argued that the 
classical view or what he termed “religious consciousness” destroyed the 
analogy between the divine consciousness and the human, which 
necessarily involves a succession of states or growth in content. 
Furthermore, Pfleiderer (1888:296), contended that it renders questionable 
as to whether a real relationship of God to the temporal process or else the 
reality of this process. According to Pfleiderer (1888:296-297), it is therefore 
necessary to understand God having successive states within his 
consciousness. But this has a definite impact on our understanding of God’s 
omniscience: “W it follows that foresight of the future must be distinguished 
from knowledge of the present and must be thought to refer not to accidents 
of the particular but rather the essential features of the universe, so that it 
coincides with the purposive idea of the world-ordering wisdom.” It is 
interesting to note that Hartshorne sees parallels between each of the 
thinkers I have just discussed and his own process philosophy. Hartshorne 
(1971:22-23) states that “it has been encouraging to discover in recent years, 
to see that Pfleiderer and Lequier have had the same ideas of God more or 
less to that which I defend”.  
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3.1.7. Alfred North Whitehead  
 
Alfred North Whitehead the son of an Anglican minister was born in England 
in 1861. Whitehead’s understanding of religion is a land mark in modern 
thought. His understanding of theology or propositional religious statements 
has challenged the orthodox understanding of God. Whitehead’s complex 
thought can be briefly described as all things are in process of becoming, 
including God. Thus for Whitehead rational religion is an attempt to find a 
permanent, intelligible interpretation of experience.  Therefore, Whitehead's 
metaphysical understanding is grounded in the primacy of how God 
experiences the world. The experience to which Whitehead looks is not 
merely the sensory experience of self-conscious organisms. Instead, such 
experience is seen as a rather complex and high-order manifestation of an 
even more fundamental form of experience. Thus, God is seen to be in the 
process of becoming through the way he/she experiences the world. It is an 
experience of both profound relationships, of contingency, of the dependence 
of God upon humanity through our cosmic experience. Therefore, in light of 
this relationship,  Whitehead in Process and Reality (1978:46) views God to 
be “bipolar” – a term that is used to describe God as having two “poles”: one 
mental and one physical; or one eternal (potential) and one temporal (actual). 
The potential pole (mind of God) is the order of all that can be, and the actual 
pole (his/her body) is the order of all that is. The potential pole is both 
absolute and eternal; but the actual pole is relative and temporal. So then 
God is actually finite but potentially infinite. Thus, Whitehead describes God 
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as having two natures: primordial and consequent when he states (1978:45) 
that, analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar i.e., God 
has both a mental and a physical pole. God has both a primordial nature and 
a consequent nature. The primordial nature is an infinite envisioning of all 
potentialities not the actual reality or action. Thus, God knows the multiplicity 
of possibilities of any future action that may be taken by him/her or humanity. 
Therefore, there is no completion to God. God is eternal and therefore 
unfinished, open-ended, relating and responding to the unfolding world. 
Whitehead (1978:45) argues that: 
This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually 
deficient, and unconscious. The other side originates with physical 
experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration 
with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 
'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious. His necessary goodness 
expresses the determination of his consequent nature  
This nature of God is that aspect of the divine that engages the temporal 
world. It draws up the experience of the world into the divine life, and 
incorporates it into its own eternal process of concrescence. In so doing, God 
orders the plurality of experiences into the divine unity, bringing about the 
greatest possible harmony of events. Whitehead (1978:45-46) goes on to 
argue: 
Thus, the actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity of 
actual components in the process of creation. This is God in his/her 
function of the kingdom of heaven W Each actuality in the temporal 
world has its reception into God's nature. The corresponding element in 
God's nature is not temporal actuality, but the transmutation of that 
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temporal actuality into an ever-present fact. An enduring personality in 
the temporal world is a route of occasions in which the successors with 
some peculiar completeness sum up their predecessors. The correlate 
fact in God's nature is an even more complete unity of life in a chain of 
elements for which succession does not mean a loss of immediate 
unison. 
 
Thus humans are seen to be “created co-creators” with God to bring this 
harmony of actual events into reality. The creation itself is seen as a co-
operation between God and all other beings. Thus, process theologians are 
panentheists, God attains perfection successively and endlessly because of 
his/her interaction with humanity in the time. As a result, God is limited by 
conditions from the outside. While process theists affirm divine love, they 
reconstruct divine power. Griffin (2004:298) states that process theodicy is 
based upon a notion that there are metaphysical principles in operation that 
are beyond the control of divine determination. According to Whitehead 
(1978:52), this metaphysical principle is itself the “principle of limitation” as 
God relates to the actual (metaphysical). The assumption here is that God’s 
perfect power is best conceived in his/her relation to human beings; thus God 
is limited, at least to some degree, by others who possess a power of their 
own.  
Because of the limitation of God’s divine power, process theists do not hold 
God culpable for failing to prevent evil or suffering but rather see any 
suffering in the creation as also undergone by God. God is the instantiation of 
the created process, not the Creator. While the world depends upon God for 
its order and meaning, God depends upon the world for divine enjoyment and 
satisfaction. God's nature is therefore in a sense contingent upon the reality 
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of the world (and vice versa). Thus, God is also clearly not omnipotent. In 
process theology God merely guides the unfolding process of creation. 
Herzog (1988:84-85) describes process thought even more clearly by stating: 
“Omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience indicate the constant turning 
of the Creator to the creature. Divine power shared with creatures to allow 
the creator God to be influenced by his creatures. When God cooperates with 
his creatures, this leads to self-limitation”. Therefore, according to 
Whitehead, God is not an all-powerful, all-knowing, arbitrary ruler of the 
earth. In fact, Whitehead (1978:41) believes that God is powerless before the 
freedom of each individual moment. For in this sense God is no different from 
every other actual entity. He knows more because he envisages more. He 
suffers more because he knows more. In conclusion, according to 
Whiteheadian thought, God is that actual entity that is either the structure or 
context in which reality emerges (primordial nature) and the totality of that 
reality (consequent nature). This is because God apprehends both the totality 
of possibility (primordial nature) and the totality of actuality (consequent 
nature) fully. God is therefore a being who is abstract and concrete, eternal 
and temporal, transcendent and immanent. Thus Whitehead views God and 
the world as not actually different. God is the order (and value) in the actual 
world. The world is God’s consequent nature. It is the sum total of all actual 
entities (events) as ordered by God. But the world is in process, it is 
constantly changing, therefore God in his/her consequent nature is constantly 
in flux. 
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Whitehead view of creation is also different from orthodox Christianity. He 
views the universe as eternal. God is dependent on creation as creation is   
dependent on God. Thus God is not “before all creation, but with all creation” 
(1978:343). God does not bring the universe into existence, he directs its 
progress. Thus God is more a comic persuader than a God who is in control. 
Whitehead (1978: 31-32) even views God as a creation itself one who is self- 
caused being who is constantly becoming. The process of creation is 
therefore an eternal process of God’s self-realization. Thus God knowledge is 
grows moment by moment within the community of actual events. Thus God 
is becoming in continuity. For Whitehead there is no changeless enduring “I”.  
Human begin are self-caused becoming. Whitehead in Modes of Thought, 
22827  states: 
I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyment, hopes, fears, 
regrets valuations of alternatives, decisions- all of them subjective 
reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity- which is 
Descartes’ “I am”- is my process of shaping this welter of material into 
consistent pattern of feelings. I shape the activities of the environment 
into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and yet, as being 
myself it is a continuation of the antecedent world. 
 
Whitehead thus see himself as co-creator one who share with God this 
character of self-causation. There is therefore, an on-going evolutionary 
process. God is achieving more and more value and because of this 
movement neither God nor the world can reach static completion. 
 
 
                                         
27
 http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Whitehead/Whitehead_1938/1938_08.html 
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3.1.8. Charles Hartshorne 
 
Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) was born in Kittaning, Pennsylvania 
(U.S.A.). After attending Haverford College he served in World War I in 
France as a medic, taking a box of philosophy books with him to the Front. 
After the war Hartshorne received his doctorate in philosophy at Harvard, and 
there he met Whitehead28. Hartshorne (1963:604) argues that divine 
foreknowledge does not follow from omniscience unless it can be shown that 
divine foreknowledge is possible. However, divine foreknowledge is not 
possible unless future events exist, as fully determinate. Hartshorne denies 
that future events exist in this sense. More precisely Hartshorne (1984: 30) 
insists: 
The future is irreducibly potential rather than actual, and this means in 
some degree, however slight, indeterminate rather than determinate. 
Becoming is the passage from incomplete definiteness to definiteness. 
It is creation. 
 
If perfect knowledge is knowledge of the world, as it actually exists, then 
according to Hartshorne (1945:248) “omniscience is only possible when 
understood as temporal – as knowing new facts when there are new facts to 
know, but always knowing all the facts there are at the time”. This is 
Hartshorne’s central argument concerning divine knowledge and is found 
throughout his writings. Thus, perfect knowledge knows things as they are. 
The past is determinate and the future is partly indeterminate. Therefore, 
                                         
28
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hartshorne/ 
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perfect knowledge knows the past as determinate and the future as partly 
indeterminate.  
It is the process philosophers and theologians of the twentieth century that 
had the greatest influence and impact on open theism. According to Mellert:  
The incorporation into God of both the static perfections and the 
process perfections is the great achievement of Charles Hartshorne. In 
his writings he distinguished between absolute perfection and relative 
perfection. The former is applied to a being that is “unsurpassable in 
conception or possibility even by itself”; the latter obtains when the 
being is “unsurpassable except by itself.” It is the latter concept that is 
important for process theologians. It means that, in addition to 
imperceptible perfections, which are static, there are also perfectible 
perfections, which are dynamic. Given the temporal frame of reference, 
relative perfections do not and need not imply imperfection, which is the 
absence of a perfection that should be present at that time. It simply 
means that something which reaches perfection relative to the rest of 
reality in one moment of time can be further perfected at a future 
moment of time.29 
  
Of these the clearest and most complete statement is that of Charles 
Hartshorne. His view of divine foreknowledge and of indeterminate future as 
seen from his general metaphysical view has had the most significant impact 
on open theism. Hartshorne, like all other process philosophers, believes that 
the basic unit of reality is not substance but event. Every event has two 
sides: an eternal or abstract side; and a temporal or concrete side. Thus, 
there is both permanence and change in everything that occurs. This general 
understanding applies to everything including God, who participates in the 
same bipolar character of reality as elaborated by Hartshorne (1941:19-20):  
There is both an absolute and a relative pole in God’s nature, God’s A-
                                         
29
 http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=3040&C=2599. 
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perfection (or absolute perfection) and his R-perfection (or relatedness 
perfection). The former means that which in no respect could be 
conceivably any greater and hence incapable of increase while the 
latter means that individual beings W than which no other individual 
being could conceivably be greater, but which itself, in another ‘state’, 
could become greater (perhaps by the creation within itself of new 
constituents).  
 
Hartshorne (1941:20) states that perfection is “excellence such as rivalry or 
superiority on the part of other individuals is impossible but self-superiority is 
not impossible”. It is that latter conception of perfection that Hartshorne is 
working with when he discusses such attributes as omnipotence and 
omniscience. Hartshorne concludes (1941:98) that it is perfectly possible to 
have an omniscient being who changes. Working from the model of R-
perfection, it would make perfectly good sense as stated by Hartshorne 
(1941:98) that a being who changes will know far more at one moment than 
the preceding moment; but this implies he/she was previously ‘ignorant’ only 
if it is assumed that events are there to be known prior to their happening. 
Thus for Hartshorne, if knowledge is to be true it must correspond to reality, 
and the things that have not yet happened are not real. Thus to know them 
would be to know them falsely, for there is nothing of the sort to know. 
Hartshorne (1941:98) further elaborates that if the future is indeterminate, if 
there is real freedom between alternatives, if any which way can happen, 
then the true way to know the future is to see it as undetermined or unsettled. 
This is how Hartshorne views the future. Hartshorne (1941:100) notes that 
human beings have the ability to predict the future, because we have learnt 
the laws that govern these occurrences. This is not how classic Evangelical 
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theologians claim that God knows the future and, if it were, that would 
assume a type and extent of determinism that theologians have not 
subscribed to. If, however, the future is unsettled or indeterminate, knowing it 
as such rather than as determined would not be ignorance, but true 
knowledge. Hartshorne is also aware that some invoke the law of excluded 
middle to attempt to prove that future events are determinate. Using an 
example to prove his position he says (1941:100): “Either I will write a letter 
tomorrow or I will not write it tomorrow – only one can be true.” Hartshorne 
however replies (1941:100-101) that while only one of these statements 
might be true, it may be that both of them are false. Between the two 
statements is the statement, “I may do it”: meaning that “the present situation 
of myself and indeed of the world in its totality is indeterminate with respect to 
my doing it. Thus, for Hartshorne the difference between the contradictory 
statements of “it will occur” is not “it will not occur” but “it may occur”. 
Thus, Hartshorne is clear about his intellectual heritage of understanding of 
divine knowledge. He (1984:27) insists that God is all-knowing only in the 
Socinian sense. Concerning fulfilled prophecies, Hartshorne (1941:103-104) 
states that it does not indicate that the future that was predicted was 
determined, but rather that when the future became present it was definite. 
For Hartshorne, it means that nothing more than coincidence was involved, 
or that the person making that prediction knew enough about the pertinent 
laws, such as the character of persons involved, to be able to prophecy 
accurately what would happen. Thus, predictions are made based on 
inference from known present conditions.  
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3.2. Basic Tenets of Open Theism  
 
None of the precursors mentioned in the preceding section examined could 
be categorized as evangelicals in their orientation. Open theists regard 
themselves as evangelicals who call into question the classical attributes of 
God, namely: God’s foreknowledge, God’s immutability and God’s power.  
Open theism derives its name from its view of the relationship between God 
and the future, thus emphasizing the relational nature of God. Accordingly 
they reject St. Augustine’s interpretation of God’s exhaustive knowledge 
because they deem it incompatible with a belief that God maintains tangible 
personal relationships with human beings. Sanders (1998:12) prefers to call 
this view “relational theism”, meaning by this “any model of the divine-human 
relationship that includes a genuine give-and-take relationship between God 
and humans such that there is receptivity and a degree of contingency within 
God”. In this give-and-take relationship, God receives and does not merely 
take.  
Basinger (1995:142) also maintains the same idea of a “God who interacts 
with his/her creation in the sense that he/she responds to what humans 
experience in an attempt to bring out a desired goal. Like process 
theologians, open theists defend the bipolarity of God having both an “actual” 
and a “potential” nature. Thus God is absolute, necessary, eternal and 
changeless but also relative, contingent, temporal and changing in so far as 
he relates and responds to creations. Such a view requires a comprehensive 
redefining of the doctrine of God. In openness theology God cannot be 
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omniscient and omnipotent as traditionally understood. On that view, God 
lacks exhaustive knowledge of the future; the future is thus “open” to him.  
Therefore, while God may have a clear idea of what might happen, he does 
not know when it will happen. According to Boyd (2000:11), the future is 
“partly determined and foreknown by God, but also partially open and known 
by God as such”. Divine uncertainty of the future results from God’s decision 
to grant freedom to some of his creatures. In open theism, the future is either 
knowable or not knowable. The open theists, who hold that the future is 
knowable by God, argue that he/she voluntarily limits his/her knowledge of 
free will choices so that they can remain truly free. Sanders (1998:198) takes 
this statement even further, by arguing that the future, being non-existent, is 
not knowable, even by God. 
All of the future that is undetermined by God (which includes all future 
free choices and actions), since it has not happened and is therefore 
not real, cannot be an object of knowledge. This future, they say, is 
logically unknowable, and as such not even God can rightly be said to 
know what cannot in principle be known. 
  
Boyd (2001:113) thus compares God to a master chess player, who 
considers all the possible moves an opponent might make together with all 
the possible future responses the opponent may make to each of these 
possibilities. Therefore, God does not know exactly what move to make until 
humans make the first move. Thus placing God “at risk” on this, Pinnock 
(1994:7) elaborates:  
God, in grace grants humans significant freedom to cooperate with or 
work against God’s will for their lives, and he enters into a dynamic, 
give and take relationship with us. The Christian life involves a genuine 
interaction between God and human beings. We respond to God’s 
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gracious initiatives and God responds to our responses. 
 
The above statement is an accepted explanation for God granting humans 
significant freedom within the Evangelical tradition, but Pinnock’s 
understanding of the freedom humans have in relation to God’s 
foreknowledge runs counter to the Evangelical view of God’s foreknowledge. 
Pinnock (1994:7) states:  
God takes risks in this give-and-take relationship, yet he is endlessly 
resourceful and competent in working towards his ultimate goals. 
Sometimes God alone decides how to accomplish these goals. On 
other occasions, God works with human decisions, adapting his own 
plans to fit the changing situation. God does not control everything that 
happens. Rather, he is open to receiving input from his creatures. In 
loving dialogue God invites us to participate with him to bring the future 
into being.  
 
To summarize, open theists maintain that God is bound by time and does 
not entirely know the future; and that God’s power is limited by human 
action, thus rejecting the notion of God’s exhaustive knowledge of all 
events past, present and future. Instead they affirm that God only knows 
things about the future that it is logically possibly for him/her to know. 
Therefore, the future actions of human beings are not knowable in 
advance by any being, so they cannot be included among the things that 
God knows. They would thus affirm divine “present knowledge”. Basinger 
(1995:134) explains that “Gods infallible knowledge extends over 
everything that is (or has been) actual and that which follows 
deterministically from it, excluding any future states of affairs that involve 
free human choices”. Thus God makes room for indeterminacy or risk. 
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3.2.1. The Impact of Process Thought on the Development of Open 
Theism 
 
While open theists maintain their differences from process theists, similarities 
do remain. The two differences are that process theologians believe that God 
is dependent on the world, while open theists believe that God is not 
dependent on the world. The other difference according to process thought is 
that God never acts unilaterally, whereas open theists believe that God can 
and does sometimes intervene in the world, even overriding the free wills of 
human beings (Rice 2000:185-88). 
While Boyd (2000:106) contends that there is no connection between open 
theism and process theology or thought, many open theists claim that 
process philosophers have influenced their thinking. In fact Boyd (1992:i) 
acknowledges that his position has been more influenced by Charles 
Hartshorne than any other single philosopher.  Rice (2000:165-166), an open 
theist, clearly states that he was attracted by the philosophical theology of 
Hartshorne while doing his graduate studies at the University of Chicago. He 
(2000:166)  goes on to state that if we accept Hartshorne’s version of dipolar 
theism this will help formulate a doctrine of God that is superior to the God of 
classical theism. Hasker (2000:216-17), the most prominent philosopher 
within open theism, says: “On a personal note, let me state that I first became 
clearly convinced of this thought through the reading of Hartshorne’s Divine 
Reality.” However, to what extent does process theology actually reveal itself 
in the thoughts of evangelical open theists? Hasker (2000:217) states that 
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process thought allowed him to see that God is affected by the state of his 
creatures, and sufferers when things go badly for them.  
Rice (2000:166) shows this influence exceptionally clearly by stating that: 
The notion that a perfect being can change is not only conceptually 
coherent (a point that Hartshorne argues at great length) but gives us 
an idea that is more faithful to the biblical portrait than classical theism 
and more helpful to us on the level of personal religion as well. The idea 
that God’s relation to the world is interactive, or dynamic, makes it 
possible for us to develop coherent concepts of divine love and 
creaturely freedom. In doing so, it helps us to overcome some of the 
problems that have perplexed Christian thinkers for centuries, such as 
the relation of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. 
 
While I have noted Boyd’s objection to this influence of process thought, 
Boyd states (2000:31) that “some evangelicals have wrongly accused open 
theists of being too close to process thought, but the two views have little in 
common”. He further argues (2000:170) that they are different because 
process theology holds that God needs the world. He could not exist without 
it. It also denies God’s omnipotence. Yet in Trinity and Process (1992), he 
seemed to be attempting to work out a conventional Trinitarian view with 
process categories. Boyd (1992: Preface) states:  
This work is, in essence, an attempt to work out a Trinitarian-process 
metaphysics, which overcomes this impasse. It is our conviction that the 
fundamental vision of the process worldview, especially espoused by 
Hartshorne, is correct. But it is our conviction as well that the spiritual 
and traditional understanding of God as triune and antecedently actual 
within Godself is true, as is, in fact, a foundational doctrine of the 
Christian faith. But we contend, these two views, when properly 
understood within a proper framework, do not conflict. Indeed, it shall 
be our connection that Hartshorne’s a priori metaphysics, when 
corrected of certain misconstrued elements actually requires something 
like a Trinitarian understanding of God to make it consistent and 
complete! My warmest appreciation must also be expressed to Charles 
Hartshorne. Though I disagree with him on a great many points, he has 
influenced my thinking more than any other single philosopher, living or 
dead. 
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While Boyd alludes to the differences that exist between process thought and 
open theism, he does acknowledge the considerable influence that process 
thought philosophers had on his own perspective. Open theists have also 
been influenced not only by Hartshorne but also by Whitehead’s view of 
reality. Boyd (2000:17) insists that the future is not something that is 
knowable; it has no reality, so the inability to know is the inability to know 
something. Therefore, for Boyd God not knowing the future is not a lack of 
knowledge because there is no future to be known. Thus open theists, by 
contrast, hold that the future consists of partly settled realities and unsettled 
realities or potentials. Thus, the futures for the open theist are sets of 
possibilities that God knows about, but not the possibility that actually 
becomes reality.  
In this chapter I have shown the influences that have impacted upon the 
development of an open view of God sometimes referred to as Neotheism 
(cf. Geisler and House, 2001), which deals with human free will and its 
relationship with God, including the nature of the future. It is the teaching that 
God has granted to humanity free will and that for the free will to be truly free, 
the future free will choices of individuals are unknown ahead of time by God. 
They hold that if God knows what a person is going to choose, then how one 
can be truly free when it is time to make those choices, since one cannot 
make a counter choice because it is already “known” what the choice is going 
to be. In other words, one could not actually make a contrary choice to what 
God “knows” a person will choose, thus implying that the choice in question 
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would not actually be free. This view has been relatively rare in church 
history, but is gaining popularity today in certain sectors of evangelicalism. 
Theologians in the school of open theism have argued that the classical 
definitions of both divine omnipotence and omniscience are seriously 
problematic for addressing the problem of evil and suffering. Hasker 
(1994:152) provides the following explanation:  
God knows that evils will occur, but God has not for the most part 
specifically decreed or incorporated into his plan the individual 
instances of evil. Rather, God governs the world according to general 
strategies which are, as a whole, ordered for the good of creation but 
whose detailed consequences are not foreseen or intended by God 
prior to the decision to adopt them. As a result, we are able to abandon 
the difficult doctrine of ‘meticulous providence’ and to admit the 
presence in the world of particular evils God’s permission of which is 
not the means of bringing about any greater good or preventing any 
greater evil. 
 
 
3.2.2. The Impact of Open Theism on Evangelical Theology 
 
Having looked at the perspective development of open theism, this section 
will engage the impact the open view of God has on Evangelicalism and its 
distinctive which is a cause for concern.  Differences about God between 
Evangelicalism/ classical theism and open theism can be summarised as 
follows which affects one’s view of God and Scripture. Stallard (2000:5) 
makes an interesting observation about the concerns read out at the 
November 2000 national meeting of Evangelical Theological Society held in 
Nashville concerning the non-traditional ways of looking at God and how 
he/she interacts with the created order, especially with human beings. At 
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stake for evangelicals in the discussion is the reconstruction of God and how 
he/she relates to the world concerning evil, suffering, prayer, and the 
guidance of God in everyday life? 
 
Classical Evangelicalism Open Theism 
God is Creator God is director 
God is sovereign over the world  God is working with the world 
God is independent of the world God is dependent on the world 
God is unchanging God is changing 
God is absolutely perfect  God is growing more perfect 
God is monopolar God is bipolar 
God is actually infinite God is actually finite 
God is omnipotent God power is limited 
 
3.2.2.1. Effects on Systematic Theology  
When one doctrine in systematic theology is reinterpreted, it impacts all other 
doctrines. No one area of systematic theology can be developed in isolation. 
Boyd’s (2000:8) claim that “next to the central doctrines of the Christian faith, 
the issue of whether the future is exhaustively settled or partially open is 
relatively unimportant” is just not true because it necessities a reinterpretation 
of those central doctrines. Examples taken from hamartiology and soteriology 
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reflect how a reinterpretation of the exhaustive knowledge of God impacts on 
the traditional evangelical view of sin and salvation. Sanders (1998: 45-49) 
teach that God did not expect or know that Adam and Eve were going to sin 
in the Garden of Eden. In soteriological eschatology, Sanders (1998:133) 
maintains, “there is nothing specifically said in the Old Testament that would 
have led one to predict a dying and raised Messiah”. Rice (1981:43) states 
that at the incarnation God took the risk that not knowing whether Jesus   
would fail in the struggle with temptation. That means that Christ could have 
sinned which impacts the doctrine of the impeccability of Christ. And this very 
real possibility ran the “risk of permanently disastrous consequences to the 
Godhead itself”.  
 
3.2.2.2. Trustworthiness of God 
The open theist constructs a God who can only react to the actions of mere 
mortals. While God knows what could happen, He/She does not know when 
it will happen, until it happens.  So God does not know any real action that 
will occur. That is not a God who engenders trust, hope, and security. There 
is no comfort in the open theistic view of God who is waiting to respond. 
Jeremiah 10:12 says: “But God made the earth by his/her power; he/she 
founded the world by his wisdom and stretched out the heavens by his 
understanding” (NIV italic added). God’s power (omnipotence) is directly 
linked to his/her wisdom and understanding (omniscience).  
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3.2.2.3. Trustworthiness of God’s Word  
Although many open theists claim to believe the Bible is the infallible and 
inerrant Word of God, this is inconsistent with their basic teaching. If God 
cannot know the future infallibly, then the predictions in the Bible that involve 
free acts cannot be infallible. Some of them may be wrong and we have no 
way of knowing which ones. Sanders (1998:125) states: “God is yet working 
to fulfil his promises and bring his project to fruition. The eschaton will 
surprise us because it is not set in concrete; it is not unfolding according to a 
prescribed script.” The “prescribed script” that Sanders refers to is what 
Evangelicals understand to be predictive prophecy as declared in the Bible. 
Pinnock (2001:50) further elaborates that much of prophecy is conditional 
involving free choices that cannot be known, yet Evangelicals see the very 
nature and wonder of prophecy as its specificity. And if all prophecy involving 
libertarian freedom is conditional, then there could not be any test for a false 
prophecy as the Old Testament prescribes in Deuteronomy 18:22. All of this 
would seem to say that there is no sure prophetic word and that the 
Scriptures cannot say with authority what the future holds. Erickson (1998: 
267) states that the “Bible is an expression of God’s will to us, possesses the 
right supremely to define what we are to believe and how we are to conduct 
ourselves”. Evangelicals therefore, understand the Bible to be the inspired 
Word of God and what is recorded in it is actually what God wants us to hear. 
If God does not know the future or God changes his/her mind, then the Bible 
cannot be trusted. 
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3.2.2.4. Authority of God  
Erickson (1998:268) defines authority as the right to command belief and/or 
action. God has ultimate authority because of who he/she is. God is the 
highest being, the one who always has been, who existed before we or any 
other being into existence. God is the only being having the power of his/her 
own existence within him/herself, not dependent on anyone or anything else 
for his/her existence. A nineteenth century Scottish churchman, Andrew 
Bonar quoted by Bonar (1960:529), wrote: “There is a natural aversion to 
authority, even the authority of God, in the heart of man.” Everything about 
open theism elevates and defends the autonomy of human beings over the 
authority and sovereignty of God. Bloesch30 (1995:256) says of God as 
presented in the open theist’s worldview: “This is a far cry from the God of 
Calvin and Luther who is ever active in all things and events, steering 
everything toward a foreordained goal and purpose.” And I would suggest 
that open theism defies human and humanizes God, as will be reflected in 
Chapters 4 to 6. In doing so robs God of his authority to care for and provide 
for our needs. The authority of God is also averted because his/her word or 
                                         
30
 “Donald G. Bloesch (1928-2010) born in Bremen, Indiana was a noted American 
evangelical theologian.  For more than 40 years, he published scholarly that generally 
defended traditional Protestant beliefs and practices while seeking to remain in the 
mainstream of modern Protestant theological thought. The ongoing publication of his 
Christian Foundation Series has brought him recognition as an important evangelical 
American theologian. From 1957 until his retirement in 1992, he was a professor of theology 
at the University of Dubuque, Iowa he continued as a professor-emeritus. The Theological 
Seminary's library serves as the repository of his papers. He received his undergraduate 
degree from Elmhurst College. He earned his Bachelor of Divinity (BD) at Chicago 
Theological Seminary and his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago He did postdoctoral work in 
Europe at University of Oxford and Tubingen. He served as president of the Midwest 
Division of the American Theological Society”. www.wikipedai.org/wiki/Donald G. Bloesch. 
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promises cannot be relied upon because God changes his/her mind.  The 
following three chapters will investigate the doctrines of God’s foreknowledge 
(Chapter 4), God’s Immutability (Chapter 5) and God’s Omnipotence 
(Chapter 6) to show that the evangelical understanding of these attributes is 
in keeping with the traditional or orthodox understanding of the 
aforementioned doctrines.  While open theists claim that they are part of the 
Evangelical church, the following chapters will show that their understanding 
of these attributes is a deviation from an evangelical understanding 
concerning the doctrines under investigation. 
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Chapter 4  
God’s Omniscience: A Literary Investigation 
 
Introduction 
 
Stanley Gundry in his 1978 presidential address before the Evangelical 
Theological Society expressed concern about the direction of evangelicalism. 
This concern has become a reality, especially in the form of open theism. In 
this chapter and the two following chapters I shall investigate three attributes 
of God to show that an Evangelical understanding of the attributes under 
preview is rooted in orthodox theology and the interpretation by open theists 
is a radical departure from a tradition they claim to hold to. Another challenge 
posed by open theists is both theological and practical because “a right 
conception of God is essential not only to systematic theology but also to 
practical living” (Tozer31, 1961:10). The concept of God is foundational to 
Evangelicalism, thus open theists challenge Evangelical belief at its very 
                                         
31
 “Aiden Wilson Tozer was an American evangelical pastor, speaker, writer, and editor. After 
his conversion to Christ at the age of seventeen, Tozer found his way into the Christian & 
Missionary Alliance denomination where he served for over forty years. In 1950, he was 
appointed by the denomination's General Council to be the editor of The Alliance Witness 
(now Alliance Life). Born into poverty in western Pennsylvania in 1897, Tozer died in May 
1963 a self-educated man who had taught himself what he missed in high school and 
college due to his home situation. Though he wrote many books, two of them, The Pursuit of 
God (1941) and The Knowledge of the Holy (1961) are widely considered to be classics 
within the Evangelical tradition.”  
http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/1082290.A_W_Tozer. 
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roots. In this chapter I shall use the works of Alexander Roberts and James 
Donaldson Ante -Nicene Fathers (1979) and Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers (1979) to trace the development of the doctrine of God’s 
omniscience from the perspective of the early church fathers.  This approach 
is used to show that an Evangelicals understanding of the three attributes are 
constant with traditional understanding of the doctrine/s and that the open 
theism argument in a radical departure from the Evangelical view. This study 
therefore requires an investigation on how the early church fathers 
understood these attributes. This also provides a platform on which to 
engage the current knowledge on the subject that illuminates the significance 
of this study.  
Open theists offer a bold re-conceptualization of the nature of God and 
his/her relationship with the created order. Because those proposing this new 
model are self-professed evangelicals, and because they claim to do so 
partly in faithfulness to Scripture, this approach deserves careful 
consideration.  
This chapter will be broken down into three sections. First, I shall consider 
the traditional understanding of the omniscience as reflected in the writings of 
the early church fathers; second, I shall consider the evangelical perspective; 
and in the third section I shall give an overview of the central constructive 
elements of open theism and discuss how it challenges traditional theism. 
After each historical analysis I shall provide a critique of open theism, using 
the works of Boyd to demonstrate that open theism suffers from fatal flaws 
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that are not consistent with the evangelical belief system. Chapters 5 and 6 
will follow the same format. 
 
4.1. Omniscience 
 
At the core of open theism is the belief that God does not possess infallible 
foreknowledge of future acts. This view stands in stark contrast to the 
traditional view of God’s omniscience that the Christian church held from its 
very inception. The early church held a very high view of Scripture that 
affirms the all-knowing nature of God. Hodge (1995:397) states that the 
infinite knowledge of God is clearly and constantly asserted in Scripture. 
Hodge (1995:397) elaborates that the knowledge of God does not only 
comprehend everything, but is also intuitive and immutable. God knows all 
things as they are: being as being, phenomena as phenomena, the possible 
as possible, the free as free, and the past as past, the present as present, 
and the future as future. Thus Hodge sees a God who cannot be ignorant of 
anything and his/her knowledge can neither increase nor decrease.  
  
4.2. Evidence from the Church Fathers to Reformers   
 
The early church fathers acknowledged and affirmed the exhaustive 
knowledge of God. While they do not use the term omniscience, the ideas 
stated in Scripture concerning this doctrine are clearly believed by them and 
taught in their writings.  
 
 
 
 
109 
 
4.2.1. Justin Martyr (CE 100-165)  
Justin Martyr was one of the early Christian apologists who used eschatology 
to elaborate on the foreknowledge of God. He states that Christ will return to 
earth when “the number of those who are foreknown by him as good and 
virtuous is complete, on whose account He has still delayed the 
consummation” (in First Apology 45 in ANF Vol. I:178). He also affirms that 
God knows beforehand the people who will follow Christ, even before they 
are born (in First Apology 28 in AFN Vol. I: 172). Justin Martyr understands 
prophecy as God’s foreknowing all that will be done by all men. He further 
elaborates on this point (in Dialogue 141 in ANF Vol. I: 269): “W but if the 
word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, 
it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably [wicked], but 
not because God had created them so”. When Justin Martyr (in First Apology 
54 in ANF Vol. I: 177) speaks of future events being prophesied, he does not 
refer to fatalism but to God’s foreknowing them: 
So what shall be told about future events being foretold, we do not say 
it came about by a fatal necessity; but God foreknowing all that shall be 
done by all men, and it being his/her decree that the future actions of all 
men shall be all recompensed according to their several value. He/She 
foretells by the Spirit of prophecy that he/she will bestow meet rewards 
according to the merit of action done, always urging the human race to 
effort and recollection, showing that he/she cares and provides for men 
(italics added). 
 
4.2.2. St. Irenaeus (120-202 C.E.) 
St. Irenaeus echoes Justin Martyr’s argument when he links foreknowledge 
to prophecy. He (in Against Heresies 4.32.2 in ANF Vol. I:506) sees 
prophecy as evidence of divine foreknowledge when he states that the Old 
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Testament “foreshadowed the images of those things which [now actually] 
exist in the church, in order that faith might be firmly established; and 
contained a prophecy of things to come, in order that man might learn that 
God has foreknowledge of all things”. St. Irenaeus (in Against Heresies 
4.32.2 in ANF Vol. I:506) also see the establishment of the Christian faith 
with God’s foreknowledge through prophecy. According to St. Irenaeus God 
even foreknows the doctrine of evil teachers (Against Heresies, 3.21.9 in 
ANF Vol. 1:454). St. Irenaeus (in Against Heresies, 4.29.2 in ANF Vol. I:502) 
also states that this exhaustive knowledge of God extends also to those who 
will choose not to believe: 
If, therefore, in the present time also, God knowing the number of those 
who will not believe, since he/she foreknows all things, has given them 
over to unbelief, and turned away his/her face from men of this stamp, 
leaving them in the darkness which they have chosen for themselves 
(italics added). 
   
At the same time St. Irenaeus (in Against Heresies, 4.32.2 in ANF Vol. I: 506) 
connects the establishment of the Christian faith with God’s foreknowledge 
through prophecy by stating that “in order that our faith might be firmly 
established; and contained a prophecy of things to come, in order that man 
might learn that God has foreknowledge of all things”. Thus I propose that St. 
Irenaeus maintained that God has exhaustive knowledge of all things. 
 
4.2.3. Tertullian (CE160-220) 
In responding to Marcion’s understanding of Adam and Eve sinning in the 
Garden of Eden as rejecting God’s foreknowledge, because this action to sin 
has shown failure in God to know the future, Tertullian maintained a position 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
by holding in tension God’s foreknowledge and predestination. He declares 
that God, who is the author of the universe by his very attributes, foreknows 
all things. When God appointed them their places, he/she did so because of 
his/her foreknowledge. Tertullian states (in Against Marcion 2.5 in ANF Vol 
III: 301) that: 
But what shall I say of his prescience, which has for its witnesses as 
many prophets as it inspired? After all, what title to prescience do we 
look for in the Author of the universe, since it was by his very attribute 
that he/she foreknew all things when he/she appointed them their 
places when he/she foreknew them (italics added). 
 
Tertullian (in Against Marcion 2.5 in ANF Vol. III: 301) adds that it was by this 
foreknowledge that God issued a caution against sin under the penalty of 
death in the Garden of Eden. Tertullian (in Against Marcion 2.7 in ANF Vol. 
III: 303) clarifies this point by stating that this foreknowledge of sin and its 
penalty did not interfere with God’s gift of freedom of choice, even if he/she 
knew that humans would perish if they chose to sin.  
 
4.2.4 Origen (CE 185-254) 
In his work against Celsus, Origen (in Against Celsus 7.44 in ANF Vol. IV: 
626) contends that God knows all who will walk worthily and will serve God 
faithfully until death. In articulating a position on the foreknowledge of God, 
Origen includes the future of all things, including sins, as part of God’s 
exhaustive knowledge. The principle behind Origen’s articulation of God’s 
foreknowledge includes human free will. He argues against Celsus that while 
God foreknew and predicted Judas’s betrayal of Jesus it does not mean God 
caused it. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, 
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comes to pass because it was predicted; but Origen (in Against Celsus 2.20 
in ANF Vol. IV: 440) argues against this by stating that: 
God who foretold it was the cause of its happening, because he/she 
foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, would have taken 
place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to God who was 
empowered with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence” (italics 
added).  
 
However, Origen in the Commentary to the Romans argues that the word 
“foreknowledge” should not be used for God’s knowledge of evil. Origen 
states, as (cited in Oden 1992:70-72): 
In scripture, words like foreknew and predestined do not apply equally 
to good and evil. For the careful student of the Bible will realize that 
these words are only used for good... When God speaks of evil people, 
s/he says that s/he that s/he never knew them... They are not said to be 
foreknown, not because there is anything that can escape from God’s 
knowledge, which is present everywhere and nowhere absent, but 
because everything which is evil is considered unworthy of his 
knowledge or of his foreknowledge. 
 
In the above statement Origen does not disprove God’s exhaustive 
foreknowledge but demonstrates that God’s actual knowledge includes all 
things, although Origen views acts of evil to be in a different relationship to 
God. Nonetheless Origen believed that God’s knowledge was exhaustive. 
 
4.2.5. St.  Augustine of Hippo (CE 354-430)  
The theological reflections of St. Augustine dominated the medieval church in 
the West. In his writings he clearly set forth the idea of God. He proclaimed 
the infallible exhaustive foreknowledge of God about all future actions and 
events, including those resulting from free choice. According to St. Augustine 
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(in City of God 11.21 in NPNF Vol. II: 216), the foreknowledge of God is like a 
mirror that reflects future events that are going to happen. Even though 
God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to the event in question, its 
content is caused by the event itself. Since there is no casual influence that 
comes from God’s foreknowledge, it in no ways jeopardizes human freedom. 
This foreknowledge is utterly unchangeable, because for Augustine all this 
takes place in the eternal present. St. Augustine (in City of God 11.21 in 
NPNF Vol. II: 216) declared:  
For he/she does not pass from this to that by transition of thought, but 
beholds all things with absolute unchangeableness; so that of those 
things which emerge in time, the future, indeed are not yet, and the 
present are now, and the past no longer are; but all of these are by 
him/her comprehended in his/her stable and eternal presence. Neither 
does God see in one fashion by the eye and in another by the mind, for 
he/she is not composed of mind and body; nor does God’s present 
knowledge differ from that which it ever was or should be for those 
variations of time, past, present and future, though they alter our 
knowledge do not effect God’s (italics added). 
 
For St. Augustine God is outside of time and so his/her knowledge is 
timelessly eternal; therefore God can see every future human decision and 
event in one all-encompassing eternal “present”.  St. Augustine (in City of 
God, 11.2 in NPNF Vol. II: 206) states that God’s knowledge is completely 
independent of time. Thus, because of God’s infallible and exhaustive 
knowledge he/she foreknows exactly how human beings will use their free 
will. This foreknowledge does not negate human choice or the use of freewill. 
St. Augustine (in City of God, 5.9 in NPNF Vol. II: 90-92), in articulating a 
response to Cicero’s denial of God’s foreknowledge, very clearly states that 
God, whose foreknowledge is infallible, knows all of human action. With 
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regard to God’s foreknowledge and the use of free will, St. Augustine (in City 
of God, 5.10 in NPNF Vol. II:93) concludes that: 
It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what would be 
in the power of our will, there is for that reason nothing is in the power 
of our will. For he/she who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing. 
Moreover, if he/she who foreknew what would be in the power of our 
will did not foreknow nothing, but, something, assuredly, even though 
God did foreknow, there is something in the power of our wills. 
Therefore we are by no means compelled, either retaining the 
prescience, to take away the freedom of the will that God is prescient of 
future things, which is impious (italics added). 
 
For St. Augustine there should be no reason to abandon free choice in favour 
of divine foreknowledge nor should one deny God’s foreknowledge as a 
condition for holding the free choice of human. Therefore St. Augustine (in 
City Of God 5. 10 in NPNF Vol. II:93) argues:  
Man does not sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it 
cannot be doubted but that it is the man himself who sins when he does 
sin, because he/she whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknows not 
that fate, or fortune, or something else would sin, but that man himself 
would sin, who, if he/she wills not, sin not. But if he/she shall not will to 
sin, even this did God foreknow (italics added). 
 
Thus, for St. Augustine God infallibly foreknew from all eternity how human 
beings would use their free will; therefore future free acts are determined 
from the vantage point of omniscience, but not from the stand point of our 
free choice. 
 
4.2.6. Anselm  
Anselm (1970:153), who followed St. Augustine’s theological insights about 
the exhaustive knowledge of God, reasoned that God exhaustively foreknows 
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every future event, and that what God foreknows will occur in exactly the 
same manner as God foreknows it. “For God foreknows every future event, 
but what God foreknows will necessarily occur in the same manner as he/she 
foreknows it to occur”. Anselm also further clarifies that this perspective of 
God’s foreknowledge includes all the free acts of human beings. Anselm 
argues (1970:154) that God, who foresees what you are willingly going to do, 
foreknows that your will is not compelled or prevented by anything else; 
hence this activity is free will. Thus, for Anselm the foreknowledge of God is 
not the cause of the event or act that occurs because of human free will. 
Anselm (1970:162-163) acknowledges that God “sees all things whether they 
are free or necessary; and conversely, as God sees them so they are”. 
Therefore because of this exhaustive knowledge of everything, the 
knowledge of God is unchangeable and eternal. Since God knows from 
eternity, Anselm argues (1976:185), “the foreknowledge of God is not 
properly called foreknowledge, for all things are always present to God. And 
so God does not have knowledge of future things, but knowledge of present 
things. Thus Anselm observes that future is present to God’s eternity. 
Therefore God does not have to see or wait for future events to take place for 
the future to pre-exist in God for all eternity. 
 
4.2.7. Thomas Aquinas 
 Thomas Aquinas, influenced by views of St. Augustine concerning God’s 
omniscience, could not accept Aristotle’s idea that God could not know the 
world, but insisted that God’s omniscience had as well to include 
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comprehensive knowledge of the world—past, present, and future. Aquinas 
(Summa Theologicia, Question 14.4)32 argues that God’s knowledge is 
dependent on him/herself. This knowledge is self-asserting, self-referential 
and self-sufficient. He thus observes:  
 
It must be said that the act of God’s intellect is his/her substance. For if 
that act of understanding were other than is substance, then something 
else would be the act of divine perfection of the divine substance, to 
which the substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is 
altogether impossible; because the act of understanding.... Now in God 
there is no form which is something other than his/her existence. Hence 
as God’s essence itself... it  necessarily follows that God’s act of 
understanding must be his/her essence and his/her existence (italics 
added).  
 
Thus God knows himself/herself by his/her own self-knowledge, as attested 
by St. Augustine. Aquinas (Summa Theologica, Question 14.3)33, concerning 
God’s understanding and awareness of him/herself, suggests that God 
knows him/ herself thoroughly and his/her self-knowledge is completely true: 
God perfectly comprehends perfectly... Now it is manifest that God 
knows Him/Herself perfectly as perfectly as God is knowable. For 
everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality, since 
a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as to 
its actuality. Now the power of God is as great as his/her actuality in 
existing because it is from the fact the God is in the act and free from all 
matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive (italics added).  
 
For Aquinas, God knows him/herself fully because the knowledge that 
God possesses cannot be separated from God. One can then conclude 
that Thomas Aquinas sees God’s knowledge as identical to God’s 
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essence. And therefore God’s knowledge and essence would be related to 
his character as immutable and eternal and simple. Therefore all 
knowledge pre-exists in God, who is the efficient Cause of all things. 
Whatever pre-exists must pre-exist in God, who is the efficient cause and 
God knows him/herself entirely. He also fully knows human beings and all 
their actions. Therefore one can conclude that God knows all things 
perfectly insofar as they all pre-exist in God. In clarifying St. Augustine’s 
position that God does not behold anything outside of him/herself, Aquinas 
(Summa Theologica, Question 14.5)34 argues that: 
God knows things other than himself. For it is manifested that S/He 
perfectly understands him/herself, otherwise God’s existence would not 
be perfect in God’s act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly 
known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known....God 
must necessarily know things other than him/herself. And this appears 
still more plainly if we add that every existence of the first cause... viz. 
God – is his/her own act of understanding. Hence whatever affects pre-
exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in, must be in God’s act of 
understanding, and all things must be in God according to an intelligible 
mode (italics added). 
 
One can conclude that God sees him/herself in him/herself because God 
sees other things not in themselves but in him/herself because God’s 
essence and knowledge are one. Furthermore, since God is an eternal Being 
all time is one eternal present and the future is part of time; therefore God 
knows the future including the free acts of human beings. Since God is 
infallible the future known to God is without error. Therefore, as an 
omniscient being, God knows all future contingents. If something has to 
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occur then God knows it will occur (Summa Theologia 1a. 14.7)35i Therefore 
God sees all things in one (thing), which is him/herself. God sees all things 
together and not successively (italics added). Thomas Aquinas goes even 
further by stating that an omniscient mind cannot be wrong about what it 
knows, because the knowledge of God is the cause of things. He states (in 
Summa Theologia  Question 14.8)36: “Now it is manifest that God causes 
things by his/her intellect, since his/her being is his/her act of understanding, 
and hence God’s knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as his/her 
will is joined to it” (italics added). Aquinas (in Summa Theologia, Question 
14.8)37 in response to objection 1 clarifies this position even futher by stating 
that the cause of things must be understood in light of God’s foreknowledge. 
That God knows what will occur must happen. This by no means diminished 
the free will action of human beings.  
As stated in Chapter one that Evangelicalism has its roots also in the 
reformation, therefore it would be appropriate to also take into 
consideration the views of Luther and Calvin. 
 
4.2.8. Martin Luther (1483-1546 CE) 
Martin Luther an Augustinian monk followed the approach of St. Augustine 
and interprets the all-knowing God from the perspective of God’s 
determined will. Luther (1957:80) states that God foreknows nothing 
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contingently, but God foresees, purposes, and does all things according to 
his/her own immutable eternal and infallible will. Therefore one can 
understand Luther as stating if God will that which he/she foreknows then 
God’s will is eternal and immutable. Luther (1957: 80-81) asserts that “the 
will of God is effective and cannot be impeded, since power belongs to 
God’s nature; and God’s wisdom/knowledge is such that God cannot be 
deceived”. Luther’s understanding of the omniscience of God is most 
clearly enunciated in his on free-will debate with Erasmus. Luther’s 
(1957:80) is unequivocal about the extent of God’s omniscience by stating 
that: 
 it is fundamentally  necessary and healthy for Christians to 
acknowledge that God foreknows nothing contingently , but that God 
foresees, purposes, and does all things according to his/her own 
immutable, eternal and infallible will. This bombshell knocks “free-will” 
flat, and utterly shatters it; so that those who want to assert it must 
either deny my bombshell, or pretend not to notice it, or find some other 
way of dodging it. 
 
Luther’s use of the term contingently speaks to that which was not previously 
planned or thought about. Therefore God cannot know things contingently, 
for to do so according to Luther (1957:81) means that God’s knowledge is 
mutable- such is not to be found in God  Thus, Luther believed that God 
knows all reality regarding him/herself and all things outside of him/herself, 
because God wills everything. God is not just a mere observer but actively 
involved in the created order. Luther (1957:81) further elaborates that this 
knowledge of the future God does not establish by “necessity” in the sense of 
compulsion, but rather out of his/her own free will. Therefore, for Luther God 
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has infallible knowledge of all future events, including those flowing from free 
choice. 
 
4.2.9. John Calvin (1509-1564 CE)  
John Calvin following the traditional framework of St. Augustine therefore 
articulates clearly the traditional understanding of omniscience or prescience 
as Calvin (as cited in McNeill: 3. 21.5: 926-929) describes it: 
The predestination by which God adopts some to the hope of life, and 
adjudges others to eternal death, no man who would be thought pious 
ventures simply to deny; but it is greatly caviled at, especially by those 
who make prescience its cause. We, indeed, ascribe both prescience 
and predestination to God; but we say, that it is absurd to make the 
latter subordinate to the former.  When we attribute prescience to God, 
we mean that all things always were, and ever continue, under his eye; 
that to his/her knowledge there is no past or future, but all things are 
present, and indeed so present, that it is not merely the idea of them 
that is before him (as those objects are which we retain in our memory), 
but that he truly sees and contemplates them as actually under his 
immediate inspection. This prescience extends to the whole circuit of 
the world, and to all creatures it . 
 
Like Luther, Calvin acknowledges that this foreknowledge does not lead to 
fatalism but that God is actively involved in the affairs of his/creatures 
when Calvin in Commentary on Genesis38  speaks of Joseph’s comments 
to Pharaoh in Genesis 41 that the knowledge of Joseph concerning future 
events was dependant on the revelation of what God himself/herself would 
do.  
Though, therefore, the providence of God is in itself a labyrinth; yet 
when we connect the issue of things with their beginnings, that 
admirable method of operation shines clearly in our view, which is not 
generally acknowledged, only because it is far removed from our 
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observation. Also our own indolence hinders us from perceiving God, 
with the eyes of faith, as holding the government of the world; because 
we either imagine fortune to be the mistress of events, or else, adhering 
to near and natural causes, we weave them together, and spread them 
as veils before our eyes. Whereas, therefore, scarcely any more 
illustrious representation of Divine Providence is to be found than this 
history furnishes; let pious readers careful]y exercise themselves in 
meditation upon it, in order that they may acknowledge those things 
which, in appearance, are fortuitous, to be directed by the hand of God. 
  
To summarise: In reviewing the early church fathers from Justin Martyr to 
the reformer John Calvin  a clear understanding of the omniscience of God 
resounds:  that God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge from all 
eternity of everything that occurs, including all free action. This infallible 
knowledge does not diminish the freedom of the human being, since God 
knows for a certainty what human beings will do. In the next section I shall 
engage an evangelical perspective on the exhaustive knowledge of God to 
show that the evangelical understanding is rooted in historical theology. 
 
4.3. An Evangelical Understanding of Omniscience 
 
Evangelicals understand God’s knowledge as being exhaustive. However 
this exhaustive knowledge should not be seen as fatalism. Helm (1993:218) 
states that fate suggests impersonality as in astrological beliefs, but 
providence is personal, the personal activity of God in his/her creation 
through which he/she brings to its appointed end or destiny. Fate may also 
suggest the interferences of the gods, whereas providence is the all-
embracing rule of the one God. Thiessen (1996:81) elaborates: “God is 
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infinite in knowledge. He knows himself and all other things perfectly from all 
eternity, whether they be actual or merely possible, whether they be past, 
present or future. He/She knows things immediately, simultaneously, 
exhaustively and truly”. This is illustrated by (Rhoda et.al.)39 in the following 
diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
God knows all true propositions 
The future is a true proposition 
Therefore, God knows the future. 
 
Grudem (1994:190), in keeping with this evangelical understanding, states 
that God fully knows all things actual and possible in one simple eternal act. 
Thus the term omniscience designates God’s cognitive awareness. God has 
knowledge of all time: past, present and future. This knowledge includes 
even the future and free actions of human beings. However, omniscience 
should not be confused with causation. Free actions do not take place 
because they are foreknown, but are foreknown because they take place 
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(Thiessen, 1996:82). Tozer (1978:62-63), in trying to explain the exhaustive 
knowledge of God, states that “God knows instantly and effortlessly all matter 
and all matters, all mind and every mind, all spirit and every spirit all being 
and every being W things visible and invisible in heaven and on earth, motion 
space time life death, good evil heaven and hell. Because God knows all 
things perfectly, he/she knows nothing better than any other thing, but all 
things equally well. God never discovers anything and is never surprised, 
never amazed. God never wonders about anything nor does s/he seek or ask 
questions”.  
The mode of God’s knowledge consists of God’s knowing all things perfectly, 
undivided, distinctly and immutably. This knowing is thus distinguished from 
human and angelic knowledge because, God knows all things by him/herself 
or by his/her essence (not by forms abstracted from things – as is the case 
with creatures – both because these are only in time with the things 
themselves, but the knowledge of God is eternal, and because God can have 
no cause outside of him/herself). Therefore God’s knowledge of him/herself 
and creation is infinite. It is exhaustive of everything external and internal to 
God. Thus the knowledge of God is not gained or acquired but is because 
he/she knows all things. God’s knowledge or knowing thus is not perceived 
fragmentarily as humans perceive from the perspective of time; God knows 
exhaustively in eternal simultaneity. Bavinck (1977:187), following the 
argument of Aquinas, states that “God is an eternal pure being and God’s 
self-knowledge has for its content nothing less than full, eternal, divine 
essence. Being and knowing are one in God. God knows him/herself by 
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means of his/her being”. While God’s knowledge is not a gradual process of 
development, neither does God’s knowledge increase or decrease. For in 
God there is no process of becoming, no development or in the words of 
Aquinas, no potentiality because God is a perfect being. For if God 
knowledge is not exhaustive, then how could we hold that which he/she 
promises in the Scriptures to be true.  Charnock (1977: 322) states this even 
more clearly:  
If God were changeable in his knowledge, it would make him unfit to be 
an object of trust to any rational creature. His revelations would want 
the due ground for entertainment, if his understanding were 
changeable; for that might be revealed as truth now which might prove 
false hereafter, and that as false how which hereafter might prove true; 
and so God would be and unfit object of obedience in regard of his 
precepts, and an unfit object in regard of his promises. For if he be 
changeable in knowledge he is defective in knowledge, and might 
promise that now which he would know afterwards was unfit to be 
promised, and, therefore, unfit to be performed. It would make him an 
incompetent object of dread, in regard of his threatenings; for he might 
threaten that now which he might know hereafter were not fit or just to 
be inflicted. A changeable mind and understanding cannot make a due 
and right judgment of things to be done, and things to be avoided; no 
wise man would judge it reasonable to trust a weak and flitting person. 
God must needs to be unchangeable in his knowledge; but as the 
schoolmen say, that, as the sun always shines, so God always knows; 
as the sun never ceaseth to shine, so God never ceaseth to know. 
Nothing can be hid from the vast compass of his understanding, no 
more than anything can shelter itself without the verge of his power.  
 
Helm (1993:169) identifies the evangelical understanding of the exhaustive 
knowledge of God as an extension of the classical tradition and theologians 
as diverse as Augustus Strong (Baptist) and Ludvig Ott (Catholic) are in 
agreement that God knows the future. 
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4.4. Analysis of Omniscience in Open Theism  
 
The denial of God’s omniscience by open theist provides a basis for the 
major lines of difference between open theism and Evangelicalism. This is 
done by the open theists appeal to Scripture that on the surface appear to 
limit God’s omniscience. These passages can be grouped into two 
categories: Divine growth in knowledge and God’s repentance. Thus open 
theists have raised serious biblical and theological objections against the 
traditional view of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. Because God only knows 
that which is true (that is, the past and present), the future is not a reality and 
is therefore false and cannot be known to God. Even the possibilities are not 
known, because this is in the future. This then calls for an engagement to 
take this proposal seriously and weigh the evidence. In this section 
consideration will be given to the positive evidence that Boyd and other 
proponents of open theism offer for their denial of divine foreknowledge 
based on their understanding of the nature of time and the nature of the 
future.  Boyd (2000:122) argues that God cannot be a- temporal using 
Hartshorne A theory and B Theory of time, while the Evangelical view of 
complete divine knowledge coexists with atemporal or the temporal view of 
God. 
 With regards to the future Boyd (2000:17) states that the idea that God does 
not know the future is not a limitation on God’s omniscience because the 
future is no something that is knowable. Therefore, God cannot know the 
future because there is no future.  For Boyd (2000:15-16) the events of the 
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future might or might not come to pass. This then present us the framework 
as to how Boyd understands that the future is not a reality and therefore 
cannot be known by God.  To keep the flow of the argument, this section, will 
also offer a critique on Boyd interpretation of some common passages in 
Scripture to investigate how Boyd comes to the understanding of God 
possessing limited knowledge. This is illustrated by (Rhoda et.al)40 in the 
following diagram 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
God knows only true propositions 
The future is not a true proposition 
Therefore, God cannot know the future 
   
4.4.1.  Boyd’s Reading of “Divine Growth in Knowledge” Texts  
One of the initial appeals of open theism is that it challenges us to read the 
text of Scripture simply for what it says which at times is taken to be 
“literalistic”. It is evident that open theism brings to the study of biblical 
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reading a fairly literal41 hermeneutics, including those passages that  
traditionally  have been understood as anthropomorphic descriptions of God. 
Evangelicals in South Africa, especially within the Baptist Tradition use the 
Grammatico-Historical42 method of interpretation.  Martin (1977:222) states 
that this method takes seriously  God’s revelation which God has been 
pleased to communicate in verbal form in the pages of Holy Scripture” For 
this reason the Evangelical interpreter begins an investigation of the text into 
the meaning of the text with a conscious endeavor to know what the words 
meant in their historical setting. Understanding what those words meant in 
the historical context, the interpreter will transpose the meaning of the text 
into present day reality. Martin (1977:223) goes on to state “a true corrective 
is supplied by our resolve to treat the whole corpus of Scripture with serious 
intent and to hear what its total witness may be by the rigorous and 
disciplined application of a method which seeks to elucidate the message in 
its original setting and in its literal sense”.  Boyd (2000:60-72) however, 
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 It is acknowledged that Evangelicals adhere to a literal hermeneutical principle of 
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sense which we call the written or literally spoken sense.” See Concordia Theological 
Quaterly. It can be stated that open theism departs from the traditional hermeneutical 
principle that scripture interprets scripture, to project their concept of God unknowing using 
Feuerbach’s theory of projection who claimed  that our conceptions of "god" are always just 
projections of our own value. 
42
 For a fuller discussion of  this subject see  Klien, Blomberg and Hubbard,  Introduction to 
Biblical Interpretation  and Mickelson, Interpreting the Bible 
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speaks of interpreting this text straightforwardly and at face value.  Boyd 
(2000:54) states that open theism is rooted in the conviction that the 
passages that are used to build up the motif of openness should be taken 
just as literally as the passages that constitute the motif of future 
determination. What Boyd infers is that this text ought to be taken just as it 
appears, as giving an exact description of God rather than being understood 
as anthropomorphic43 or metaphorical. Thus open theists offer an unusual 
hermeneutic as seen in the few examples discussed below.  
One of the key passages cited by Boyd is Genesis 22:12 (NIV): “And he said, 
‘Do not stretch out your hand against the lad, and do nothing for now I know 
you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from Me.” 
Boyd (2000:64) states that this verse has no clear explanation if God was 
certain that Abraham would fear him/her before he offered his son. To 
support his argument that God literally did not know what Abraham’s 
response would be until Abraham made it. Boyd (2000:54) insist that is God 
only literally learned what he/she had not known; this was a real test and God 
learned the results only when Abraham acted. Behind this insistence, is an 
underlying hermeneutics of a “straight forward” or “literal” or face value 
meaning as the correct interpretation of these passages.  Therefore, Boyd 
                                         
43
 It is quite interesting to note the similarities between Feuerbach Theory of Projection and 
Open Theism. For Feuerbach religion is a product of anthropomorphic projection. Open 
theist tries to understand God through these metaphorical descriptions of God in the Bible, 
thus projecting man conception of his own nature unto God. Feuerbach moves from the 
biblical narrative that Man created by God to God created by Man which open theist also do 
by interpreting God through human projections “our image”.  However, due to the scope and 
nature of this study, a comparative analysis is not possible here. I am indebted  to one of the 
examiners  in bringing to my attention to Feuerbach’s  Theory of Projection  I find  it very 
interesting as it relates to open theism and how open theist interpret the anthropomorphic 
images of God portrayed in the Bible .   
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concludes that God learns (for now I know that you fear the Lord) the state of 
Abraham’s heart as he/she observes Abraham’s willingness to offer Isaac on 
the altar. When Abraham actually raised his knife, then only was God able to 
say “now I know”. God learned something that he/she had not known before, 
and according to Boyd and other open theist this passage, like other so-
called growth knowledge text, illustrates that God does not have exhaustive 
knowledge of the future.  Commenting on Exodus 4:1-9, Boyd (2000:67) 
bemoans the fact that many interpreters fail to acknowledge God’s ignorance 
of how many miracles it might have taken to convince the people of Israel to 
believe that God had sent Moses.  Boyd (2000:65) further cites other Old 
Testament passages where God tests Israel “to know” whether Israel would 
fear him/her. He then concludes that these passages cannot be reconciled 
“with the view that God eternally knows exactly what will happen in the heart 
of a person to do” – which is in direct conflict with an Evangelical 
understanding of God’s knowledge of the future.  
If one had no other information about God, his/her nature and God’s eternal 
purposes, one would have to concede that these passages seem to teach 
that God’s knowledge is growing, that God is learning as history progresses.  
A reflection on other similar biblical texts only exposes the problem with this 
straightforward approach. Using Genesis 3:9, when the Lord calls out to 
“man” and asks “Where are you?”, a straightforward reading of the text here 
results in an interpretation that: 
 God does not presently know where “man” is; and  
 
 
 
 
130 
 
 God is spatially located so that God is unaware of where Adam and 
Eve are hiding until they reveal themselves to God. 
Thus, to read this text in the same manner as Genesis 22:12 and many other 
texts as Boyd does would result in a denial of God’s exhaustive present 
knowledge and a denial of God’s omnipresence. The problem become 
greater as one reads the narrative of Genesis 3:11-13, when God asks 
“man”: “Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree of 
which I have commanded you not to eat?” Thus, God’s question to Adam and 
Eve taken at face value serves the purpose of informing God of “mans” past 
action in violating God’s prohibition. As one continues to read, verse 13 
likewise indicates God’s ignorance of Eve’s past actions. If the hermeneutical 
principle of the straightforward reading is applied to these passages then one 
is forced to deny God’s exhaustive knowledge of the past, God’s exhaustive 
knowledge of the present and God’s omnipresence. Thus open theists are 
unwilling by their own stated commitment to deny any of the doctrines that 
are vital to their understanding that God has exhaustive past and present 
knowledge, but deny God’s future knowledge because the future is not yet 
reality and that which is not reality cannot be known. Sanders (1998:198) 
observes: “W though God’s knowledge is coextensive with reality in that God 
knows all things that can be known, the future free actions of free creatures 
are not yet reality, so there is nothing to be known.” Thus if the future truly is 
“open” it is ridiculous to speak of the content of its reality or that this reality 
can be in some sense “settled”. 
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Boyd (2000: 59) cites another passage, Numbers 14:11 as evidence that the 
future is not known to God. “And the Lord said to Moses: “How long will this 
people spurn me? And how long will they not believe in me, despite all the 
signs which I have performed in their midst?”  His premise is that God does 
not know while at the same time it reflects on God questioning Adam and 
Eve in Genesis 3:8-9 as rhetorical. It appears the only way to avoid the 
undesirable doctrinal implication of this straightforward reading is to deny the 
inconsistent openness hermeneutics used to motivate that God “grows” in 
his/her knowledge. Boyd (2000:59) argues as follows: 
Some suggest that in these verses (Num. 14:11 and Hos. 8:5) the Lord 
was asking rhetorical questions, just as he had done when God asked 
Adam and Eve where they were. (Gen.3:8-9). This is a possible 
interpretation, but not a necessary one. Unlike God’s question about 
location in Genesis, there is nothing in these texts or the whole of 
Scripture that requires these questions to be rhetorical. Moreover, the 
fact that the Lord continued for centuries, with much frustration, to try to 
get the Israelites not to despise him/her and to be ‘innocent’ suggests 
that the wonder expressed in these questions was genuine. The 
duration of the Israelites’ stubbornness was truly an open issue (italics 
added). 
 
 Boyd (2000:14-15) states that unique interpretation is needed unless one 
assumes the future is entirely settled. Boyd is unwilling to accept that the 
literalistic interpretation of anthropomorphic language regarding God’s 
knowledge brings one to the conclusion that God has limited knowledge of 
the future. 
Furthermore, Boyd believes that God did not know of Judas’s betrayal in 
eternity. He supports his arguments by arguing that John 6:64 does not 
demonstrate that Jesus knew in eternity or even early in his ministry that 
Judas would betray him. Boyd (2000:37) claims that the word arche used 
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here does not imply that Jesus has any foreknowledge that Judas would 
betray him before Judas decided in his heart to betray him. Using Isaiah 
46:9-11 and 48:3-7, Boyd maintains that God knows all things that he/she 
has planned or determined to know. God chooses not to determine anything 
involving free choices of human beings. Boyd declares that these passages 
do not reveal a God who knows the entirety of the future but one who only 
knows in part. Boyd (2000:30) argues that the future is settled to the extent 
that God is going to determine it but nothing in the Isaiah 46:9-11 and 48:3-7 
texts requires one to believe that everything that will happen will do so 
because it is settled ahead of time. Boyd claims that should Judas have 
chosen not to betray him; it is likely that Jesus could have had someone else 
to fulfill that task. Boyd seems to confuse God’s foreknowledge with direct 
causation. God’s foreknowledge therefore, should not be seen as the 
causation of an event that removes human free will or human self-
determination. Boyd (2000:31) argues that:  
Indeed, God is so confident of his/her sovereignty, we hold that, God 
does not need to micromanage everything. God could if he/she wanted 
to, but this would demean his/her sovereignty. So God chooses to leave 
some of the future open to possibilities, allowing them to be resolved by 
the decisions of free agents. It takes a greater God to steer a world 
populated with free agents rather than to steer a world of pre-
programmed automatons (italics added).  
 
God’s foreknowledge should not be seen as curtailing the actions of human 
freewill or human beings consistent with their natures. Boyd argues that 
Judas’s action of betrayal should not be based on God’s foreknowledge but 
on the very character of Judas. He states that God can predict with great 
accuracy the action of a person not necessarily through God’s foreknowledge 
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but rather through God’s insights into the character of the one performing it. 
Boyd (2000:35) states: 
Our omniscient Creator knows us perfectly, far better than we even 
know ourselves. Hence we can assume that God is able to predict our 
behaviour far more extensively and accurately than we could predict it 
ourselves. This does not mean that everything we will do is predictable, 
for our present character doesn’t determine our future character. But it 
does mean that our behaviour is predictable to the extent that our 
character is solidified and future circumstances that will affect us are in 
place. 
 
Boyd’s argument supposes that a person’s character may inevitably lead to a 
particular action that may be certainly known by God. When presented with 
circumstances one will choose to act in a certain way. Boyd (2000:35) argues 
that, given the knowledge that we have of Peter, we or anyone else who 
knew him could have predicted that he would deny Jesus. Thus, Boyd 
believes that the betrayal of Jesus was not known by God in eternity and 
argues that Jesus did have a prior knowledge of Judas’s intent to betray Him. 
Jesus only discovered this at the time of Judas’s actual decision to do so, or 
later, or at the exact moment. He selected Judas as a disciple. One must 
then also disagree with Boyd’s position that Judas’s betrayal was not a 
specific fulfilment of Scripture. 
 
4.4.2. An Evangelical Interpretation of Genesis 22:12  
Because Genesis 22:12 is the most quoted text used by open theist to prove 
that God had no knowledge of future events, it then need to be evaluated a 
bit deeper to investigate how the straight forward interpretation of Genesis 
fare? 
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There are three problems that are raised by Ware (2000:67-71) concerning 
the literal straightforward reading of the text under investigation. 
First, If God must test Abraham to find out what is in his heart, then it call into 
question God’s present knowledge of Abraham’s inner spiritual, 
psychological, mental and emotional state.  Ware (2000:68) argues using 1 
Chronicles 28:9 and 1 Samuel (16:7) to show that the Lord searches, and 
understands every intent and thought of the heart of people. In light of the 
above texts mention that speaks to the issue that God know very thought of 
human beings, doesn’t God know Abraham fully.  Ware (2000:68) observes: 
God knows that state of Abraham’s heart better than Abraham does 
himself. Is there any facet of Abraham’s inner thought, feelings, doubts, 
fears, hopes, dreams, reasoning, musings, inclinations, predisposition, 
habits, tendencies, reflexes and pattern that God does not know 
absolutely and fully” 
  
Because the openness interpretation of Genesis 22:12 claims that only when 
Abraham raises his knife to kill Isaac, does God know Abraham’s intention, 
cannot avoid but conclude that God also lacks knowledge of the present. 
This literal reading poses a problem for the open theist because it contradicts 
their own commitment to the God’s exhaustive knowledge of the present.  
 Ware (2000:68) engages the second problem by asking the question “Does 
God need this test to know specifically whether Abraham fear God.”  While 
open theist deny also the present knowledge of God (as discussed above), is 
also their denial of specific content of the present knowledge. Open theists 
state that God only knew Abraham’s true commitment when Abraham raises 
his knife over his son. It is then reasonable to conclude from this literal 
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interpretation that God does not know until the raising of the knife whether 
Abraham is God-fearing. Granting that God know Abraham’s inner life 
perfectly, it seems highly doubtful even by open theist’s standards that God 
learns about the intentions of Abraham. Boyd (2000:152) writes that God 
know the thoughts and intentions of all individuals perfectly.”  Boyd illustrates 
this by using the prediction of Peter’s denial, Boyd (2000:35) writes: 
Sometimes we may understand the Lord’s foreknowledge of a person’s 
behaviour simply by supposing that the person’s character, combined 
with that Lords perfect knowledge of all future variables, makes the 
person’s behaviour certain. As we know, character becomes more 
predictable over time. The longer we persist in a chosen path, the more 
that path becomes part of who we areW Our omniscient Creator knows 
us perfectly, far better than we ourselves. Hence we can assume the 
God is able to predict our behaviour far more extensively and accurately 
than we could predict it ourselves. 
 
If one compare the two cases between Peter and Abraham, Abraham’s heart 
seems far more predictable than Peter’s three denials. That is, it seems 
apparent that Abraham’s past conduct provides a better basis for knowing 
that state of his heart. Due to Abraham’s consistent obedience to the 
commands of God, using Boyd’s argument Abraham actions could have 
been more easily predicted, yet Boyd insist that until Abraham raised the 
knife over Isaac, God did not know whether Abraham feared him/her. 
The question then arises that If God know us better than ourselves, as shown 
by Boyd himself in such strong definitive terms with regards to God’s intimate 
and exhaustive knowledge of our inner lives and character leaves one to 
wonder why does God need to test people to know what is in their hearts. 
How then does Boyd reconcile his statements that God knows us perfectly 
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and in another that God only learns what is in our hearts by testing us? Boyd 
(2000:63) tries to alleviate this problem by using 2 Chronicles 32:31 to show 
that God is actually ignorant.  Consider Boyd’s (2000:64) statements with 
regards to his treatment of Hezekiah: “Similarly, the Bible says that God 
tested Hezekiah “to know all that was in his heart”. If God eternally knew how 
Hezekiah would respond to him/her, God couldn’t have really been testing 
him in order to come to this knowledge (italics in the original). It is important 
to notice that while 2 Chronicles 32:31 says that God sought to know “all that 
was in his heart”, Boyd (2000:64) states God sought to know “how Hezekiah 
would respond”.  Thus the preceding comment seems to contradict Boyd’s 
open theistic framework about God’s exhaustive knowledge. Given this, God 
really cannot fail to know what is in someone’s heart at any point. But for 
Boyd God can and is ignorant of future free actions. So, it is only by changing 
“know what is in the heart” to know how God will respond that Boyd makes a 
case that supports the view that God grow in knowledge. 
The third critique that Ware (2000:71) engages deals with the open theist 
commitment to the nature of libertarian freedom. Boyd (2000:64) like Sanders 
(1998:52-53)  asserts that God needed to know the Abraham was a person 
that could be trusted  with that fulfilment of the divine project, and Abraham’s 
actions made God aware that Abraham  was a faithful covenantal partner. 
Thus, Abraham’s testing proved that he is was faithful to God and can be 
trusted with working with God in the fulfilment of God’s purposes. But since 
Abraham possessed libertarian freedom, and since even God can be taken 
aback by improbable and implausible human action, what assurance would 
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God have that Abraham would still remain faithful in the future. Therefore, 
God would need to consistently test Abraham to evaluate his faithfulness to 
the God and his/her purposes. That this shows how transient the “now I 
know” is for God. Ware thus clearly illustrates how the open model 
interpretation fails. In a similar fashion open theist take divine repentance text 
is a straight forward manner as will be investigated next. 
 
 4.5. Boyd’s Reading of “Divine Repentance” Passages 
 
As discussed in the above section, a straightforward reading of particular 
texts also leads Boyd to conclude that God knowledge is limited and that God 
grow in his/her knowledge as God engages with humanity. In a similar 
fashion, Boyd interprets divine repentance texts in a straightforward manner. 
Boyd (2005:56-57) writes: 
Now some may object that if God regretted a decision he/she made, 
God then must not be perfectly wise. Wouldn’t God be admitting to 
make mistakes? It is better to allow Scripture to inform us regarding the 
nature of divine wisdom than to reinterpret an entire motif in order to 
square it with our preconception of divine wisdom. If God says he/she 
regretted a decision, and if Scripture elsewhere tells us that God is 
perfectly wise, then we should simply conclude that God can be 
perfectly wise and still regret a decision (italics added). 
 
Boyd tries to prove his case by undertaking a survey of biblical passages. 
Thomas (2001:189) states: “This technique seeks a larger picture in a 
passage before investigating the details. In fact, it disparages traditional 
methods that investigate the details first, before proceeding to the larger 
picture.” Thomas has coined the phrase “hermeneutical hopscotch” to 
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describe the practice of hopping from one carefully selected part of a 
larger section of Scripture to another. By selecting only parts that support 
a predetermined opinion, this method can demonstrate just about anything 
the interpreter desires to prove. For instance, Boyd (2000:56) begins with 
Genesis 6:6, and says: “The Lord was sorry that he had made humankind 
on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart.” He then uses this to prove 
that God did not know in advance that humans would come to this wicked 
state and therefore regrets that he/she created humanity. 
Boyd’s interpretation of Exodus 32:14 – “So the Lord changed his/her mind 
about the harm which he/she said he/she would do to his/her people” – 
suggests that God was confronted with a previously unknown situation that 
resulted in God’s reassessing his/her decision about what he/she intended to 
do. While the straightforward reading of this passage and others like it would 
lead one to this conclusion, the simplest and most straightforward reading 
may not be the true reading, as I have shown previously. Ware (1986:441-
44) states that “to inquire whether it is possible that such divine repentance 
text may be best understood as anthropomorphic”. I believe that the best way 
to understand texts in which God is said to have changed his/her mind or 
when God is said to repent it indicates 1) God’s awareness that the human 
situation has altered and 2) God’s desire to act in a willing way to this 
changed situation. In Exodus 32:14 God is aware of and takes into account 
the urgent prayer of Moses. It goes against the teaching of Scripture and 
Evangelical thought to state that God has learned something new by the 
changed situation. Rather, as indicated by Ware (2001:101), these 
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expressions of repentance or regret may indicate more narrowly that God 
was aware of what had changed and chose to act in accordance with this 
new situation. This awareness and choice to act was known from eternity, yet 
God interacts in a temporal and existential flow of developing and changing 
human situation, of which God has full knowledge. Thus God knows and 
anticipates all future human action and responds to it accordingly. 
Second, when God is said to repent it indicates God’s real experience, in 
historically unfolding relationships with people, of changed emotions or 
dispositions in relation to some changed emotion or disposition. Just because 
God knows in advance events that will occur, does not preclude God from 
expressing appropriate emotions and expressing appropriate reactions when 
it actually happens. While God may have known of the prayer of Moses, God 
nonetheless reveals his/her experience internally and expresses outwardly 
appropriate moral responses to these changed situations when they occur in 
history. This then reveals a God who expresses emotion in human history; 
while it should be noted that human action cannot generate in God an 
emotional response that alters or terminates what God has foreknown. 
That God repents from or regrets his/her decisions is difficult to reconcile with 
an evangelical understanding of the all-wise God of Scripture. Foremost, it is 
at odds with the clear teaching of the Bible that God’s knowledge is limitless 
(Psalms 147:5). Given then that “divine growth” and “divine repentance” 
passages used by Boyd does not imply that God has learned something that 
he/she has not known previously, I shall now focus on some Scriptural 
affirmations of God’s exhaustive knowledge of the future and then develop 
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theological objections to open theism’s understanding of God’s limited 
knowledge. 
Boyd has proposed some serious biblical and theological arguments against 
the traditional view of God’s omniscience; thus the model presented by Boyd 
calls for an assessment. It needs to be acknowledged that this re-
conceptualization of God and his/her relation to the world has actually 
contributed positively to how Evangelicals view God. Overall, however, there 
are many crucial problems attached to this model: it departs from traditional 
theism and ultimately leads to a departure from how evangelicals view the 
type of knowledge that God possesses. Boyd’s denial of God’s exhaustive 
knowledge provides the first major departure from Evangelicalism.  
Because of the interpretive principles that are used in the above text to 
suggest that God repents, regrets or grows in his/her knowledge, the crucial 
task here is to analyse how the “biblical evidence” of “divine repentance” and  
“divine regret: could affect how one understands God’s foreknowledge.  The 
question then arises of whether all these so-called “openness” texts should 
be interpreted literally, that is by their straightforward and literal meaning. 
While this is always the interpretative starting point, one can often be led 
astray if one insists that the straightforward meaning is in fact the intended 
and correct meaning. The answer then awaits a discussion of metaphors, 
models and anthropomorphisms. 
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4.6. Metaphors and Anthropomorphisms 
 
Because of the infinite qualitative differences that exist between God and 
his/her creation, the language used to refer to God is metaphor.  Thus 
through metaphorical language, something that is well known becomes a 
window through which one gains perspective and insight into something that 
is less well known. Since God is not identical to human, the use of metaphors 
expresses both similarities and differences between the two beings.  
McFague (1982:13) says that metaphorical statements “always contain the 
whisper, ‘it is and it is not’”.  Fretheim (1989:7) states that the metaphor does 
say something about God that corresponds to reality but is never fully 
descriptive. The metaphor does not stand over against the literal. Though the 
use of the metaphor is not literal, there is a literalness intended in the 
relationship to which the metaphor has reference. However the failure to 
recognize that difference is equally damaging when we fail to hear the 
“whisper”. Open theists have become so accustomed to looking at God 
through human imagery that they have failed to notice the difference between 
God and people. Thus Bümmer’s (1993:14) caution must remain, even when 
a metaphor is as fundamental and fruitful as describing God as a person: 
Like all conceptual models, those in theology remain metaphors and 
therefore what they assert is always accompanied by the whisper “and 
it is not”. The fruitfulness of personalist models for talking about God 
should therefore never make us deaf to the whisper that God is not like 
other people.  
 
Anthropomorphism, the representation of God in terms of human physical 
or emotional experience, abounds in Scripture and reveals the personal 
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nature of God. The use of anthropomorphic terms in Scripture is not to 
humanize God but rather to make God accessible to man. God is personal 
and through the use of anthropomorphistic characteristics God stands 
before man as a personal and living God. Thus any attempt to spiritualize 
these anthropomorphic descriptions of God ends up depersonalizing God 
and impoverishing us. Thus anthropomorphic metaphors retain both 
similarities with and differences from the divine reality they depict. The 
similarities are crucial to remember. This helps us to experience God in a 
very real and literal way. 
Yet the differences are also real and significant, and it must be kept in 
mind that there is a distinction between God and human beings. Since all 
Scripture is to some extent anthropomorphic and since all biblical 
descriptions of God are metaphorical to a certain extent, one must hold 
that the repentance and regret of God is an anthropomorphic metaphor. 
As such there are some similarities and differences.  Piper (1994:191) 
comments that one can say that there is a sense in which God does 
repent and there is a sense in which he/she does not. The strong 
declaration in 1 Samuel 15:29 and Numbers 23:19 that God cannot repent 
is intended to keep us from seeing the repentance of God in a way that 
would put God in a limited category like humans. God’s repentance is not 
like ours because God is not caught off guard by unforeseen events as we 
are because God knows all the future. So, one can conclude that this is an 
expression and emotion that is different from the regret and repentance 
that we humans experience; and that differences exist between divine 
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repentance and its human counterpart. Therefore one must not 
understand the repentance or the regret of God in any way that will 
diminish the extent and intensity of God’s foreknowledge because God is 
not a person that he/she should repent.     
In the above sections I have endeavoured to demonstrate that neither 
divine growth-in-knowledge text nor the repentant text imply that God has 
learned something he/she did not previously know. It is therefore 
imperative to address the question: Whether there is sufficient and clear 
teaching is the Bible to reflect that God in fact has exhaustive knowledge? 
It thus will be shown in the next section that there is more than ample 
proof to warrant an affirmation in God’s omniscience. 
 
4.7. An Evangelical Objection against Limited Omniscience 
 
Due to the lack of biblical and historical support for the belief in the limited 
knowledge of God, open theists like Boyd fail to provide a compelling 
theological foundation for the doctrine of limited omniscience. The arguments 
that open theists offer will be analyzed in light of evangelical theism, which 
has its roots in traditional theism. 
At the center of open theism is the limited omniscience of God. It reasons 
that: 
  God knows infallibly whatever is possible to know. 
  It is not possible to know infallibly free acts. 
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 Therefore, God does not know free acts infallibly. 
Sanders (1998:198) states that though God’s knowledge is coextensive with 
reality in that God know all that can be known, the future free actions of free 
creatures are not yet reality, and therefore there is nothing to be known. He 
(1998:132) goes on to state that this gap in God’s knowledge of the future 
does leave open the possibility that God can make mistakes about some 
points. Open theists believe that with regards to the free acts of human 
beings God can only prognosticate what human beings are likely to do, 
based on his/her vast knowledge of human character, events and 
tendencies. Open theists do make one important proviso by stating that 
anything God wishes to know about the future, in order to accomplish his/her 
ultimate plan, God can know by divine intervention. God can tamper with 
human freedom, if necessary and on occasion, so as to determine the final 
outcome of things. Ordinarily God does not do this; hence human beings are 
free to do what even God him/herself does not know (Boyd 2000:34). 
Evangelicals have no difficulty with the logical form of this basic argument 
about God’s omniscience, which is that God cannot know the impossible. 
The disagreement evangelicals have with Boyd and open theists is with the 
content of the second assertion that it is not possible for God to know 
infallibly any action of humans that may occur in the future. 
These conclusions can be challenged in two ways. First, these conclusions 
assume a particular view of free choice called “libertarianism” that not all 
evangelicals accept. Evangelicals who hold to the Calvinistic tradition argue 
that free acts are actions which one desires. God gives free agents the desire 
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that God decrees. Hence, future free acts in the sense can be free yet 
determined. Since they are determined they can be infallibly known by God in 
advance. 
Second, evangelicals who follow traditional theists such as St. Augustine, 
Anselm and Thomas Aquinas point out that there is no contradiction in 
claiming that the future free action of human beings is both determined as it 
relates to God’s infallible foreknowledge and free as it relates to the 
individual’s power to do otherwise. Thus, infallible foreknowledge and free 
choice are not contradictory. 
The law of non-contradiction demands that, to be contradictory, two 
propositions must affirm and deny the same thing in the same sense and in 
the same relationship. But in this case, an event is determined in one 
relationship (God’s knowledge) but not determined in a different relationship 
(free choice). 
Boyd argues that the future is not a reality and is therefore not true. God 
could not know events in advance because they have not yet occurred. 
Earlier, I pointed out that Boyd (2000:34) admits that God can know, 
intervene in and determine the future action of a free agent to bring about 
God’s purposes. Therefore, Boyd cannot object to the possibility of God 
knowing future free actions of human beings and the reality of the future. 
Evangelicals on the other hand believe that God knows in advance events 
that will occur. Evangelicals have no problem with saying that God can know 
something is going to occur because an eternal God does not fore-see. All 
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future events are present to God in the eternal now. Thus the future is reality 
to God, therefore true.  
Barth (1957:558), in keeping with  the classical understanding of the attribute 
of omniscience, states: “W we now take a further step and say of the divine 
knowledge first that it possesses that character of foreknowledge, in relation 
to all its objects, with the exception of God him/herself in his/her knowledge 
of him/herself” (italics added). 
Brunner further clarifies this position, although critical of the influences of 
Greek philosophy on Christian theology as espoused by open theists; he 
nonetheless advocates a traditional view of divine foreknowledge. Brunner 
(1949:262) argues: 
God knows of an action of the creature, which is not his/her own action. 
God knows above all about the free activity of that creature to which 
he/she has granted the freedom to decide for him/herself. The future 
can only be known by us as contained in the present as it necessarily 
follows from that which now is. The freedom of The Other is the 
borderline knowledge of our knowledge. For God this limitation does not 
exist. His/Her knowledge of the future is not  a knowledge based upon 
something that already exists in the present, but that it is a knowledge 
which lies outside the boundaries of temporal limitations ... God know 
that what takes place in freedom in the future as something which 
happens in freedom (italics added). 
   
Grudem (1994:191) acknowledges that when evangelicals speak of God’s 
knowledge they understand it as being that God knows everything in one 
“simple act” and that what God knows is not divided into parts. This means 
that God knows everything fully. Versfeld (1972:100-101) states the we must 
not think of time in the impersonal manner to which classical physics has 
accustomed us i.e. (past present and future) and by quoting St. Augustine 
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(Confessions XI) states that the past and the future must be experienced as 
the present is experienced. Thus God is always present to him/herself and to 
all history. Thus St. Augustine see the very substance of God as eternity and 
by eternity St. Augustine means the act by which God is always present to 
him/herself and to all history (Versfeld, 1972:101).  Thus eternity is time 
proper to God, who comprehends everything in the present. God thus guides 
history, so that so that when one looks back at their lives, one can see how 
wonderfully God operated in guiding all things in him/her. 
 
Summary 
 
The classical understanding of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, which is an 
essential belief in the evangelical Christian church, should not be abandoned 
for a position that has no biblical or theological foundation. Open theism, 
which has its source in process theology, seriously undermines the doctrine 
of God’s unchanging character. In trying to understand human freedom at the 
expense of forfeiting God’s thorough knowledge of the future and by 
interpreting anthropomorphic text literally, open theists have created a finite 
or limited God.  
Denial of the infallible and exhaustive knowledge of God has serious 
implications for evangelicals, not the least of which is that it undermines one 
of the core statements of faith within the evangelical tradition: that is, the 
infallibility of Scripture.  
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Chapter 5  
 
God’s Immutability: A  Literary Investigation  
 
Introduction 
 
In a rapidly changing world, the constancy of God is a comfort. When the 
Bible states God as being the same yesterday, today and forever, it reflects a 
God who does not change. This divine immutability involves several aspects. 
Erickson (1998:395), states that first there is no quantitative change. God 
cannot increase in anything because God is already perfection and if God 
decreased in anything he/she would cease to be God. Second, there is no 
qualitative change. The nature of God does not undergo modification. God 
does not change his/her mind, or modifies actions that rest on his/her nature 
which remains unchanged no matter what happens. Kierkegaard (1958: 256), 
in articulating a defence for the immutability of God, states that while the 
world is in a constant flux, God remains unchanged, and no change touches 
God, not even the shadow of change. For Kierkegaard God remains eternally 
unchanged. Grudem (1994:163), defines the unchangeableness or 
constancy of God as follows as “God is unchanging in his/her being, 
perfection, purpose and promise, yet God acts and feels emotion and God 
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acts and feels differently in response to different situations” (italics added). 
Edward (1978:305-306) states: 
that the doctrine of utter unchangeableness of God set severe limits 
upon understanding other divine attributes such as God’s activity, 
omniscience and eternity in classical supernaturalism. God was 
required to know a changing world in an utterly unchanging way, to act 
upon a temporally developing world of nature and human history in a 
totally a temporal way... rather than successively.  
 
However, Pinnock (1994:120), following in the footsteps of Edward, asks how 
God can know a changing world if God is unchangeable. Pinnock believes 
that through God’s growing knowledge of a changing world, God cannot be 
omniscient and unchangeable while engaging a changing world. According to 
open theists, this changing knowledge develops a God who changes. As 
Nash (1983:99) observes: “Of all the current debates about the divine 
attributes, the disagreement over the property of immutability is the most 
heated. However, Seeberg (1964:114-115) observes that among the early 
apologists the true Christian doctrines included: “There is One God, the 
Creator, Adorner, and Preserver of the world W The invisible God is 
unbegotten, nameless, eternal, incomprehensible, and unchangeable Being”.  
 
Ware (1986:434-437) reflects on the immutability of God in the following 
ways: 
 Ontological immutability: God is unchangeable in the supreme 
excellence of his/her nature, i.e. the immutability of God’s eternal and 
self-sufficient being. Thus in affirming God’s ontological immutability, 
God is attributed with changelessness of his/her own independent 
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existence, essence or attribute, which qualities of being have ever 
been his/her alone and to which no future quality or value can be 
added. 
 Ethical immutability: God is also unchangeable in his unconditional 
promise and moral obligations to which he/she has freely pledged 
him/herself. This is referred to as the faithfulness and reliability of God 
by which he/she is true to his/her word and unfailing in accomplishing 
that which he/she has promised. 
 
The following section reflects how the early Church Fathers understood 
God’s immutability. 
 
5.1. Evidence from the Church Fathers to Reformers   
 
The early church fathers maintained that the true God was unchangeable in 
character, while they did not deny that God alerted his/her actions in time, so 
that humans might see God ostensibly as changing his/her mind. The early 
church fathers accepted that, from all eternity, these supposed changes were 
in fact settled. Changes within time are for the benefit of the successions of 
events to be understood by finite beings.  
 
5.1.1. Novatian (200-258 CE)  
Novatian (in Treatise Concerning the Trinity, 4 in AFN Vol. V: 614-615) 
affirms that God is immutable in his/her essential being. In discussing his 
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view of the Trinity, Novatian embraces the notion that God does not change 
in essential Being. He argues that the nature of God does not allow God to 
change. Thus God cannot be both good and evil or be the originator of both 
good and evil. Thus, for Novatian there is no increase or decrease in any part 
of God: to do so God would have to be mortal, thus making God imperfect. 
This immutability, according to Novatian, means that whatever God is, God 
always is; whoever God is, he/she is always Him/Herself; and whatever 
character God has, God always has. Therefore God says: “I am God, I 
change not.” Novatian argues that anything not born cannot undergo change, 
holding his/her condition always. For whatever is in God constitutes divinity 
and therefore must always exist, maintaining itself by its own power, so that 
God should always be God. 
Thus the attribute of simplicity is directly related to immutability. God’s 
attributes are not independent of each other and they interact without causing 
any change to the perfect Being. Novatian argues that any change in God’s 
perfect being would make God less than divinity, for if God were to 
experience change then God would cease to be God. Novatian (in Treatise 
Concerning the Trinity, 4 in AFN Vol. V: 614-615)  uses the immutability of 
God as a criteria to establish and validate the nature of God:  
God is incorruptible, he/she is therefore both immortal and because 
God is immortal he/she is incorruptible, – each being involved by turns 
in each other, with itself and in itself, by a mutual connection and 
prolonged by a vicarious concatenation to the condition of eternity. 
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5.1.2. Aristides (125 CE) 
Aristides, who was renowned for his faith and wisdom, presented books on 
Christian religion to the prince Hadrian to prove that Jesus was the only God. 
He (in Apology 4 in AFN Vol. X: 265) uses immutability as evidence for the 
prince Hadrian that someone is truly God. Those that are subject to change 
and decay Aristides calls created things. However, Aristides understands 
God as being immortal, indivisible and immutable. While interacting with the 
world, God sees, overrules and transforms everything.   
Let us turn now, O King, to the elements in themselves, that we may 
make clear in regard to them, that they are not gods, but a created 
thing, liable to ruin and change, which is of the same nature as man; 
whereas God is imperishable and unvarying, and invisible, while yet 
he/she sees, and overrules, and transforms all things.  
 
5.1.3. Melito of Sardis (160 CE) 
In articulating a response to the discourse in the presence of Marcus 
Antoninus to reveal God to him, Melito states that sin is when a person 
abandons that which really exists and serves that which does not in contrast 
to the true God. Melito uses the attribute of God’s immutability to argue his 
point. Melito (in Remains of the Second and Third Centuries in ANF Vol.VIII: 
751) states: 
There ‘is’, that which really exists by his/her power, and it is called God. 
He/She I say really exists, and by his/her power doth everything subsist. 
This being is in no sense made, nor did God ever come into being, but 
always existed from eternity and will continue to exist forever and ever. 
God changeth not, while everything else changes (italics added).  
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5.1.4. Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria (250-328 CE) 
While little is known of Alexander’s early life, he came to lead the church as 
the thirteenth Pope in 313 CE. Arius was a fourth century Alexandrian 
presbyter condemned as a heretic by the First Ecumenical Council at 
Nicaea because of his teaching that Jesus Christ the Son of God was not 
co-eternal and co-substantial with God the Father, but was rather a created 
being subordinate to the Father. To this Alexander responds (in Epistle on 
Arian Heresy 12 in ANF Vol. VI: 295): 
Concerning who we thus believe even as the Apostolic Church 
believes, in one Father unbegotten, who has from no one the cause of 
His being, who is unchangeable and immutable, who is always the 
same and admits of no increase or diminution. 
  
He goes on to state that Jesus Christ, being of the essence of the Father, is 
also immutable: “He is equally with the Father unchangeable and 
immutable, wanting in nothing”. This again affirms that the immutability of 
God was the belief of the early church.  
 
5.1.5. St. Augustine Of Hippo (354- 430 CE) 
According to Gilson (1983:22), the question of God’s immutability was for St. 
Augustine not simply one aspect of his doctrine, but was “perhaps, the most 
profound and most constant element in his metaphysical thought”. 
 For Augustine, God is unchanging, because his/her immutability follows 
his/her supremacy. The intrinsic nature of God’s immutability is the evidences 
of divinity. St. Augustine (in City of God in NPNF Vol. II 12.2: 277) states that 
since God is a Supreme Being he/she cannot change and being God, he/she 
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created all things. Augustine (in City of God in NPFF Vol. II 11.1: 203) affirms 
that only God is immutable, for no created thing can be immutable. Thus 
there can be only one true unchangeable good, the blessed God.  
According to St. Augustine, anything that is open to change is mutable; thus 
St. Augustine (in Confessions in NPNF Vol. I 12:15: 181) conclude that even 
God’s will is immutable and eternal: 
Truth tells me in my inner ear, concerning the very eternity of the 
Creator, that his/her substance is in no wise changed by time, nor that 
God’s will is separate from his/her substance?.... God willeth not one 
thing now, another anon, but once and forever God willeth all things that 
he/she willeth; not again and again, nor now this, now that; nor willeth 
afterwards what he/she willeth not beforeWSuch a will is mutable and 
no mutable thing is eternal; but our God is eternal (italics added). 
 
God’s mind also cannot change, for to change means that God then is 
created and therefore not divine. For St. Augustine (ibid) God does not 
operate in our three-dimensional understanding of time but operates in a 
manner different and profoundly unlike our way of thinking.  St. Augustine (in 
City of God in NPNF Vol. II 11.21: 216) states: 
God’s mind does not pass from one thought to another. God’s vision is 
utterly unchangeable. Thus, God comprehends all that takes place in 
time – the not yet existing future, the existing present and the no-longer-
exiting past in an immutable and eternal present... [Neither] is there any 
then, now or afterwards in his/her knowledge, for unlike ours, it suffers 
no change with triple time present, past and future. With God there is no 
change, no shadow of alteration (italics added). 
 
The divine mind and will cannot change because they are identical with 
his/her essence. If God’s will is part of his/her substance and God’s 
substance cannot change then it remains true for St. Augustine that the 
will and mind of God cannot change. For God, to change his/her will or 
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mind means that God cannot be eternal or divine because God is forever 
identical with him/herself. 
 
 5.1.6. Anselm (1033-1109 CE)  
Anselm found grounds for the immutability of God in God’s perfection, 
simplicity, supremacy and his/her unique immateriality. One of Anselm’s 
proofs (1962:2) for God’s existence is the argument from degrees of 
perfection in the world: 
 Some beings are more nearly perfect than others. 
 But things cannot be more or less perfect unless there is 
something wholly perfect by which they can be compared and 
judged to be less perfect than it. 
 Therefore, there must be a most perfect Being which we call God. 
But if God is absolutely perfect he/she cannot change, since any 
change would be for the worst, and God would then not be perfect. 
Anselm also based God’s immutability on his/her simplicity, with the basic 
idea that God cannot be analysed or divided. For Anselm God is 
ontologically one being without dimensions, poles or divisions. God is 
therefore, the ultimate reality of him/herself”. 
Anselm, like the other early church fathers, continues with the argument 
that sees the immutability of God as evidence for divinity and eternality. 
However, for Anselm (1962:87) God’s immutability follows from his/her 
unique immateriality: that is, God being spirit has no parts and so there 
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cannot be more than one spirit of this kind. And this spirit must be an 
indivisible spirit. With regards to eternality, Anselm uses the immutability 
of God to argue for God’s eternality. Thus Anselm (1962: 83) understands 
that God must be eternal without beginning or end. God cannot be 
temporal or transient but is immutable and indivisible.  
Anselm (1962:161) sees God’s immutability as a basis for his/her infallible 
knowledge. For Anselm even the free choices of men are fully known by 
God even before they come to pass. Because God’s attributes are 
identical to him/herself, his/her knowledge does not change due to the 
free action of human will. For Anselm, God cannot change in his/her 
nature, since he/she is perfect, unique, spiritual and supreme and that 
God has an infallible ability to “foresee the future”. 
 
5.1.7. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE) 
In articulating a defense against the question that God is not immutable, 
Aquinas (in Summa Theologica 1. 9 1)44 offers three basic arguments in 
favour of God’s immutability. He first argues that a God of pure actuality 
has no potentiality to be other than what he/she is, while change can only 
come from potentiality to be something other than what one is. The 
second argument of Aquinas that confirms God’s immutability relates to 
simplicity. He uses arguments (Summa Theologica 3.1.7)45 that draw on 
St. Augustine’s conclusion that God is truly and absolutely simple; and 
                                         
44
 See http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1009.htm. 
45
 See http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1003.htm. 
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that God is without parts and therefore cannot change. The reasoning is 
that only something that does not change attaches itself to self-identity. If 
God changes then God would not be God. Because, according to 
Aquinas, this would not be a change but an annihilation of that being. The 
third argument for the immutability of God extends from absolute 
perfection. Whatever changes requires something new. But an absolutely 
complete Being cannot acquire anything new. God is perfect. Therefore 
God cannot change. 
 
5.1.8. Martin Luther 
Luther understanding of God’s immutability can also be derived from his 
argument on the Bondage of the Will.  Althaus (1966:105) reflects that 
central to all of Luther's theology is his understanding of God that can be 
summarized as Gottes Gottheit, which means "God is God."  In the 
deepest sense, Luther believes that God is above all and in all. God, 
through his creative power, reveals that he is free and immutable. He 
alone can bring life into existence. He alone sustains life. He alone freely 
wills. Moreover, what  God wills cannot be impeded or resisted by a mere 
creature. God is all-powerful and therefore, God's will is alone immutable. 
Luther acknowledges that God and his/her knowledge in one that is; 
God's will cannot be changed, altered or impeded. The immutability of 
God's will is the logical conclusion to the freedom of God's will. God's 
sovereignty and almighty power demands that whatever God wills 
happens by necessity. Nothing occurs contingently. God's will does not 
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act independently of reality, as the human will does, but rather, God's will 
creates reality. In Luther's theology, the will of God is not contingent and 
so likewise, the foreknowledge of God is also not contingent. For 
whatever God wills, he/she foreknows and so, whatever he/she 
foreknows must, by necessity, happen. For if it did not happen, then God 
would be fallible and his/her will contingent which Luther (1957:105) 
declares “is not to be found in God!” It is the immutable will of God, acting 
freely, that provides the Christian with “the assurance of things hoped for” 
(Heb. 11:1), namely that the promises of God will be fulfilled. As Luther 
(1957: 81) suggests, “the Christian's chief and only comfort in every 
adversity lies in knowing that God does not lie, but brings all things to 
pass immutably, and that His will cannot be resisted, altered or impeded. 
Therefore to change his/her will God must then also change in his/her 
plan and purposes making God mutable. Luther (1961:178) in discussing 
the wrath of God against falsehood as oppose to those who live on the 
“immutable truth of God” causes us to be comforted if believed because 
God does not change. Luther (1961:117) declares that God is 
unchangeable; however God is magnified in our knowledge and 
experience when we greatly esteem and highly regard God. God nature 
does not change based on how humanity views him/her or on how God 
inter acts with humanity. 
 
5.1.9. John Calvin 
Calvin considered it settled in Christian theology that God is immutable. 
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The immutability of the Word of God is inherent is the very essence or 
nature of God. Calvin (as cited in McNeill: I.13.7:129) asserts:  
John at once attributes to the word of God a solid abiding presence and 
ascribes something uniquely his/her own, and shows how God, by 
speaking, was creator of the universeW.Unchangeable, the Word 
abides everlasting one and the same with God and is God him/herself.  
 
Because God is immutable thus any attempts made to thwart the 
purposes or promises of God will fail. In discussing Psalm 110:1 Calvin 
(as cited in McNeill:  2:15:497-498) states:  
The Psalmist declares that no matter how many strong enemies plot 
against the church, they do not have the power to prevail against/over 
the God’s immutable decrees which God appointed to Jesus Christ. 
Hence it follows that the devil, with all the resources of the world, can 
never destroy that which is eternally decreed. 
 
Calvin (as cited in McNiell: 3.20.43:906) drawing on St. Augustine the 
perspective and understanding of prayer directs Christian to pray 
according to the will of God. A will that is not hidden and unchangeable. 
Calvin therefore understands that there is no tension between the will and 
the very nature of God. For God to change his/her plan must include a 
change in his/her very nature. 
The above historical review illustrates that the immutability of God was 
affirmed by the early church fathers and reformers, who stressed that it is 
impossible for God to change for better or for worse. God cannot gain 
value, since God eternally encompasses all such values in his/her intrinsic 
being. Because God is immutable so too are his/her plans and promises. 
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5.2. An Evangelical Understanding of Divine Immutability 
 
The doctrine of the immutability of God held by evangelicals is grounded 
firmly in biblical contexts from both the Old and New Testaments and 
through the writings of the early and medieval church. The definition of 
God’s immutability having the attributes of being unchanging in nature, 
desire, purpose and promises as espoused by evangelicals finds its roots 
in the teaching of the early church fathers and in Scripture. Grudem 
(1994:163) states  God is unchanging in being, perfection, purposes and 
promises. Yet God does act and feel emotion, and he acts differently in 
response to different situations. Grudem (1994:163) goes on to state that 
that while God created a changing universe, but in contrast to this change 
God is “ the same” referring to Malachi 3:6 and James 1:17. Bavinck 
(1977:149) notes that the fact that God is immutable is of the utmost 
importance in maintaining the Creator/creature distinction, and for our 
worship of God: 
The doctrine of God’s immutability is of highest significance in religion. 
The contrast between being and becoming marks the difference 
between Creator and the creature. Every creature is continually 
becoming. It is changeable, constantly striving, seeks rest and 
satisfaction, and finds rest in God, in him/her alone, for only God is a 
pure being and no becoming. Hence, in Scripture God is often called 
the Rock (Italics added).   
  
Erickson (1988:304) speaks of God’s constancy as involving several 
aspects: 
There is first no quantitative change in God. God cannot increase in 
anything because he/she is already perfect. Nor can God decrease, for 
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if God were to decrease, God would cease to be God. There is also no 
qualitative change. The nature of God does not undergo modifications. 
Therefore, God does not change his/her mind, plans or actions, for 
these rest on his/her nature (Italics added). 
 
While, Karl Barth’s perspective concerning scripture is different from an 
Evangelical understanding that the Bible is the Word of God, Barth’ 
understanding of God’s attributes or perfection is worthy of our consideration 
here. For Barth (1957:491-493) God constancy (immutability) means that 
God remains who God is, a living immutable God.  This perfection of God’s 
constancy does not mean immobility, for this type of abstract immutability for 
Barth (1957:494) cannot be equated to the God of the Bible. Barth 
(1957:494) therefore describes God’s perfection by stating that God is 
immutably the living God in his/her freedom and love.  However, this love and 
freedom does not negate the constancy of God but rather affirms it. God is 
what God is in his/being and actuality and therefore God cannot deny 
him/herself. Barth (1957: 494-495) states: 
 
At every place God is what God is continually and self-consistently. 
His/Her love cannot cease to be His/Her love nor His/Her freedom 
His/Her freedom. God alone could assail, alter, abolish, or destroy 
Himself/Herself. But it is just at this point that He/She is the “immutable” 
God. For at no place or time can God or will God turn against 
Himself/Herself or contradict Himself/Herself, not even in virtue of 
His/Her freedom or for the sake of His love (italics added). 
 
Barth’s perspective of the immutability of God is in keeping with an 
Evangelical understanding.  
 
5.2.1. Arguments for the Immutability of God  
Geisler (2001:108-110) presents arguments for the immutability of God 
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that resonate within Evangelicalism: 
 The argument from Pure Actuality 
God is Pure Actuality. God is being; everything else merely comes into being. 
Evangelicals understand that God is the great I Am, the Self-Existent One. 
To speak of   “pure actuality”    does not only mean that   God is completely 
determinate and without any residual indeterminacy or "potency" but also that 
God is existence or "actuality" pure and simple, without any limitation.  God 
exists in the fullest possible sense exhibiting all pure perfections to the 
highest degree. God's essence is therefore said to be identical with his/her 
existence. What God is, the very fullness of being, guarantees that he/she is. 
Creatures exist in a diminished sense, however, and exhibit perfections only 
to a limited degree as constrained by their natures or essences.  From this 
perspective, that which is created has the “potency” to change. God is 
essential a Pure Act who lacks no “potency”. Therefore, what has no 
potentiality cannot change, because change is passing from one state of 
potentiality to a change of actuality, or from actuality to potentiality. Therefore 
evangelicals understand that God cannot change. To change means that 
God is temporal; but God is atemporal and thus to deny God’s non-
temporality is to deny who God actually is. This is inconsistent with 
evangelicalism and disastrous for the divine attributes under investigation. 
 The Argument from Simplicity 
God is infinite and an infinite being cannot be divided, because God cannot 
be divided into infinite parts. Therefore to speak of the argument from 
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simplicity is to state that nothing can be added or subtracted from God.  
Therefore, to diminish any attribute is to diminish God him/herself because 
God’s attributes are what God is. Every attribute of God is identical with his 
essence. 
Bavinck (1977:176) explains: 
The simplicity is of great importance, nevertheless, for our 
understanding of God. It is not only taught in Scripture (where God is 
called “light,” “life,” and “love”) but also automatically follows from the 
idea of God and is necessarily implied in other attributes. Simplicity 
here is the antonym of “compounded.” If God is composed of parts, like 
a body, or composed of genus (class) and differentiae (attributes of 
different species belonging to the same genus), substance and 
accidents, matter and form, potentiality and actuality, essence and 
existence, then his perfection, oneness, independence and immutability 
cannot be maintained.  
 
God is not an abstract Absolute Idea who happens to have knowledge and 
power. Rather, God in his/her very essence, within him/herself and by 
him/herself, is omniscience, immutability and omnipotence. God is whatever 
he/she has, for he/she has nothing that he/she is not. 
 The Argument from Perfection 
The third argument that Geisler (2001:108) uses for the immutability of God 
comes from God’s absolute perfection. The perfection of God means that 
he/she is devoid of all change in essence, attributes, consciousness, will, and 
promises. No change is possible in God, because all change must be to 
better or worse, and God is absolute perfection. No cause for change in God 
exists, either in him/herself or outside of him/her. Since God is absolutely 
perfect he/she cannot be more complete or find improvement. Therefore God 
cannot change. 
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 The Argument from Infinity 
Evangelicals affirm that God is infinite as his/her being has no limits. 
Temporal beings, however, do have limits and has a beginning because 
whatever is temporal must have a beginning and therefore must have a 
cause. As discussed in argument from simplicity, an infinite being cannot 
be divided. Hence it is impossible for an infinite being to have parts. For 
change involves the loss or gain of parts; hence an infinite being cannot 
change. 
 The Argument from Necessity 
Geisler (2001:267) holds to the view that God is a Necessary being. If God 
is a Necessary being, then he/she cannot change. That is to state that 
God has no potential in his/her being not to be. If God has no potentiality 
in his/her being, then God is a Pure Actuality and thus cannot change. 
 The Argument from an Unchanging Cause 
Geisler (2001:72) asserts that the Bible declares and logic demands that 
God is the First, Uncaused Cause. This means that God existed before 
and beyond the space-time universe. Thus to argue that God becomes 
temporal at creation makes no logical sense, because God is non-
temporal by nature before and after creation. Therefore the act of creating 
beings with free will does not in any way make God finite or temporal. 
Creation brought about a difference in relationship, not in essence. Prior to 
creation the Creator had no relationship with creation.  
Based on Geisler’s arguments, evangelicals understand that owing to 
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God’s constancy his/her intentions are always consistent with his/her 
purposes, which are also always consistent because God’s will does not 
change. Evangelicals therefore understand that God’s immutability can be 
applied in the following ways: 
 
5.2.2. The Immutability of God’s being  
Immutability is a property which belongs to the divine essence in the 
sense that God can neither gain new attributes that he/she didn't have 
before, nor lose those already his/hers. To put it simply, God doesn’t grow. 
There is no increase or decrease in the Divine Being. If God increases 
(either quantitatively or qualitatively), he/she was, necessarily, incomplete 
prior to the change. If God decreases, he/she is, necessarily, incomplete 
after the change. The deity, then, is incapable of development either 
positively or negatively. God neither evolves nor devolves. His/her 
attributes, considered individually, can never be greater or less than what 
they are and have always been. God will never be wiser, more loving, 
more powerful, or holier than he/she ever has been and ever will be. 
This is at least implied in God’s declaration to Moses: “I am who I am” (Exod. 
3:14); and is explicit in other texts. For example: “Every good and perfect gift 
is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights, who does 
not change like shifting shadows” (Jam. 1:17). “I the Lord do not change. So 
you, O descendants of Jacob, are not destroyed” (Mal. 3:6). “Jesus Christ is 
the same yesterday and today and forever” (Heb. 13:8).  
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 5.2.3. The Immutability of God’s Life   
When Evangelicals talk about the immutability of God’s life, they are very 
close to the notion of eternality or everlastingness i.e.  God never began to 
be nor will ever cease to be. God simply is. He/She did not come into 
existence (for to become existent is a change from nothing to something), nor 
will he/she go out of existence (for to cease existing is a change from 
something to nothing). God is not young or old:  God is. Thus one can read: 
“In the beginning you laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are 
the work of your hands. They will perish, but you remain; they all wear out 
like a garment. Like clothing you will change them and they will be discarded. 
But you remain the same, and your years will never end” (Ps. 102:25-27). 
“Before the mountains were born or you brought forth the earth and the 
world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God” (Ps. 90:2; cf. 93:2).  
 
5.2.4. The Immutability of God’s Character   
Immutability may also be predicated on God’s moral character by stating that 
God cannot become better (morally) than who he/she already is. If God could 
change (or become) in respect to his/her moral character, it would indicate 
that he/she had been morally imperfect or incomplete antecedent to the time 
of change, and hence never God. If for the worse, it would indicate that 
he/she is now morally less perfect or complete, i.e., subsequent to the time of 
change, and hence no longer God. It will not do to say that God might 
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conceivably change from one perfect being into another equally perfect 
being. For then one has to specify in what sense God has changed. What 
constitutes God as different in the second mode of being from what he/she is 
in the first? Does God have more attributes, fewer attributes, better or worse 
attributes? If God in the second mode of being has the same attributes (both 
quantitatively and qualitatively), in what sense is he/she different from what 
he/she was in the first mode of being?  
5.2.5. The Immutability of God’s Plan  
To deny immutability to God’s purpose or plan would be no less an affront to 
the deity than to predicate change of his/her being, life, and character. There 
are, as I understand, only two reasons why God would ever be forced to or 
need to alter his/her purpose:  
 If God lacked the necessary foresight or knowledge to anticipate any 
or all contingencies (in which case God would not be omniscient, 
contrary to the claims of open theism); or  
 If God had the needed foresight or knowledge but lacked the power 
or ability to effect what he/she had planned (in which case he/she 
would not be omnipotent).  
But since God is infinite in wisdom and knowledge, there can be no error or 
oversight in the conception of his/her purpose. Also, since God is infinite in 
power (omnipotent), there can be no failure or frustration in the 
accomplishment of his/her purpose. The many and varied changes in the 
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relationship that God sustains with human beings, as well as the more 
conspicuous events of redemptive history, are not to be thought of as 
indicating a change in God’s being or purpose. They are, rather, the 
execution in time of purposes eternally existing in the mind of God. For 
example, the abolition of the Mosaic Covenant was no change in God’s will; it 
was, in fact, the fulfilment of his/her will, an eternal will which decreed change 
(i.e., change from the Mosaic to the New Covenant). Christ’s coming and 
work was no makeshift action to remedy unforeseen defects in the Old 
Testament scheme. It was but the realization (historical and concrete) of 
what God had from eternity decreed. 
 
5.3. Boyd’s understanding of Divine Immutability 
 
God immutability has been challenged by advocates of process theology, a 
theological position described in my introduction that views God as in a 
constant state of flux. Process theologians believe that process and change 
are essential aspects of that which genuinely exists; therefore God must be 
changing over time also. Process theologians like John Cobb and David 
Griffin believe that God is continually changing, adding to him/herself all the 
experiences that happen anywhere in the universe. Boyd who endorses the 
teaching of Hartshorne (1967:248) viewed God as: 
“An enduring society of actual entities” — not an “I" who endures 
through change but an “I-I-I-I” series that is created partially anew each 
moment. God in his/her present concrete state is not identical to what 
he/she was in his/her previous concrete state. The God one may serve 
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now is not the God one may have served yesterday nor the God one 
may serve tomorrow — or even the next second (italics added). 
 
Boyd adopts and modifies much of Hartshorne’s position. Boyd (1993) 
agrees that God has two poles: one represents God as God is necessarily 
(eternal) and the other what God experiences moment-by-moment 
(temporal). In other words, God is supremely consistent in his/her character 
while also supremely changing in his/her responsiveness to creation and 
his/her relationship to the Godhead as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This for 
Boyd (1993: 232) means “the totality of what God is at any given moment is 
contingent”. What God experiences in and outside of him/herself changes 
him/her. Thus for Boyd (1993: 386) God is “an eternally on-going event, and 
an event which is dynamic and open.” Within God, there is “eternally ‘room 
for expansion’” Boyd in modifying Hartshorne’s view comes up with a 
neoclassical model that tries to satisfy the biblical portrayal of God. 
 Boyd (1992: 2003) therefore sees God as one who is in a constant change 
of flux as he/she responds to the free actions of human beings. Boyd also 
rejects the immutability of God because he sees that as a product of the 
influence of Greek philosophy. Boyd (2000:109) states that the view of God 
as eternally unchanging in every respect (and thus possessing an eternal, 
unchanging foreknowledge of all of world history) owes more to Plato than it 
does to the Bible. However, God’s immutability, rightly understood, is not a 
philosophical abstraction. The immutability of God as presented in Scripture 
should not be confused as the immutability of the ‘god’ referred to by Greek 
philosophers. In Greek thought immutability meant not only unchangeability 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
but also the immobility of “god”. Sanders (1998:86) describes Aquinas as the 
“apex of medieval theology who sought to harmonise the biblical classical 
synthesis he inherited from the Christian tradition with the newly discovered 
works of Aristotle”. But with regard to the view of God’s foreknowledge 
Aquinas offers a different perspective from that of Aristotle, as reflected in 
Chapter 3.  Oden (1990) states that overestimating the strong hold the 
influence of Greek philosophy had on the traditional understanding of God 
and his/her attributes is to understate the counter Greek influences that one 
reads in the Psalms and Isaiah and in the writings of Paul 
Boyd follows the argument of Sanders (1998:187) who states that: “The 
essence of God does not change but God does change in experience, 
knowledge, emotions and actions.” Pinnock (2001:72) expresses it this way: 
“If God is personal and enters into relationships God cannot be immutable in 
every respect, timelessly eternal, impassable or meticulously sovereign.” 
Boyd (1993:379-81) contends that God freely experiences our hurts, joys, 
and sins by entering into solidarity with us. Boyd (1993:357-58) states that if 
God did not then God would be indifferent to us and our lives wouldn’t matter 
to God, nor would God matter to us.  Charnock (1977:121-122) however 
repudiates such an argument by observing that God does not change 
because of the action of creation because he willed to create from eternity. 
He states that while the work of creation was new, the decision to create was 
as ancient as God him/herself. Charnock (1977:122) makes an even clearer 
statement about God’s immutability when he says that if God had willed the 
creation of the world only at a time when the world was brought into being, 
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and not before that, then indeed God had been changeable. According to 
Charnock (1977:121), creation therefore was not a new counsel or new will of 
God but that which was from eternity. The Bible clearly demonstrates that 
God is faithful to his/her promise, that God expresses love and mercy 
towards repentant sinners and executes judgement on the unrepentant 
sinner. How human beings change, then, determines how God will apply 
his/her absolute standards of love, goodness, wrath and judgement, as 
illustrated by (Howe 1999:10) in the diagram below: 
 
So  it can be see that what open theists interpret as change in God when 
dealing with creation is really only God’s manner of interaction with creation; 
and that God’s response to the acts and attitudes of his/her creation is 
compatible with his/her eternal nature. Since human decision often conflicts 
with what God wills to do, open theists maintain that God’s will and plans 
must change to accommodate human decisions – thus making God mutable. 
Otherwise there would be no integrity in human decision making. Isaiah 
(14:24, 46:9-10) depicts God’s immutability as a characteristic of his/her 
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deity. Barth (1957: 495-497) states that human actions do not constrain the 
perfection of God. He sees Exodus 3:4 in support of God’s immutability. If 
God is said to “repent”, God is still immutable, that is he/she is the one God 
in his/her freedom and love. For God is said to repent from his/her threatened 
judgement. Barth (1957:500) cautions against two errors, first, is to regard 
the world as an integral part of God’s nature, and second, to oppose the 
world’s mutability to God’s immutability as though creation does not live by 
the constancy of God.  
Open theists have obscured the meaning of immutability by failing to 
distinguish between immutability and the idea of immobility, and have thus 
presented the stilted view that God as an immutable God cannot interact with 
his/her creatures. Pinnock (2001:48) writes: “A static and immobile God is not 
more perfect than our heavenly Father.” For this reason God should not be 
seen as immobile but unmoved: thus reflecting not on a conception that in 
and of itself implies static or incapability of relating with the external, but 
rather indicates a being that has not been “moved” or brought into being by 
another. 
Oden (1992:112) reflects the same position:  
That biblical witness views God not as immobile or static, but consistent 
with his/her own nature, congruent with the depths of his/her personal 
being, stable not woodenly predictable. If God promises to forgive, 
‘He/She is just and may be trusted to forgive our sins’ (1 John 1:9) 
because his/her character is dependable (italics added). 
 
Boyd therefore argues that God’s flexibility is seen especially in his/her 
response to our prayers. Boyd uses the extension of Hezekiah’s life as an 
example of God changing his/her mind (2000:82): 
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Now, if we accept the classical view of foreknowledge and suppose that 
the Lord was certain that he/she would not let Hezekiah die, wasn’t God 
being duplicitous when he/she initially told Hezekiah that he would not 
recover? W If we suppose that the Lord was certain all along that 
Hezekiah would, in fact, live fifteen years longer after this episode, 
wasn’t it misleading for God to tell him that he/she was going to add 
fifteen years to his life? Wouldn’t Jeremiah [Jer. 26:19] also be mistaken 
in announcing that God changed his/her mind, when God reversed 
his/her stated intentions to Hezekiah – if, in fact God’s mind never 
changes? (Italics added). 
 
Boyd, in using Jeremiah 26:19, gives an example from the Bible in order to 
show that God can, in fact, make one decision on what he/she will do, and 
then change that decision. Boyd (2003:78) argues that: 
When a person is in a genuine relationship with another, willingness to 
adjust to them is always considered a virtue. Why should this apply to 
people but not to God? On the contrary, since God is the epitome of 
everything we deem praiseworthy, and since we ordinarily consider 
responsiveness to be praiseworthy, should we not be inclined to view 
God as the most responsive being imaginable? 
 
 Sanders sees God as changing his/her mind as he/she responds to human 
needs and requests. Sanders (1998:53), understands this by means of God’s 
invitation to Abraham “into the decision-making process” before he/she 
decided what to do with Sodom. Sanders (1998: 64) states that Moses too 
influenced God to change his/her mind: 
Being in relationship to Moses, God is willing to allow Moses to 
influence the path he/she will take. God permits human input into the 
divine future. One of the most remarkable features in the Old Testament 
is that people can argue with God and win (italics added). 
 
Pinnock (2001:42) writes:  
God does not will to rule the world alone but wants to bring the creature 
into his decisions. Prayer highlights the fact that God does not choose to 
rule the world without our input. 
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Barth (1957:502) on the other hand argues that that  while God engages 
his/her creation, this engagement cannot change the actions of God; this 
immutability does not prevent God from having a real history with his/her 
creation in revelation and reconciliation. The creature’s resistance to God 
bring no conflict or change in God. 
However, Boyd following Sanders (1998) and Pinnock (2001) understanding 
of God as one who is changes his/her mind because of the free decisions of 
human beings because future contingents are not reality. Boyd (2000:170) 
states that “future free decisions do not exist (except as possibilities) for God 
to know until free agents make them.” Boyd (2000:75) suggests that “God’s 
mind is not permanently fixed ... some of what God knows regarding the 
future consists of things that may go one way or another.   
Therefore, Boyd affirms that God is so affected by human action that God 
changes his/her intention or decisions. Thus for open theistic God may 
change his/her mind or will according to what human beings do and thus 
mutable.  
From an Evangelical perspective, God does not change his/her mind in 
eternity but changes his/her acts towards human beings in accordance with 
his/her foreknowledge of the acts and attitudes of human beings. God keeps 
his/her word and promises. Thus God acts with human free choices and 
therefore is proactive rather than reactive. Boyd fails to realize that God’s 
communication gives genuine respect to human decisions and the sequential 
process of human reason and emotions.  
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The Bible is clear in its statements that God is immutable (Mal. 3:6; Jam. 
1:17). In addition, God’s counsel is immutable (Heb. 6:17).  Ward (1977-53-
55) contends that divine changelessness is essential to divine providence, 
considered especially as preservation. If God is subject to change, then he 
might cease to be, or to be the sustaining ground of the world. Thus we have 
a guarantee of the stability, regularity and ordered continuity of temporal 
change only if there is a changeless God. The problem arises both on a 
theoretical and a practical basis. If God is changing, then he/she is not the 
God of preservation and providence. Geach (1977:6) asserts that the 
confidence in God and his promises that Christians have can only be 
experienced and justified on the basis of the immutability of God. This 
guarantees that God can and will fulfil his promises. If this is not the case, 
then Christianity as it has ordinarily been understood is destroyed 
 
Erickson (1998: 304-308) summaries the reason for the belief in the 
immutability of God 
 Because God is perfect, he/she cannot change, because all change 
is either, increase or decrease, improvement or decline, and 
perfection can neither be improved upon nor lost. 
 Because God is pure actuality, there can be no change in him/her, for 
all change is actualization of potentialities which are present. 
 If God could change, he/she would not be uncaused, and therefore 
could not be the cause of anything else either. 
 If God could change, we could not have confidence in his preserving 
all things that are, since his ability to do so might decline or alter. 
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 If God could change we could not have confidence in him to keep his 
promises, thus losing an essential component of Christianity. 
Thus the argument of Boyd can be concluded in the following way: that an 
eternal, immutable God cannot have a real relationship with a changing 
world. The essence of the argument can be formulated as follows: 
 All real relationship involves change. 
 An unchanging God cannot change. 
 Therefore, an unchanging God cannot have a real relationship with a 
changing world. 
Open theists therefore place emphasis on God’s relational nature. 
Accordingly they oppose the Augustinian perspective because they find it 
difficult to reconcile an unchanging God with a God who can maintain 
tangible personal relationships with human beings. Sanders (1998:12) calls 
this “relational theism”: meaning that any understanding of the divine-human 
relationship must bring into focus that there is receptivity and change in God. 
Such an approach implies a radical recasting of the doctrine of God as 
traditionally held by evangelicals. 
 
 
5.4. Summary 
 
Boyd argued that the doctrine of God’s immutability is derived from Greek 
philosophy rather than the Christian text. Therefore, Boyd is his attempt to 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
make God relative to human beings overlooks the fundamental Christian 
foundation on which the traditional conception of God’s immutability is 
derived from Scripture and held as fundamental to God’s nature by the early 
church fathers. 
Because God’s character does not change, there is therefore no change in 
God. Because God is a simple Being, all of his/her attributes are in perfect 
harmony and do not change to fit external circumstances (Jam. 1:17). To 
speak of God’s simplicity means that God cannot be analysed or divided. 
God is one being without dimensions, poles or divisions. In contrast to the 
changing world God remains the same. Psalm 102:26 reflects the character 
of God that does not change. God does not change in his/her power (Rom. 
4:20f), his/her plans and purposes (Ps. 33:11; Isa. 46:10); his/her promises 
(1Kngs. 8: 56, 2 Cor.1:20); his/her love and mercy (Ps. 103:17), or his/her 
justice (Gen. 18:25; Isa. 28:17). Thiessen (1977:83) argues that because 
God is one, he/she does not change because God is one. God’s immutability 
is due also to his/her necessary being and self-existence: that which exists 
uncaused, by the necessity of his/her nature must exist as he/she does. 
Because of this perfection there can be no change in God. Any change in 
his/her attributes will make Godless “Godly” or a limited God. While the 
created order changes and decays, God stays the same. This however must 
not be confused with God’s immobility. Oden (1992:111) states that divine 
“immutability” is a religious affirmation that God will not change, but that does 
not mean that God cannot relate to changing human circumstances. God’s 
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responsiveness in human affairs does not imply changes in his/her character, 
intention or will. 
 
Conclusion 
In an endeavour to take seriously the attribute of God’s immutability, the goal 
has been to form our conception of God’s changelessness from Scripture 
and the Church Fathers. As a result I have presented the view that was 
traditionally held that God is both independent and self-sufficient and hence 
immutable in respect of his/her supreme existence. Boyd, in attempting to 
undermine this fundamental teaching about the immutability of God, states 
that those who hold to an unchanging God do so by understanding God in 
Aristotelian terms. This understanding of God lacks the vital energies of the 
biblical witness and reduces God to one who is unresponsive to human 
needs. However, I have argued that the Greek philosophical understanding 
of God has not permeated the classical/traditional proclamation of God’s 
constancy because in Scripture we find a clear teaching of God’s 
immutability. The proposition that God is ignorant of the future and therefore 
changes his/her plans and purposes to accommodate human inconsistencies 
and circumstances must be rejected. This is because the open theistic 
understanding of God’s immutably does not resonate with the evangelical 
understanding of God’s immutability that is rooted in Scripture, Church 
history and sound reasoning.  
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Evangelicals do not obscure the meaning of God’s immutability with the idea 
of immobility. The Greeks had this understanding of “the unmoved mover” 
that God cannot change therefore; he/she must be disinterested in the 
creature he/she created. Thus the view provided of immobility is closer to 
Deism than to a loving God shown to us through Christ. While God’s nature 
is settled with no possibility of change, his/her actions in the world are 
predetermined in accord with how humans relate to God’s immutable nature. 
For there to be a real relationship, an unchangeable God must have 
changing relationships with changing people, yet remain constant in 
character and purpose. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
God’s Omnipotence: A Literary Investigation   
Introduction 
 
The omnipotence of God can be defined as the perfect ability of God to do all 
things that are consistent with the divine character. Bavinck (1977:243) 
defines omnipotence as God’s absolute power; as his/her ability to do 
whatever is in harmony with all of his/her perfections and God’s ordinate 
power; as God’s ability to perform whatever God decrees. While open theists 
do not directly deny the omnipotence of God, by default this divine attribute is 
undermined because of the attack on omniscience and God’s immutability. 
Whitehead (1978) views God as “dipolar”. He sees God as one who is 
influenced but also one who can be persuaded. Because God interacts with 
human beings in time and space (temporally), God is influenced by them. 
Thus for the process theologian God is affected and influenced by the world. 
Thus process theologians redefine God’s omnipotence in terms of 
persuasion or influence in the overall world process.  God is seen as one 
agent among many in the world, and has as much power as any such agent. 
This power is not absolute, but limited persuasive or passive power.  
The greatness of God’s power is ground for religious praise. In such praise 
the Christian regards God’s power as an absolute, the very standard of 
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power. To attribute weakness to God is incompatible with Evangelicalism and 
the stance of worship. Omnipotence is inseparable from God’s omniscience 
and God’s immutability. Another important reason to study this attribute is its 
relationship with the problem of evil. In this chapter an historical and literary 
investigation of the Early Church Fathers and their understanding of God’s 
omnipotence will be undertaken. This study will show that the view of an all-
powerful God  held by the Church Fathers still resonates within the 
Evangelical tradition and that the problem of evil does not cause a barrier to 
our understanding of God’s omnipotence. However, this understanding 
needs to be clarified by the acknowledgement that omnipotence does not 
mean that God can do anything: 
 God cannot do anything logically impossible. 
 God cannot do anything that contradicts his/her nature. 
 God cannot make decisions that limit the possibilities of what God 
can do. 
These so called “limitations” of God’s power do not delimit God but rather 
enable the Christian to have even more confidence in the constancy of God.  
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6.1. Evidence from the Church Fathers to Reformers on God’s       
Omnipotence 
 
 6.1.1. Clement of Alexandria (150-215 CE) 
Clement argues against the foolishness and absurdity of images by which 
gods are worshipped because he sees this as the worship of the products of 
human hands. These products are made because human beings choose 
disbelief in God and a licentious rather than restrained life style. Clement 
compares human art with the power of God. He (in Exhortation to the 
Heathens in ANF Vol II. 185-190) states: “How great is the power of God! 
His/Her  bare volition was the creation of the universe. For God alone made 
it, because he/she is truly God. The mere willing was followed by the spring 
into being that he/she willed” (italics added). In this statement Clement 
reflects on the power of God as God’s perfect ability to do all things 
consistent with the divine nature. God can do all that he/she wills to do and 
God’s power is not limited to the influence of this temporal world. God’s 
power works according to the divine will. Thus for Clement God’s power is 
expressed in his/her will. As a result Clement sees God exercising influence 
everywhere and overall in such a way as to empower and enable the 
freedom of other things. The extent of this influence is called omnipotence. 
Thus, for Clement God’s omnipotence means that there is nothing that God 
cannot do.  
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 6.1.2. Origen  
Origen, in articulating a defence against Celcus’s understanding of the nature 
and power of God, states (in Against Celcus in ANF Vol. IV:553) that God 
possesses not only the power but the will to act– but that God cannot do 
anything which is contrary to reason or contrary to the divine nature. Origen 
defines God as good, just and omnipotent. God is eternal, invisible and 
incorporeal. But by definition his/her qualities are not absolute; he/she cannot 
act out any action, since his actions are limited to absolute goodness, justice 
and wisdom. Origen views God as having natural limitations: for example, 
God cannot lie (Tit. 1:2); and God cannot tempt anyone to sin (Jam. 1:13). 
But this by no means interferes with God’s omnipotence. 
 6.1.3. St. Augustine of Hippo  
St. Augustine also understands God’s omnipotence as God’s being able to 
do anything that is not in contradiction to his/her own nature.  St. Augustine 
(in City of God 5.10 in NPNF Vol. II: 92-93) states: 
For God is called omnipotent on account of his/her doing what he/she 
wills, not on account of his/her suffering what he/she wills not; for if that 
should befall him/her, he/she would by no means be omnipotent. 
Wherefore, he/she cannot do some things for the very reason that 
he/she is omnipotent (italics added). 
 
This by no means diminishes God’s power because God cannot contradict 
him/herself, God cannot die or sin. If God were able to sin then God could not 
be described as omnipotent. St. Augustine (in City of God 5.10 in NPNF Vol. 
II:92-93) also states that God is omnipotent on the basis of that which he/she 
wills, and not on that which he/she does not will. According to St. Augustine, 
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this is because the will/knowledge of God God’s consists of all the decisions 
creatures will make. However, this power is not always coercive, thereby 
honouring human freedom.  
 6.1.4. Thomas Aquinas 
Aquinas discusses divine omnipotence in a number of places. The following 
remarks will be based principally on Summa Theologica, Question 2546, 
which answers the question whether there is power in God. Aquinas notes 
six sub questions: 
 Whether there is power in God 
 Whether his/her power is infinite; 
 Whether he/she is omnipotent;  
 Whether he/she can make the past not to have been; 
 Whether he/she can do what he/she has not done or do away with 
what he/she has done;  
 Whether he/she can make better what he/she has already made. 
In answering the first question Aquinas47 states that active, not passive, 
power is found in God and his/her power is infinite and unrestricted. If any act 
is performed by God is a pure act. Therefore, active power belongs to God 
preeminently in the highest degree. Aquinas like St. Augustine makes no 
distinction between the power of God and the will of God because that God’s 
active power is his/her perfection.  The second question argues: Active 
                                         
46
 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm 
47
 ibid 
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power is found in God because he/she is a perfect act. God is perfect and 
unlimited. God’s power is the same as his/her nature therefore infinite. 
In answering the third question on the omnipotence of God, Aquinas asks if 
God is omnipotent. If God can do anything, what is the meaning of 
“anything”? The correlative of power (potentia) is the possible and anything 
that can possibly be or be done falls within the scope of the divine power that 
does not contradict his/her nature. Aquinas48 state: 
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an 
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing 
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on 
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving 
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being 
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of 
power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of 
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, 
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among 
the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called 
omnipotent 
 
God’s power relates to a possible absolute, i.e. that which is possible without 
qualification. Therefore, for Aquinas there is nothing impossible for God 
 
6.1.5. Martin Luther 
Luther was unflinching in his recognition that divine omnipotence implied that 
God was the original cause of all things and actions, including the actions of 
Satan.  Luther’s (1960:145) understanding concerning the omnipotence of 
God is clear: “God works all in all...God even works what is evil in the 
impious ... [Judas'] will was the work of God; God by his almighty power 
                                         
48
 ibid 
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moved his/her will as he/she does all that is in the world.”   Luther, therefore, 
understands all action then is extensions of God's will, including the will of 
Satan. “Since God moves and does all, we must take it that he/she moves 
and acts even in Satan and the godless;...evil things are done with God 
himself setting them in motion.” Luther did not believe in the concept that 
human beings have free will. He (as cited in Kerr, 1966:91) states that a word 
is not even found in the Scriptures. Thus, Luther believed that in God's 
presence the human will or free-will ceases to exist because only God has 
free-will (as cited in Kerr, 1966:88).  Such is the power of God that all things 
are drawn into the accordance his/her will. The following passage from The 
Bondage of the Will not only continues the point, but shows Luther's (as cited 
in Kerr, 1966:35) supreme rhetorical skills: “The human will is like a beast of 
burden. If God mounts it, it wishes and goes as God wills; if Satan mounts it, 
it wishes and goes as Satan wills. Nor can it choose its rider....The riders 
contend for its possession.” In Luther's reading of divine omnipotence, there 
is no basis for human autonomy and self-determination. For Luther, what was 
at stake was divine omnipotence and any amount of self-reliance for 
salvation takes away from the power and glory of God, and our reliance on 
God. Thus, for Luther all power and the exercise of all power belongs to God. 
Luther is not always philosophically astute, but his (as cited in Kerr, 1966:35) 
definition of omnipotence contains an important clarification: “By the 
omnipotence of God I do not mean the potentiality by which he/she could do 
many things which he does not, but the active power by which he/she 
potently works all in all....” (italics added). Thus God has no passive power, 
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but has complete active power. The notion of God as some passive source of 
power is of course totally foreign to Luther. Luther (as cited in Kerr, 1966:29) 
believed in the “Almighty God Maker of heaven and earth.”  Luther’s 
understanding of God is in contradiction to the Aristotelian concept of a God 
who does not have the power to engage and govern the world. For Luther 
God’s will is his/her power and nothing can hinder it. 
  
6.1.7. John Calvin 
Calvin in defining his understanding of God’s omnipotence disputes the 
distinction made between the absolute power of God (the set of all possible 
that God could enact) and the ordained power of God (the subsets of those 
possible that God decides to act on. This distinction was largely held by 
medieval theologians as a means of safeguarding God transcendence and 
unknowability, while maintaining the fundamental reliability of the created 
order.  Steinmetz (1995: 40) quotes the following passage from Calvin’s 
commentary on Isaiah 23 in which he rejects out of hand the scholastic 
distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power: 
The invention, which the Schoolmen have introduced, about the 
absolute power of God, is shocking blasphemy. It is all one as if they 
said that God is a tyrant who resolves to do what he pleases, not by 
justice, but through caprice. Their schools are full of such blasphemies, 
and are not unlike the heathens, who said that God sports with human 
affairs. 
 
 While Calvin rejected the distinction made, Steinmetz (1995:40-52) argues 
that it was not with the content that Calvin disagreed with but rather the 
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terminology used to describe God’s power.  Calvin’s understanding of God’s 
power stems from the primacy of divine will in his/her thought.  
 
6.2. An Evangelical Understanding of Omnipotence 
 
Evangelicals understand omnipotence to mean “all power”. A biblical 
synonym is Almighty. Grudem (1994:217) states: “omnipotence means that 
God is able to do all his/her holy will”.  Barth (1957: 523) connects the 
omnipotence the constancy or immutability of God and states that all of God’s 
perfections are omnipotent. He argues therefore that God’s omnipotence is 
not power without connection, that is power in and of itself is not God, but 
rather that God is power. Bath understanding of omnipotence therefore is to 
be understood to be both a potentia (a power within possibility) and a 
postestas (an authority or rule), simultaneously and without separation.  The 
criterion for the manifestation of this power does not lie outside of God but in 
God himself/herself. Therefore Barth (1957: 535-536) argues thus “God 
cannot do a thing because it is impossible; it is impossible because God 
cannot do it. The limits of the possible is not self- contradictionW.but 
contradiction of God” 
 
Therefore, to say that God can do all things would be incorrect as God’s 
power must be interpreted in accordance with God’s own character. God can 
only do things that are in harmony with his/her character (Thiessen, 
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1977:82). Thus there are some things that God cannot do. Frame (2002: 
518-520) list six actions that God cannot perform: 
 
 Logically contradictory actions: like making a square circle. 
 Immoral actions: God cannot lie (Tit. 1:2, Heb. 6:18) or sin (Hab. 
1:13). 
 Actions appropriate only to finite creatures: like buying shoes, 
celebrating birthdays or getting sick. 
 Actions denying his/her own nature: like making another God equal to 
him/herself, abandoning his/her divine attributes and denying 
him/herself (2 Tim 2:13). 
 Changing his/her eternal plans: God’s eternal plans are 
unchangeable. 
 Making a stone so large that he/she cannot lift it. For God to make a 
stone so large that he/she cannot lift it means that God must 
contradict his/her omnipotence. God cannot contradict him/herself.  
However, these are not objects of power and so do not limit the power of God 
but rather reflects God’s holiness and character.  There are two ways that 
God exercises his/her power; thus a distinction may be drawn between God’s 
absolute power and his/her ordinate power. Absolute power means that God 
may work directly without secondary causes e.g. in creation. The works of 
providence illustrate the ordinate power whereby God uses secondary 
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causes (Thiessen, 1996:82).  In either case, God is exercising his/her divine 
efficiency. 
Evangelicals (Grudem 1994, Erickson 1998) all affirm the omnipotence of 
God, however they do not hold to the nominalist tradition in theology, of 
which William of Occam was the most famous representative. He 
developed the distinction between God’s absolute power and his/her 
ordinate power. It is to this distinction that Calvin objected. Some 
nominalists took a more extreme view, God has the power to do logically 
contradictory thing as cited by Bavinck (1977:243): 
God was able to sin, to go astray, to die, to be changed into a stone or  
an animal, to change bread into the body of Christ, to effect 
contradictions, to undo the past, to make false what was true and true 
what was false. God is pure indifference or arbitrariness, absolute 
potency, without content: God is nothing but may become anything. 
 
This is how nominalist views the absolute power. God is in their view above 
the laws of rationality, truth and morality, free to act against them or change 
them as he/she wishes. Others like Schleiermacher and Strauss denied the 
absolute power of God and insisted that God’s power is limited to what 
he/she accomplishes. Berkhof (1981:80) repudiated the view of 
Schleiermacher and Strauss by asserting that: 
 
In that sense we can speak of the potentia absoluta, or absolute power, 
of God. This position must be maintained over against those who, like 
Schleiermacher and Strauss, hold that God's power is limited to that 
which He actually accomplishes. But in our assertion of the absolute 
power of God it is necessary to guard against misconceptions. The 
Bible teaches us on the one hand that the power of God extends 
beyond that which is actually realized, Gen. 18:14; Jer. 32:27; Zech. 
8:6; Matt. 3:9; 26:53. We cannot say, therefore, that what God does not 
bring to realization, is not possible for Him. But on the other hand it also 
indicates that there are many things which God cannot do. He/She can 
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neither lie, sin, change, nor deny Himself, Num. 23:19; I Sam. 15:29; II 
Tim. 2:13; Heb. 6:18; Jas. 1:13,17. There is no absolute power in Him 
that is divorced from his/her perfections, and in virtue of which he/she 
can do all kinds of things which are inherently contradictory (italics 
added). 
 
Erickson (1994:302-303) states that there are certain qualification to the all-
powerful character of God i.e. God is able to do all things that are proper 
objects of his/her power. These qualifications have been previously listed as 
the things God cannot do. 
I shall therefore present an evangelical definition of omnipotence as God who 
can do anything that is logically possible and is consistent with his/her other 
attributes. This definition is in keeping with the historical teaching of St. 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. 
 
6.3. Boyd’s understanding of Omnipotence 
Process theology, the father of open theism, insists that God is limited in 
his/her power. This system of thought in which God is portrayed as having 
something less than perfect power is the reasoning that open theists use to 
deal with the problem of evil. Within this view, one could speculate that 
although God is perfectly good and thus would prefer a world devoid of evil, it 
is not within his/her power to bring such a world about. Just as open theism 
robs God of his/her perfect knowledge, especially his/her infallible 
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foreknowledge, so it subverts God’s almighty power. The open theist cannot 
confess the first line of the Apostles’ Creed: “I believe in God the Father 
Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.” Thus Pinnock (2001:121) argues: “We 
must not define omnipotence as the power to determine everything but rather 
as the power that enables God to deal with any situation that arises.” God’s 
power is restricted by the freedom of human beings and the fulfilment of 
God’s plans for history is dependent on the choices we make. In many 
particulars, therefore, the course of history is finally contingent upon human 
choices rather than divine wisdom. Boyd (2000:97) articulates this position 
most clearly when he states that: 
It might help if we think of God’s power and our say-so in terms of 
percentages. Prior to creation, God possessed 100 percent of all power. 
He possessed all the say-so there was. When the Trinity decided to 
express their love by bringing forth a creation, they invested each 
creature (angelic and human) with a certain percentage of their say-so. 
The say-so of the triune God was at this point no longer the only one 
that determined how things would go. God’s personal creations now 
possessed a measure of ability to influence what would occur. This was 
necessary (as was the risk that went with it) if God’s creations were to 
be personal beings who had the ability to make authentic choices, 
including the choice whether to enter a loving relationship with him. 
 
Open theists therefore, in their redefinition of God’s omnipotence, replace it 
with “omnicompetence”. Ironically, Boyd who decries the Calvinistic 
determinism as God creating pre-programmed automatons, are quite 
comfortable with the figure of God as a chess master who is able by his/her 
“omnicompetence” to outmanoeuvre his/her opponents and so, despite 
setbacks along the way, finally checkmate his/her adversaries and achieve 
his/her goals.  Boyd (2000:127-128) asserts the following: 
God’s perfect knowledge would allow him to anticipate every possible 
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move and every possible combination of moves, together with every 
possible response which he might make to each of them, for every 
possible agent throughout history W Isn’t a God who perfectly 
anticipates and wisely responds to everything a free agent might do 
more intelligent than a God who simply knows what a free agent will 
do? Anticipating and responding to possibilities takes problem-solving 
intelligence. Simply possessing a crystal-ball vision of what’s coming 
requires none. 
 
Thus the assumption of the “omnicompetence” of God within open theism 
has the added feature of resourcefulness. Sanders (1998:162) in articulating 
his opinion on the omnicompetence of God states: “Sometimes the desires of 
God are stymied, but God is resourceful and faithfully works to bring good 
even out of evil situations.” Therefore, since God is ingenious, rather than 
sovereign, it will come as no surprise that open theism rejects the idea of 
God’s will. There is no room in the open theistic version of God for his/her 
eternal, unchangeable, all-comprehensive counsel, in which he/she has 
eternally purposed what he/she will do in time 
Sanders (1988: 88) clearly explains this approach: 
God’s activity does not unfold according to some heavenly blueprint 
whereby all goes according to plan. God is involved in a historical 
project, not an eternal plan. The project does not proceed in a smooth, 
monolithic way but takes surprising twists and turns because the divine 
human relationship involves a genuine give-and-take dynamic for both 
humanity and God. 
 
Open theist therefore, believes in a God who is not in control of all things 
because he/she is restrained in his/her power. Thus, open theists understand 
the power of God to be that of “coercive” power which God uses very 
sparingly.  Boyd (1994:45) responds to question concerning coercive power 
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by declaring that, subsequent to the creation of free moral agents, “God 
necessarily surrendered a degree of his/her power.” According to Boyd 
(1994:46), this measure of unilateral divine condescension was necessitated 
by the Creator’s desire to maintain the libertarian freedom of human beings 
created in his/her image. As a consequence of this self-imposed restriction, 
God does not “always get his/her way”. In this regard, God may be said to be 
both omnipotent and sovereign in that he/she is fully able to place boundaries 
upon the exercise of divine power when it is necessary to safeguard the 
contra-causal freedom of human choices and actions. As Boyd sees it, it is 
utterly impossible for God to be always in control, and yet allow free beings to 
exercise some control. Thus, to the extent that God ‘lends’ power away and 
thus God’s power only becomes persuasive. In articulating this perspective 
Boyd calls for a redefinition of how Evangelicals understands God’s 
sovereignty. In Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, Boyd (2001:44) states 
that “some Christians use the word sovereignty as though it is synonymous 
with control” This loss of control thus limits the power of God to do that which 
God will to do. To delimit the will of God is to limit his/her power because 
God’s power is the outworking of his/her will. For Boyd limits God’s power to 
human free-will rather than God’s will. This strips God of his/her sovereignty 
and makes God dependent upon his/her own creatures. Boyd therefore must 
concede that God is not the only power in the universe that he/she has 
created. Not only does God have to rule with them in mind, God may even 
have to contend with them. Boyd therefore does not see God as a being who 
is completely in control and exercising exhaustive sovereignty because open 
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theist believe that there is no single and all-determining divine will that 
controls all things.  Boyd (2001:45) also claims that God shares power: 
Despite the various claims made by some today that we must protect 
the sovereignty of God by emphasizing his absolute control over 
creation and denouncing the openness view, I submit that we ought to 
denounce the view that God exercises total control over everything, for 
a truly sovereign God is powerful enough to share power and face a 
partly open future. 
 
Frame in his criticism of open theism demonstrates that open theism even 
denies that God has complete control over creation. Frame (2001:112) states 
that open theism limits the power of God to espouse human libertarian 
freedom. 
 
6.4. Summary 
In the preceding section I have articulated a historical understanding of the 
omnipotence of God and also reflected on how open theists view God’s 
power. It has been established from history that the early Church Fathers 
understood that God is the all-powerful Creator who preserves and governs 
everything in the universe as well. 
It has therefore been established that the open theistic interpretation of God’s 
power limits God to the direction of his/her creation. This perspective of 
God’s relationship with creation is not found in Scripture or in the history of 
the early church. Within Evangelicalism the term “omnipotence” is used to 
describe an all-powerful God’s on-going relationship with his/her creation. 
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The acceptance of the biblical doctrine of omnipotence enables one to avoid 
common errors in thinking about God’s relationship with creation. The biblical 
teaching is not deism (which teaches that God created the world and then 
essentially abandoned it), or pantheism (which teaches that the creation does 
not have a real, distinct existence in itself, but is only part of God), but 
providence – which teaches that although God is actively related to and 
involved in the creation at each moment, the creation is separate from 
him/her. Moreover, the biblical teaching does not demonstrate that events in 
creation are determined by chance (or randomness); nor are they determined 
by impersonal fate (or determinism), but by God, who is the personal yet 
infinitely powerful Creator and Lord. The open theistic perspective stands in 
stark contrast to this evangelical understanding. 
 
Conclusion 
Boyd attempts to delimit God and thereby convince his readers that such an 
open view is the best way to a good God and evil. He (2001:8) concludes 
that, based “on the authority of God’s Word”, the future is not exhaustively 
settled or known by God. Basinger (1995:133) writes: 
 
It is important to note that this debate is not, as some have implied, over 
whether God is omniscient (or fully omniscient). To say that God is 
omniscient is to say simply that God knows all that can be known. And 
those of us who deny that God has exhaustive knowledge of the future 
do not deny that God knows all that can be known. The debate is over 
what it is that can be known. That is, the debate is over what it means 
to say God is omniscient.  
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However, Boyd’s development of the case for openness does not limit itself 
to Scripture. Even while claiming to be a thoroughgoing Biblicist and 
evangelical on this issue, Boyd’s (2000:8-12) statements reveal the 
foundation of his view. He argues that open theism is the “best 
philosophically compelling view available”, while at the same time claiming to 
base his beliefs exclusively on Scripture.  
Boyd, who has strong philosophical training and leanings, states categorically 
(2000:17): “The debate between open and traditional understandings of 
divine foreknowledge is completely a debate over the nature of the future: W 
that is the question at hand, nothing else.” From these statements, it seems 
clear that Boyd’s approach is essentially a philosophical one, and not a 
theological one. It is based far more on the logic of human thought than on 
Scripture, which Evangelicals hold to be divinely inspired. I therefore 
conclude that Boyd understanding of God and the knowability of the future by 
God has been influenced by philosophers, rather than extracted from the 
biblical text through exegeses. 
Boyd appears to have been so driven to demand human freedom at the 
expense of God’s sovereign will and exhaustive foreknowledge that he, in 
effect, deifies humans and humanizes God. Open theism treads dangerously 
close to fulfilling the atheist Voltaire’s (1694-1778 CE) often quoted 
observation: “If God made us in His image, we have certainly returned the 
compliment.” The open theistic concept of God’s attributes is rather an 
extreme view outside the acceptable and appropriate boundaries of 
Evangelicalism. Even more so, open theism is found to be a radical 
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reformulation of this doctrine under investigation and by in its own admission 
a radical departure from Evangelicalism. Tertullian (in Five Books Against 
Marcion 2.5 in ANF Vol. III: 301) in his response to Marcion notes that we 
must vindicate those attributes in the Creator that are being called into 
question.  
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Chapter 7 
The Problem of Evil and Suffering 
 
Introduction 
 
The problem of evil is regarded as one of the most serious objections to 
theism and to Christianity. In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky 
(1954:224) states “the earth is soaked from its crust to the centre with the 
tears of humanity”. The cries of humanity have constantly been a challenge 
to the church to reconcile the attributes of God’s knowledge, power and 
goodness with all the suffering in the world. Richard Dawkins49, an atheist, 
would use the suffering of this world to conclude that there is no God. In 
trying to deal with the problem of evil Boyd in his book Is God To Blame? 
(2003: 21) asserts:  “The most important aspect of faith is our mental picture 
of God. The way we actually envision God may be reflected in the theology 
we articulate.” In articulating a picture of a limited God, open theism leaves 
suffering people with a God who is not able to deal with evil and suffering. 
                                         
49 Professor Richard Dawkins was the first holder of the Charles Simonyi Chair in the Public 
Understanding of Science at the University of Oxford. (Simonyi was chief architect of Microsoft Word, 
Excel etc.) . For 18 years Dawkins attacked Christianity and the God of the Bible from this well-funded 
position, with rather more passion than he promoted “the public understanding of science”! See 
“Dawkin, Richards” in Science in a Contemporary  World  
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This image thus distorts their concept of God. In this chapter I will articulate 
how the traditional view of God can, in fact, help us to cope with evil and 
suffering.  
The Evangelical view of God (which finds its understanding of God’s  
attributes rooted in historical theology) is held by open theists as particularly 
vulnerable to the argument that arises from the problem of evil due to God’s 
attributes and direct activity in the world. Boyd’s works are aimed at 
persuading his readers that open theism better shields God from the 
accusation of cruelty, injustice or malevolent apathy; thus suggesting that 
open theism is better suited to deal with the problem of evil and suffering. In 
this section I will show that it is within the classical understanding of God that 
Christians can find their best resources for dealing with the problem of evil 
from a theological, practical and even philosophical perspective. Evil is 
categorized as “moral” or “natural” evil. The first refers to the wrongful action 
of human beings. Natural evil, on the other hand, includes pain and suffering 
that are not attributable to immorality: earthquakes, famine and flooding etc .. 
To define evil, then, is no easy task. St.  Augustine maintains that evil is the 
“absence of good”. Aquinas, following a similar argument, (in Summa 
Theologia Question 48. 1&2)50 writes: “Being and perfection of any nature is 
good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature, 
Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good 
W. For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the 
                                         
50
 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1048.htm. 
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absence of the other.” Thus evil can be defined as a departure from the way 
things ought to be: whether morally as in the case of sin, or naturally as in the 
case of pain and suffering. Therefore from a practical perspective there 
arises difficulty in relating to God, given the abiding presence of evil in our 
lives and the world. How can I trust a God who allows so much injustice and 
suffering to continue? I will set out to demonstrate that the best strategy for 
dealing with this type of question arises from a classical view of God rather 
than that of open theism. 
Helm (1993:193) writes that in order to address the problem of evil one must 
reflect on the nature of evil, its origin and character. Thus, using the biblical 
data, evil is not to be identified with the body, or with certain places, but its 
source is in the human will, in rebellion against and departure from God’s rule 
(1Jn. 3:4). The mystery is that those whom God created as good defected 
from that goodness, evil being instigated by satanic influence.  
7.1. An Evangelical perspective on evil and suffering 
Evangelicalism begins theologically with the sovereignty of God: the 
transcendent, personal, infinite Being who created and rules over heaven 
and earth. He/She actively identifies with the suffering of his/her people, is 
accessible to them through prayer and has by his/her sovereign free will 
devised a plan whereby creatures may be redeemed.  
Evangelicals understand natural evil and suffering as a result of the 
disobedience of Adam. Adam and Eve while still sinless are placed in an 
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idyllic garden, where they live in a happy relationship with their creator and 
creation. The “day” they disobey God they commit moral evil (Gen. 3).  In 
trying to articulate the nature, essence or identity of evil, John McArthur 
(2000), in a sermon on “The Origin of Evil”, gives a very clear understanding 
of how Evangelicals understand evil by explaining that to disobey God was to 
initiate evil. Evil is not the presence of something. Evil is the absence of 
righteousness. You can’t create evil, because evil doesn’t exist as a created 
entity. It doesn’t exist as a created reality. Evil is a negative. Evil is the 
absence of perfection. It’s the absence of holiness. It’s the absence of 
goodness. It’s the absence of righteousness. Evil became a reality only when 
creatures chose to disobey. McArthur (2000) further explains that evil is not a 
created thing. Evil is not a substance. Evil is not an entity. Evil is not a being. 
Evil is not a force. Evil is not some floating spirit. Evil is a lack of moral 
perfection. God created absolute perfection. Wherever a lack of that exists, 
sin exists. And that cannot exist in the nature of God or in anything that God 
makes. Evil comes into existence when God’s creatures fall short of the 
standard of moral perfection.  Evangelicals, like Aquinas reject the idea that   
God is the author or the cause of evil, while at the same time to agree that 
God did not create all things is to deny the sovereignty of God. Like St. 
Augustine, evangelicals respond that evil is not a thing or a substance that 
can be created. It is rather the lack of a good thing that God has made. 
Therefore evil is a deprivation of some particular good. The essence of the 
position can be stated in the following way: 
  God created every substance. 
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 Evil is not a substance (but a privation in a substance) 
 Therefore, God did not create evil. 
Evil is not a substance, but a corruption of the good substance that God 
made. It exists only in another but not by itself. Thus, evangelicals 
understand the origin of evil as a result of creatures using their freewill to 
disobey God. Therefore it can be argued that evangelicals follow St, 
Augustine or the classical understanding of the origin of evil. 
However, another important part of evangelical faith is that God cares for us, 
and the details and direction of our lives are under the purposeful control of 
God, who does use suffering to build character, and therefore makes it 
worthwhile (Rom. 8:27).The life of Joseph as recounted in the book of 
Genesis provides evangelicals with a vivid portrait of how moral evil can 
rebound for the greater good. It should also be noted that evangelicals do not 
presume to be able to explain things. Admittedly, some moral evils are so 
horrific that they defy the imagination and one can only ask “Why”? 
Evangelicals confess that no matter how impossible a situation might seem it 
is always redeemable, for God’s power has no limits. To limit God’s power 
because of our limited and finite understanding would be presumptuous and 
arrogant. Thus evangelicals would have an a fortiori (‘from the stronger’) 
biblical ground for believing that God has good purposes in all moral evil and 
that we are just blind to or limited in our understanding of these purposes. 
The death of Jesus Christ on the cross shows how God is able to use the 
murder of Jesus to redeem humanity. Evangelicals understand that God is 
thus capable of redeeming the worst of all evils. Therefore, an a fortiori 
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argument is used to show that there are no acts “too evil” for God to redeem, 
thus bringing out the greater good. It then can be argued that within 
evangelicalism there seems be a combination of the theodicy’s of St. 
Augustine and St. Irenaeus, both of whom explain evil and suffering without 
limiting the attributes of God. 
 
7.2. How do Evangelicals Resolve the Problem of Evil? 
 
To resolve the philosophical problem of evil, evangelicals propose an 
explanation as to why God would permit evil by merging the views of St. 
Augustine and St. Irenaeus. Harold (2009:210-216) suggests that we 
evangelicals should not ask “Why am I suffering?” but rather “What is the 
meaning of this suffering?” I propose that in this way evangelicals are better 
able to give a reason for the evil and suffering in this world. Helm (1993:200) 
states that God could have prevented evil in the world by creating human 
beings who freely only choose to do that which is morally right, but God who 
is omnipotent and omniscient chose not to create such humans. 
Evangelicals generally take the approach St. Augustine (Enchiridion XI)51 
held to: 
For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has 
supreme power over all things, being him/herself supremely good, 
would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if 
God were not so omnipotent and good that he/she can bring good even 
out of evil (italics added). 
                                         
51
 See http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/books/augenchiridion/enchiridion01-23.html   
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Thus, St. Augustine asserts that God would not have allowed evil to occur 
unless he/she had not been able to bring good out of that evil. This is not the 
same as the Irenaean view that states that God allowed evil to bring out good 
but rather that God uses that which is evil to bring out good. Evangelicals do 
not hold to the view that God created evil but rather that its source is in the 
use of human will, in rebellion against and departure from God’s rule, in 
lawlessness (1Jn. 3:4). God created humanity as good and with free will, 
which deflected it from that goodness. Thus evangelicals would concur with 
St. Augustine that God is not the cause of evil because God cannot be 
morally bad, and the problem of evil cannot be used to show that God is 
morally bad. So, while evangelicals assert that God allowed evil to occur in 
the world, those reasons for the suffering and evil are revealed to us in two 
possible ways, namely: through the greater good defence: punitive evil 
(justification) and the greater good defence: non-punitive evil (ethical). I shall 
deal with non-punitive evil first. 
 
7.2.1 The Greater Good: Non-punitive evil 
Evangelicals would argue that the justification for permitting of suffering 
which is a necessary condition for the production of certain good is simply 
that suffering produces these goods. The good that suffering produces 
outweighs the evil.  This is an application of the theodicy of St. Irenaeus and 
John Hick. Although evangelicals would disagree that God’s creation of the 
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first human beings were not perfect, they would agree with St. Irenaeus that 
God allows evil to bring human beings into their perfect state. 
 Suffering builds character 
Evangelicals would argue that there is justification for God to allow evil as it is 
necessary for the building of character. The value of the good that suffering 
produces far outweighs the suffering itself. Evangelicals view as part of the 
Christian life through which the comfort of God can be experienced and 
character is transformed. Thus evangelicals justify the non-punitive approach 
to God’s permitting of evil by maintaining that it produces in everyone 
benefits which outweigh the evil and which logically would not have occurred 
if the evil had not occurred. Evangelicals understand that suffering comes 
only if God permits it and that God’s purposes are accomplished through the 
suffering we experience. Thus we understand evil as not aimless, nor 
inflicted by fate. God’s aim in allowing suffering is to encourage Christians 
not to rely on themselves but on the God who delivered Jesus – and will 
deliver us. Clement (1994:24-24) interpreting Paul in 2 Corinthians. 1:8-9 
writes: 
Paul is convinced that his descent into abject despair was deliberately 
engineered by God’s providence W Doubt, uncertainty and intellectual 
insecurity are experiences we pass through to discover faith. The 
opposite of faith, according to Paul, is not doubt but confidence “in the 
flesh”W that one can cope on one’s own; W that one does not need the 
grace of God W. The people who are farthest from the faith are W 
those who are too sure of themselves W God had to teach even him, 
the great apostle, not to rely on himself, but “on God who raises from 
the dead”. 
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Thus evangelicals respond to evil and suffering by focusing on God and 
remaining steadfast in hope during suffering because of who God is and what 
he/she is teaching us through suffering. Despite the pain that suffering 
brings, evangelicals also understand that suffering is part of the purifying 
process of the Christian life. Grudem (1988:78) comments that the image of a 
refiner’s fire suggests that such a suffering purifies and strengthens the 
Christian. Marshall (1997:157) states: 
Are we to say that God intends his/her people to suffer? Hard though it 
may seem, the answer to this question is affirmative. It was God’s will 
that Christ should suffer to redeem his/her people and Christ was 
obedient to that will. To be sure, the need arose only because of the evil 
in the world, but in the world where evil exists defeat is possible only 
through suffering W. It is right to say that God’s will for us is suffering 
because there is no other way that evil can be overcome. When we 
suffer, it is not a sign of God’s lack of love or concern for us W. Those 
who suffer can confidently place themselves in the care of God. 
 
The Christian who suffers has to trust God, rely on his/her perfect will, 
entrust their life to God.  Evangelicals understand suffering as something 
to be expected because through suffering God fulfils his/her divine plan by 
moulding his/her people and demonstrates his/her glory, when Christians 
persevere and are triumphant by being faithful to God. This perseverance 
in the midst of suffering brings an understanding of who God is but 
perseverance also builds character and character hope. McGrath 
(1995b:73) states that suffering gets rid of the dross of all the worldly 
support we foolishly invent for our faith. Through suffering we come to 
learn that God is our strength, sustenance and life and hope. 
 Suffering and Hope 
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Suffering and hope are interrelated. McGrath (1995b:50) observes that there 
is a strong sense in which it is true that the only way that leads to hope 
passes through suffering. I define hope as the unshuttering confidence that 
God is faithful to do all that he/she has promised. Hope is sensible in the light 
of God’s character and suffering then finds meaning and is endurable in the 
light of hope.  
Thus hope lives between the “now and the not yet”. How then do 
evangelicals know that what hope looks forward to will come to pass? I 
suggest that hope is inseparably linked to God’s promises. Bruce (1994:130-
131) states that “our hope is fixed in the general order of things, where the 
promises of God will be made good to his/her people in perpetuity”. It is this 
hope in God and who he/she is that spurs us on to trust him/her while we 
participate in and work through the pain and suffering, knowing that God will 
ultimately deliver us from our predicament. Because Evangelical view the 
Bible as being trustworthy for faith an life, it gives the evangelical believer 
unshakeable hope to know that God has promised to be with us when we 
pass through the raging fires and trough deep suffering and affliction. It is the 
promise that God will not forsake us but will remain with us to the very end 
(Heb 13:5; Matt 28:20). God’s promises become an anchor for the soul, firm 
and secure. Jewett (1981: 112) point out that, “hope is the anchor to the soul, 
not in the sense of guaranteeing the immortality of the soul, but in the sense 
of providing a stabilising effect on the whole person; being a basis for mental 
health in a world that seems to defy sanity. It hold firm and safe when 
everything deteriorates.” 
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 Suffering and the Cross 
The framework of an evangelical response to suffering is based on the cross. 
Evangelicals thus understand this hope more clearly as seen through the 
cross. Suffering and the cross go together. Only within the context of the 
cross is the basis of the evangelical response to suffering provided. 
Zacharias (1998:216-217) correctly noted that: 
When we come to Jesus at the cross, where love, holiness and 
suffering combine, we find both the answer to why we suffer and the 
strength to live this mortal frame for him. As we come to the cross and 
from there live our lives for him; we make the extraordinary discovery 
that the cross and the resurrection go together. 
 
The cross then becomes the focus where evil, innocent suffering, malice and 
human suffering is portrayed at its climax. For in the cross we see the wrath 
of God on one hand and on the other hand we see his love and 
righteousness revealed. The cross is the manifestation of God’s power, 
identification, participation, endurance and transformation. For in the cross 
lies the overwhelming and ultimate victory over evil. The understanding of the 
cross and our solidarity with the suffering of Christ combined with the 
perfectly redemptive nature of his work guarantee that none of our pain or 
sorrow is wasted. The whole of Christ suffering achieved good, and so would 
our suffering. Our suffering and sharing in pain as Christ did on the cross is 
valuable for the direct knowledge of God that it imparts.  Adam (1990:219) 
states that “our deepest suffering as much as our highest joys may 
themselves be direct vision into the inner life of God. From this perspective 
pain and suffering endured is yet another portal into the mind and glory of 
God. Adam (1990:218) again notes: 
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The good of the beatific vision, face to face intimacy with God is simply 
incommensurate with any merely non-transcendent good or ills a 
person might experience. Thus, the good of the beatific face-to-face 
intimacy with god would engulf... even the horrendous evils humans 
experience below.  
 
To know the beauty of the Lord in an intimate fashion is an incomparable 
good and suffering is a vehicle for closer divine acquaintance. Many 
Evangelicals will report the experience of drawing closer to God came 
through their trails. 
Thus, for evangelicals God remains the sovereign Creator and Lord of history 
who is not apathetic to the world or to humanity; God is not simply a 
transcendent power of destiny to whom one must submit. God is not an 
impersonal sphere of all being in one sense of pantheism, in which the 
individual forgetting the joy of suffering is lost to him/herself; but rather God is 
a loving God who offers him/herself in Christ Jesus. God in Christ is a 
sympathetic God who understands our pain and suffering. In Christ the 
theodicy question arises between God the Father/Mother and Christ when 
Jesus Christ cries out: “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me” (Mk. 
15:34). In the resurrection of Christ, one who dies in the space of the sinner 
and one who makes the ungodly righteous, the theodicy between God and 
Jesus Christ is finally completed. In this evangelicals see from the 
perspective of the cross that suffering is overcome as we live through the 
power of Christ’s resurrection. The cross is the ultimate symbol of God’s 
victory over sin and suffering. In the cross therefore God has done something 
about our suffering in the present and will do something about suffering in the 
future. King (1963:46) rightfully observes that evangelicals therefore see the 
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cross as a magnificent symbol of love conquering suffering and light 
overcoming darkness. For the suffering we face prepares us for glory when 
suffering and evil shall ultimately be defeated.  
Because God knows everything, he/she knows the good purpose for all evil, 
even if we do not. Since God is both omniscient and good, he/she has a 
good purpose for everything. Therefore, this can be stated in the following 
way: 
  An omniscient and good God has a good purpose for everything. 
 There is some evil for which we see no good purpose. 
 Therefore, there is a good purpose for all evil, even if we do not see it. 
The fact that human beings do not see the purpose for some evil does mean 
there is none. This inability to see the purpose for evil does not disprove 
God’s omniscience, omnipotence and goodness: it merely reveals our 
ignorance. Therefore one occasions suffering can be a part of God’s loving 
parental  discipline that he/she uses on his/her children in holiness (Heb. 
12:5-11). Suffering can at times be appointed by God for the strengthening, 
purification and spiritual growth of his/her children (e.g. Rom. 5:3-5; Jam. 1:2-
4). Suffering and pain can expose human frailty and weakness so that the 
strength of God shines all the more gloriously. 
 
7.2.2. Punitive Evil 
Evangelicals also understand that God uses moral evil, evil actions flowing 
from human decisions that are permitted by God, in part as punishment for 
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other evils. St. Augustine (as cited in Helm 1993:209) claimed that “Vices in 
the soul arise from its own doing; and the moral difficulty that ensures that 
vice is the penalty which it suffers”. While God allows evil, like St. Augustine 
evangelicals do not see God as being the author of evil.  St Augustine (as 
cited in Helm 1993: 209) also states that if one believes that God is good, 
then God cannot be the do evil. God assigns rewards to the righteous but 
judgement to the wicked, punishment that are evil for those who endure 
them. 
If God is not the author of evil, it follows that the one reason God allows evil 
for only one reason, is that the justice of God might be upheld. Therefore it 
can be concluded that evil is ordained by God as a punishment of that first 
evil. Why then does God allow this evil in the first place since it is presumably 
perfectly consistent with the justice of God that no moral evil should be 
permitted?  St Augustine proposed an answer that finds agreement within 
evangelical circles (Grudem 1994, Erickson 1998) because human beings 
using their free-will to make an immoral decision, as were in the first evil in 
the Garden of Eden that God allows evil and suffering to be.   Thus 
evangelicals understand that some suffering (not all) is punishment for sin 
and God bringing his/her judgement on those who are opposed to him/her 
(e.g. Is. 10:5- 19, 2 Thess. 1:6). It is therefore consistent within the 
evangelical tradition to argue that God allows acts of free-will, some of which 
are evil, however also ordains other evil which are punishment for the evil 
done. Thus God allows evil as punishment so that justice can reign in the 
universe as a moral order. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that God allows evil and punishment but also 
for development and discipline. Helm (1993:215) states in Christ both are 
linked, in that his atonement is both the enduring of punishment for moral evil 
and the source of renewal through which the character of God is fully 
manifested. 
 
7.3. Boyd’s Open Theism and the Problem of Evil 
 
Clearly, one of the crucial commitments of open theism is the rejection of 
God’s knowledge of the future and free actions of human beings. Tied very 
closely to this is God’s inability to control such future free actions including at 
times, some deeply tragic occurrences. So while, God feels the pain of our 
suffering, God is often unable to prevent it because God himself did not know 
that it is going to occur. Thus when evil occurs, we are not to blame God 
because he/she feels as badly about our suffering as we do. In the midst of 
suffering Christians can be comforted with the assurance that God had 
nothing to do with their suffering and that God’s disposition towards them is 
one of uncompromising love. Therefore, Hasker (1994:139) confidently 
argues that the openness model is in a better position than classical theism 
to deal with the issues raised by the problem of evil. Open theists take the 
problem extremely seriously, and they believe they address it more 
satisfactorily than do traditional theists.  
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Hasker (1989:191-201) argues at length that open theism handles the 
problem of sin far better than the traditional way of viewing sin. In particular, it 
is asserted that traditional Christian theism fails to absolve God of guilt or 
responsibility for evil and should, therefore, be abandoned in favour of the 
attractive openness model of divine providence.  
According to open theists, the problem originates with the initial sin of Adam 
– a view that most theists would agree with. Furthermore, Hasker argues that 
God’s lack of control over human actions makes him/her a risk taker. Boyd 
(2001:23) agrees that when God created human beings with free will, he/she 
took a risk, because creatures will not necessarily choose what God wants. 
However, God values human freedom so much that he/she has placed it 
beyond even God’s ability to curtail, despite his/her foreknowledge and 
relationship with the future. Griffin (2004:292) ties the expression of value to 
the degree of freedom when he writes that “no significant degree of intrinsic 
value would be possible without a significant degree of freedom”. 
Regarding this idea of freedom, Boyd opens his book God at War with the 
story of Zosia, a child tortured and killed by Nazis in front of her mother. 
Viewing her experience through the words of the hymn, My Times Are in Thy 
Hand by foster Loyd, Boyd (1997:38-39) writes: 
Again, if we have the courage to allow the antinomy between the lyrics 
of this hymn and Zosia’s tortured screams to engage us on a concrete 
level, the antinomy borders on the unbearable. What does it mean to 
assert that the hand of the all-powerful and all loving Father “will never 
cause his child a needless tear” when asserted in the vicinity of a child 
who has just had her eyes plucked out and of the screams of Zosia’s 
terrorised mother? In this concrete context, does not suggesting that 
this event came from the hand of God, and that it came about “as best 
as it seemed to thee”, come close to depicting God on Hitlerian terms? 
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What is more, would not such a conception significantly undermine the 
godly urgency one should have to confront such evil as something that 
God is unequivocally against? The Nazis’ agenda somehow here 
seems to receive divine approval. Yet while we are to view the Nazis’ 
agenda as being diabolically evil, we are apparently supposed to accept 
that God’s agenda in ordaining or allowing the Nazis’ behaviour is 
perfectly good. 
  
Further to this, Boyd argues that the Bible was written from the perspective of 
a “warfare worldview”. As Boyd (1997:20) describes it, this world-view: 
W is predicated on the assumption that divine goodness does not 
completely control or in any sense will evil; rather, good and evil are at 
war with one another. This assumption obviously entails that God is not 
now exercising exhaustive, meticulous control over the world. In this 
worldview, God must work with, and battle against, other created 
beings. While none of these beings can ever match God’s own power, 
each has some degree of genuine influence within the cosmos. In other 
words, a warfare worldview is inherently pluralistic. There is no single, 
all-determinative divine will that coercively steers all things, and hence 
there is here no supposition that evil agents and events have a secret 
divine motive behind them. Hence too, one need not agonize over what 
ultimately good, transcendent divine purpose might be served by any 
particular evil event.  
 
Unfortunately statements such as this imply, according Payne and Spencer 
(2001:267), that God is not able to prevent evil events from happening, a 
conclusion that does little to reinforce one’s hope for the future. Open theists, 
however, scoff at this conclusion, for they believe that God can intervene. As 
a result, they claim that God will surely overcome his/her enemies in the 
eschaton. As Boyd (1997:287) writes, “hence the ability of any within the 
angelic or human society of God’s creation to rebel freely against God shall 
someday come to an end”. Boyd (2001:14-15) also argues that it is 
impossible that a good and loving God can allow evil to prevail and that God 
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cannot bring about good from that which is evil. Boyd (2001:430) thus 
develops the term “warfare theodicy” as: 
The understanding of evil that follows from a Trinitarian warfare 
worldview argues that the scope and intensity of suffering we 
experience in the world are not adequately accounted for when viewed 
against the backdrop of a cosmic war between God and Satan. Much 
evil in the world is the cross fire of this age-long (but not eternal) cosmic 
battle. It is in most cases futile; therefore, to search for divine reasons 
for some episodes of suffering, though God will always work with 
his/her people to bring good out of evil, often with such effectiveness 
that it may seem that the evil was planned all along. The reason why 
God created a world in which a cosmic war could break out is 
articulated in the six theses that structure the Trinitarian warfare 
theodicy.  
  
Therefore, the answer to the problem of evil for Boyd (2001:16) “lies in the 
nature of love”. God created the world for the sake of love, to establish a 
loving relationship with humanity. Because of this God created human 
beings with the capacity to love, but also with the capacity to withhold love 
as well. Therefore, Boyd (2001:14) asserts that it is not reasonably 
possible to create creatures with the ability to love without risking the 
possibility of great evil. 
Boyd develops this in six theses: 
 Love must be chosen 
Boyd (2001:53) argues that the very nature of love requires that it either 
be chosen or rejected. To demonstrate this, Boyd (2001:55) uses the 
example of a man who implants a computer chip in his wife’s brain to 
make her always do loving things. He (2001:59) asks if the actions of the 
wife would be considered genuine love. Boyd concludes that the action 
cannot be out of love because her “love” is caused by external forces not 
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chosen freely. Thus being free to choose is the final cause of and an 
explanation for the problem of evil: therefore God is not to blame. 
 Freedom implies risk 
If love implies choice and human beings are the final cause of their own 
actions, God took a risk when he/she created such beings. According to 
Boyd (2001:86), this requires one to believe that the actions and decisions 
of God are based on ignorance. Since human beings are the ultimate 
creators of their actions, not even God can know their actions in advance. 
Hence we cannot blame God for the evil that breaks loose and creates 
suffering in a world he/she has created. 
 Risk entails moral responsibilities 
When God bestows on human beings the capacity to love, he/she gives 
them the ability to help others; thus God also gives them the capacity to 
reject love and harm others. Boyd (2001:165) states that God cannot 
protect us from the harm that others might cause us because by God 
doing so means robbing them of their freedom to choose. Thus the nature 
of love itself requires that God puts us at risk from each other and thereby 
makes us morally responsible for each other.  
 Moral responsibility is proportionate to the potential to influence 
others 
 
Boyd (2001:170) argues that the greater a creature’s ability for good, the 
greater its capacity for evil. He states that lower animals have a lesser 
capacity for love and therefore a lower capacity for evil. Human beings 
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have a greater potential to love, therefore a greater capacity to do evil. 
Angels have the greatest capacity to love therefore that greatest capacity 
for evil. Using this principle Boyd explains why God took such great risk. 
The greater the good God aims to realize in creation, the greater the evil 
God risks should his/her creation turn against him/her. Thus God is always 
at risk, not knowing how his/her creatures would respond to love. 
 The power to influence is irrevocable  
In this fifth thesis Boyd argues that God cannot immediately destroy every 
creature that turns to evil. The power of a creature to love or hate has no 
meaning without time or what Boyd (2001:181) calls “temporal duration”. 
Thus time gives meaning to love, freedom and moral responsibility and 
when God gives his/her creatures the power to choose, God has to within 
limits endure its misuse.  
 The power to influence is finite 
Creatures are by nature finite, thus their possibilities for choice, actions 
and influence are inherently limited. In the use of our choices we 
determine the eternal being we become (Boyd, 2001:188). Those who 
continue to choose evil will eventually give up their freedom and as it were 
become evil itself. Once this has happened, God will no longer allow them 
to influence others.  
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7.4. The Function of Satan 
 
In his book God at War (2001) Boyd develops a view of spiritual warfare. 
In this work Boyd concludes that history is a picture of a war propelled by 
an on-going spiritual battle between God and his/her angels and Satan 
and his angels. Satan, according to Boyd (2001:206), is the source of all 
natural evil. Blaming Satan for natural evils such as death, diseases, birth 
defects, mental illness, storms and earthquakes enables Boyd to 
encompass all forms of evil in his synthesis warfare theodicy. Every 
instance of evil originates in the choice of the creature that was given 
freedom for the sake of love. Boyd (2001:129) elaborates: 
When one possesses a vital awareness that in between God and 
humanity there exist a vast society of spiritual beings who are quite like 
humans in possessing intelligence and freewill, there is simply no 
difficulty in reconciling the reality of evil with the goodness of the 
supreme God. 
 
Boyd declares that God created a good and non-defective creation and that 
God does not will the destruction and terror that come upon humanity 
through evil. Boyd (2001:182-183) asserts that Satan invades and disturbs 
God’s good creation and uses it as a weapon to cause harm and spread 
destruction. Thus Satan’s aim is to destroy God’s work by recruiting human 
beings into his service. In Boyd’s view the understanding of spiritual warfare 
is another advantage for the development of an adequate theodicy. For Boyd 
the power of Satan prevents God from merely controlling evil and makes it 
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necessary for God to war against him. Thus, God’s power to deal with the 
opposing forces of the devil is limited. 
Thus, for Boyd, this position is consistent with the omnipotent and perfect 
goodness of God. God is omnipotent but limits him/herself to certain actions 
based on the freedom that he/she has granted to his/her creatures. Because 
God has created beings who love, he/she must allow for the possibility of 
evil. Boyd (2001:61) concludes that once we see free will as the total origin of 
evil there should be no problem in understanding why God’s character is not 
impugned by the evil in the world.  
Another aspect that is worthy of investigation is Boyd’s understanding of 
metaphysical dualism.  Boyd (2001:424) defines metaphysical dualism as the 
conflict between good and evil that is a metaphysical necessity. However, 
Boyd (2001:424) declares that his spiritual warfare theodicy mediates 
between metaphysical dualism and metaphysical monism (only good in the 
ultimate reality)  by maintaining that the conflict between good and evil is 
real, but not a metaphysical necessary and thus not eternal.  So according to 
Boyd (2001:421) God’ power is limited is dealing with evil because of shared 
power given to participating agents (also Satan) in bringing out the purposes 
of God. I define Satan as follows: A created, but superhuman, personal, evil, 
world-power, represented in Scripture as the adversary both of God and 
humanity.  However, I posit that there is no war between God and Satan... no 
cosmic battle. Boyd’s metaphysical dualism is unattainable because of who 
God is. Conway (2000: 74) defines of God as, which is also accepted within 
evangelicalism:  [God is] the Being who possesses the following attributes: 
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immutability, immateriality, omnipotence, omniscience, oneness or 
indivisibility, perfect goodness and necessary existence.  A plausible 
argument against dualism comes from Lewis (1958:33-34): 
 
 Now what do we mean when we call one of them the Good Power and 
the other the Bad Power? Either we are merely saying that we happen 
to prefer the one to the other . . . or else we are saying that, whatever 
the two powers think about it, one of them is actually wrong, actually 
mistaken, in regarding itself as good. Now if we mean merely that we 
happen to prefer the first, then we must give up talking about good and 
evil at all. For good means what you ought to prefer quite regardless of 
what you happen to like at any given moment. If  “being good” meant 
simply joining the side you happened to fancy, for no real reason, then 
good would not deserve to be called good. So we must mean that one 
of the two powers is actually wrong and the other actually right. But the 
moment you say that, you are putting into the universe a third thing in 
additional to the two Powers: some law or standard or rule of good 
which one of the powers conforms to and the other fails to conform to. 
But since the two powers are judged by this standard, then this 
standard, or the Being who made this standard, is farther back and 
higher up than either of them, and He will be the real God. In fact, what 
we meant by calling them good and bad turns out to be that one of them 
is in a right relation to the real ultimate God and the other in a wrong 
relation to Him 
 
This very meaning of good and evil implies the nonsensical nature of any 
explanation of reality that says God and the devil have to coexist equally. 
This is the reason for Boyd as to why God cannot overcome evil in the 
present reality. Because if Satan influences human being to make poor moral 
decisions that causes pain and suffering God cannot intervene because of 
the free choice he/she had given to humanity.   This understanding of 
metaphysical dualism is untenable because of the meaning God is 
omnipotent. Metaphysical dualism undermines the omnipotence of God. This 
is the case because any doctrine that implies Satan must exist in equal 
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power to God also implies that God is not omnipotent. The following 
argument explicates this point: 
 
 If God is omnipotent, then God possesses the power to destroy (if 
he/she freely chooses) any, and every, being. 
 If God possesses the power to destroy (if he/she freely chooses) any, 
and  every, being, then no being (except God) is an all- powerful 
being’  
 If Satan is not all powerful, then metaphysical dualism is false. 
 
As Schaeffer (1990: 186) emphasized that Christianity is a creation-centred 
system.  It begins with the fact that there is a Creator God who has existed 
forever. He/She has created all things, so there is nothing autonomous from 
him/her.  While I do acknowledge that Satan tries all attempts to mess up the 
plan of God, Satan does not and will not succeed. However, divine revelation 
(1 Jn. 4:4) explicitly states, “. . . He who is in you is greater than He who is in 
the world” There is no shared power but rather “allowed power”. Guthrie 
(1981:150) provides an excellent summary statement: 
 
There is a general belief that although the kosmos is God’s world, it is 
under the influence of evil to such an extent that the word itself can be 
used of mankind at enmity with God. An impression of dualism is 
unavoidably created by this means, but it is never a metaphysical 
dualism, only an ethical. . . .There is also general agreement that 
spiritual agencies have a powerful influence. . . .There are constant 
evidences of the clash between God and Satan, but never any doubt 
about the ultimate issue. What is adumbrated in other NT books comes 
to expression in the ultimate overthrow of Satan in the book of 
Revelation.  
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Boyd in articulating his position on the function of Satan while claiming to 
have a mediated position does not define the position clearly. He describes 
as at the end God will triumph over Satan. In view of Boyd’s open theism he 
seems to contradict himself. If God does not know the future because the 
future is not a reality this victory cannot be assured, this positions Boyd 
closer to metaphysical dualism than he wants to admit.   
 
7.5. Some Problems with Boyd’s Open Theodicy 
 
Having described the argument that Boyd posits for suffering, I will now point 
out its weakness and its contradiction with the evangelical position. 
Boyd, in trying to deal with the problem of evil, has diminished the attributes 
of God. When Boyd declares that God takes risks, he attacks the 
omniscience of God. In order to move away from putting the “blame on God” 
for evil he has created a metaphysical dualism: a war between good and evil 
whose outcome not even God knows because the future is open to God. 
Thus, in order to consider the theodicy of Boyd one needs to assess the cost 
of placing several evangelical Christian doctrines in jeopardy. 
The first doctrine to come under attack is the doctrine of creation. Boyd 
argues that because God created creatures with free will, he/she therefore 
cannot act as the continual sustenance source. In other words, God has to 
do nothing for created agents to act. Thus Boyd adopts a form of deism, 
because Boyd’s theodicy depends on the premise that God is not involved in 
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our events because free will is supreme: giving creation the power to exit and 
act by itself without any interaction with God. 
The second doctrine to come under attack is God’s foreknowledge. Because 
God takes a risk in creating creatures with free will, not knowing how they will 
respond to the use of this love, Boyd therefore denies God’s knowledge of 
any evil acts. Boyd’s theodicy therefore requires him to exclude God from 
knowing also the good acts of will. God cannot foreknow any free acts, be 
they good or evil, because free acts are self-determining. Boyd argues 
(2001:57) that we must be able to determine ourselves in relation to God’s 
invitation to use our free will for both good and bad acts. Thus any future acts 
exist only as indeterminate possibilities that no one can actually know. 
The third doctrine that is reformulated in the theodicy is that of God’s power. 
While I do not dispute the activity of Satan and the activity of powerful evil 
spirits, what Boyd presents in his cosmic war perspective is a form of 
dualism. To understand God’s power in light of the activities of the “demonic” 
forces that are formidable and running the cosmos W is no easy matter, even 
for God” is to limit the Divine. But is the power of the Devil the same as the 
power of God? I would argue that it is not, for the strength of the creature has 
nothing to do with the issue. What Boyd (2001:16-17, 359) proposes in his 
assessment of the activity of the Devil is that creatures are given freedom to 
do whatever they choose and God cannot intervene for to do so would be a 
“logical contradiction”. God cannot give us the power to love and withhold it 
at the same time. Granted the assumption that the power to love is the same 
as the power to withhold, Boyd is correct in his assessment that one cannot 
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operate without the other. However, Boyd (2001:359) concludes that God’s 
“inability” to involve him/herself in a “logical contradiction” limits God’s ability 
to do his/her will – thus limiting God’s power.  Evangelicals understand that 
God’s omnipotence is reflected in creating human with free-will. This by no 
means delimits God for only an omnipotent God can in the words of 
Kierkegaard (as cited in Versfeld 1972:121) “The most which, in the end, can 
be done for a being, more than any other thing which any being can do for 
itself is to make it free. It belongs precisely to the omnipotence of God.” In 
this we see the goodness of God by making a dependent finite being 
independent.  As Versfeld says (1974:121), only Omnipotence, which by 
his/her strong hand can so heavily grasp the world, can at the same time 
make him/herself do light that the created thing received independence to 
choose. If God in creating human beings had lost a little of his/her power, 
God then could not have made human beings with free-will. 
Lastly, Boyd emphasises the love as “God’s preeminent moral attribute.” 
However, as Payne and Spencer (2001:277-278) cites McGrath who notes: 
That idea can easily be misleading. The full impact of culture upon the 
concept of God which we want to discover inevitably means, given the 
richness of the Christian understanding of God, that we isolate and 
identify one aspect of that understanding of God as normative. In 
western culture, this has led to the hard-won insight that “God is love” 
being construed to mean he is a sugar-coated benevolent God who 
endorses all the insights of western culture and lends them a spurious 
sanctity. This concept of God—which owes more to nature-religion than 
Christianity, and continually threatens to degenerate into sheer 
sentimentalism—arises largely, if not entirely, through dissociating the 
insight that “God is love” from the source of that insight—the cross and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  
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Stating the point succinctly, God’s love must be viewed in the light of the 
atonement, not the atonement in the light of God’s love. The Cross poses a 
particularly strong challenge to the assumptions of open theism. 
Another challenge to open theism is the giving of thank in the midst of 
suffering as reflected in and Romans 5:3-5 and James 1:2-4. Both of these 
text commands us to rejoice in suffering because God has promised to bring 
out good through suffering. But open theist believe that our suffering is 
gratuitous, with no divinely ordained good purpose  in it, or that a good 
purpose that God has might not necessarily be accomplished in our lives, 
how then could we rejoice. These theological convictions within open theism 
would lead us from a confident rejoicing even in the midst of pain, to 
uncertainty, anxiety and perhaps even despair. Ware (2003:71) make is 
similar point with this regard to the biblical command to give thanks in all 
circumstances (1 Thess. 5:18) and to give thanks for everything (Eph. 5:20) – 
including suffering. This makes sense only in light of that God has promised 
to work in and through everything to accomplish his/her good purposes. But 
this situation would be very different id the teaching of open theism were 
correct.  If the suffering that comes into our lives is pointless, if God has no 
good intent, and all that that is does is harm, then there could no reason to 
give thanks in suffering and certainly not for suffering. 
Another major problem arises from Boyd’s open theism is how does God 
answer my prayers in a way I ask it. If God cannot know the future, then to 
what extent can one trust God? It is clear from the New Testament that God 
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delights to answer the prayers of his/her children. Jesus encourages his 
followers to ask (Matt. 7:7-8). 
Jesus promises in Matthew 7:11 that God delights to his/her children good 
gifts in response to their prayers. This then constitutes another problem, If 
God does not have exhaustive knowledge how then we can trust him/her to 
give us that which is good. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Blount (2005:178) views the open theistic understanding of God as a God 
who takes risks and adapts his/her plans to changing situations. God’s doing 
so results from the fact that he/she has created human beings as free 
creatures together with the assumption that God cannot know in advance 
what we will freely do. Such an understanding of the divine nature stands in 
marked contrast to traditional theism, which leads to a completely different 
understanding of the divine attributes. Evangelicals who uphold the 
inspiration, inerrancy, and infallibility of the Bible must search for, develop, 
and clearly articulate a theodicy that does not deconstruct the traditional view 
of God, but must tenaciously preserve the integrity of biblical claims 
regarding God’s nature and attributes. In short, any truly Christian 
evangelical theodicy must not sacrifice those non-negotiable elements that 
define and describe a “Christian Evangelical” position for the purpose of 
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providing a convenient answer to life’s most vexing and perplexing problem, 
the problem of evil. 
My conclusion is that the only genuine source of comfort and hope for 
evangelicals who are grappling with suffering and evil is a God who knows 
the future exhaustively and is not surprised by our suffering; a God who does 
not change in word and promise; and a God who has the power to act in any 
given situation. It involves our trusting in God who knows when to intervene 
to take away the suffering, and who is assuredly working out his/her good 
purposes wisely and efficaciously for his/her children. In this understanding of 
God one can rejoice and put one’s trust and ultimate hope ... even when we 
suffer.   
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
In this study I have attempted to address one of the deepest and most 
intractable problems in Evangelical theology: God and the presence of evil in 
the world. This study has engaged an historical investigation of the three 
attributes of God: God’s omniscience, immutability and omnipotence; and 
discusses how they are interpreted by open theists in light of the problem of 
evil.  
The doctrine of God profoundly affects virtually every major doctrine of 
Christianity. Evangelicals who hold to the claim that the Bible is the Word of 
God are entirely dependent on what is meant by God’s nature or attributes.  
The strength of the traditional view concerning the attributes of God lies in 
after the fact, that through the years of the church’s history, this 
understanding has predominated. Almost without interruption there has been 
a steam of testimony in the omniscience, immutability and omnipotence of 
God. Evangelical understanding of these attributes is within the orthodox 
understanding concerning these attributes. Tozer (1961:1) rightfully 
observes: “What comes into our mind about God when we think about God is 
the most important thing about us.” So the concept of God that is developed 
in our minds will have a marked effect on our practical lives.  
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8.1. Some Good Features within Open Theism 
Despite the open theist’s disagreement with to how Evangelicals view the 
attributes of God, there are some good features that its advocates have 
brought to the table for theological consideration. Erickson (1988:84-85) 
notes six positive things that could be said about open theism:  
 There is a genuine attempt to be biblical. 
 There is an attempt to be holistic theologically, taking into account 
biblical, historical, philosophical, and practical theology.  
 There is a recognition that theology is not done in a cultural vacuum 
and so we must be aware of cultural influences that affect our own 
interpretations. 
 There is a correct understanding that Greek philosophy has probably 
been read into the Bible too much. 
 There is a commendable desire to relate doctrine to the practical 
issues of life. 
 The proponents have largely treated the issue “coolly and rationally, 
rather than emotively”.  
Stallard (2001:12) adds another three positive contributions from open 
theism: 
First, fatalism is viewed as a flawed option. Open theism, although it 
goes too far, rightly refuses to view the biblical data as expressing a 
stilted kind of theological determinism that removes the mystery of 
God’s dealings with man. It is tempting, however, to note that open 
theism itself has removed the mystery of God’s dealings with man only 
from the human side of the equation. Second, open theism has focused 
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attention on passages that have had little attention in some evangelical 
circles. This is linked to a third good consequence of the discussions 
about the open view of God. There are some pockets of evangelicalism 
that are known for a posture of scholastic rationalism that leaves little 
room for the relational side of God. In spite of whatever faults it has, 
open theism does force evangelicals to think about the passages that 
assert the feelings and relationships that God has with respect to the 
world in general, and believers in particular. 
However, as reflected in chapters four to six, open theists deny the 
immutability of God, the exhaustive knowledge of God and the omnipotence 
of God. In many ways the God of open theism is finite and imperfect, which is 
radically different from how evangelicals view God and his/her attributes. 
Tillich (1965:7-8) states that” religion involves an ultimate commitment and 
any commitment to a God who is less than ultimate is ultimately unworthy.” 
 
8.2 Some Practical Considerations 
By their own admission, open theists confess an imperfect God, who is 
radically different from the God of the Bible and who said “I am the Lord, I do 
not change” (Mal. 3:6). In times of joy and pain, it is in this God of the Bible 
that Evangelicals can place their absolute confidence. Our spiritual 
confidence in God can be no greater than the nature of God, thus impacting 
our godliness. Our confidence in God can be no higher than our concept of 
God. The view of the open theist falls short of being worthy of our utmost for 
God’s highest. Evangelicals also look to the Bible because we understand 
that the Bible speaks with divine authority and is evidence of that which is 
infallible. The God of the open theist only makes guesses about free acts in 
the future. Thus it is plausible to assume that God is wrong at least part of 
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the time. Likewise if God’s Word, the Bible, is fallible, then all predictions are 
conditional; this in turn undermines our confidence in the promises of God. If 
we cannot be sure that even God can keep his/her word, our uncertainty 
undermines our belief in God’s faithfulness and care towards us. 
The evangelical Christian life depends on being able to take God at his/her 
word, knowing that what God promises God will do. According to open 
theism, God does not know all things infallibly, so how do we know God can 
keep any of his/her promises? The Bible is filled with promises from God. 
These promises are said to be irrevocable and immutable (Rom. 11:29; Heb. 
6:18). Therefore, in times of suffering the Evangelical understands that God 
will defeat evil or help the Christian overcome evil by giving him/her the 
strength to overcome. As seen in the narrative of Job and his suffering, the 
classical view of the attributes of God challenges and enables us as followers 
of God to turn our gaze towards God. One cannot allow circumstances – 
even horrific occurrence – to overwhelm one’s view of God. Adams 
(1990:287) states that “a face to face vision of God is a good for human 
incommensurate with any non-transcendent good or ills”. In this sense then 
all suffering and evil are swallowed up and defeated in the vision of who God 
is. Therefore the classical understanding of God’s attributes enables 
evangelicals to seek God’s presence and comfort in the midst of turmoil.  
The classical understanding of the attributes of God also spawns an attitude 
of humility, for to affirm complete divine control in the midst of suffering is to 
militate against the instinct of pride because it calls for trust in God. Adams 
(1987:19-20) states: 
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In Christian faith we are invited to trust a person so much greater than 
ourselves that we cannot understand him/her very fully. We have to 
trust God’s power and goodness in general without having a blue print 
of what he/she is going to do in detail. This is very humbling because it 
entails a loss of control of our own lives. 
 
In this respect the traditional understanding of God promotes faith because 
evangelicals who take this position believe that God is ultimately in control 
and that nothing is left to chance. The belief in the traditional attributes 
enables a Christian to view suffering sub specie aeternitatis (under the 
aspect of eternity). Evangelicals go through suffering with the prospect of 
their heavenly rewards putting the temporary pain of this life into proper 
perspective. The classical view of God enables evangelical Christians to 
keep these truths about God at the forefront on their minds, and their 
behaviour is motivated accordingly. 
The traditional view of God also enables Christians to pray vigorously and 
continuously before God regarding the suffering experienced by humans: 
such prayer could be called a theodicy of protest. Such complaints are bold 
in their challenge of divine wisdom and control and appear repeatedly in the 
Old Testament (Ps. 44:13-23; Ps. 13, 22, 59, 64, 74, 88 and 142). These 
prayers are the affirmation of faith, thus assuring the believer that God is 
sovereign and merciful and works to redeem all the situations of his/her 
people. These prayers enable us to understand that God has the power to 
redeem; and also enable us to pray according to the will of God. The model 
Jesus teaches is to pray that the will of God be accomplished on earth (Matt. 
6:10). Prayer helps to conform our will to God’s will. It also helps Christians to 
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handle disappointments when what we ask for does not come to pass: our 
confidence is in God’s foreknowledge and the fact that God’s plans for us are 
better than what we petition God for.  
The traditional view of God most inclines the Christian to recognize the value 
of our subjection to God; to sense our utter dependence upon him/her from 
moment to moment; and to affirm that our finest deeds are but the result of 
God’s gracious work in the life of a Christian. What one believes often affects 
how one behaves. Crabb (1998) states that in order to change behaviour one 
must change what one believes. The practical consequences of open theism 
are enormous for the Evangelical believer because it undermines the 
confidence we place in the character of God, the Word of God and the 
actions/ promises of God. 
Evangelicalism does not divide itself over “peripheral” issues; however the 
nature of God is no peripheral matter. It is fundamental to Evangelical 
Christianity because every evangelical doctrine is connected directly or 
indirectly to who God is. Since these traditional doctrines are based on the 
classical view of God, an errant view will infect other areas of faith. It is 
evident that evangelicalism embraces the teaching of the early church fathers 
on the crucial attributes under investigation: God’s omniscience, immutability 
and omnipotence. The denial of these classical attributes of God proposes a 
new kind of theism. The attributes of God are crucial to evangelical theology 
and Christian faith. Who God is in his/her being impacts directly on 
everything related to faith life and to the problem of evil.  The evangelical 
understanding concerning the attributes of God thus is found in scripture 
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continued within the tradition of the church through its confessions. Thus I 
have proved that open theism is contrary to the teaching of the early church 
and evangelicalism and is destructive to the integrity of Scripture. 
 
8.3. What the Confessions Teach 
 
It is evident as seen in chapters 4-6 that the Church Fathers embraced the 
classical view of God’s attributes that is denied by Boyd. The following tables 
reflect the continuing tradition of the classical view of God that is evident in 
the early Creeds and Confessions. Given these facts, it can be seen that 
Boyd’s open theism if fundamentally different from that of historical orthodox 
Christianity.   
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Table1 (as cited in Geisler, Battle for God. 2001;304) 
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Table 2 (as cited in Geisler, Battle for God. 2001:305) 
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The attributes of God are permanent and intrinsic qualities, which cannot be 
gained or lost, God’s attributes are essential and inherent dimensions of 
his/her very nature. Although our understanding of God is filtered through our 
own mental framework, his/her attributes are not our conceptions projected 
upon God. These attributes are objective characteristic of his/her nature; 
therefore they cannot be separated from the essence of being of God. Boyd 
in trying to develop a “modern” articulation to the problem of evil by 
articulating an Aristotelian conception of substance and attributes by 
distinguishing God’s essence from his/her attributes. The “Boydian” 
understanding of the attributes is fragmentary parts or collections of God or 
an addition to his/her essence. Thus Evangelicals understand the attributes 
of God as those qualities of God that constitute what God is, the very 
characteristic of his/her nature. These attributes are qualities of the entire 
Godhead and to change an attribute so that one can understand God 
working with humanity is to change who God is because every attribute of 
God qualifies each other.   Thus, I have proved my hypothesis that open 
theism is a radical departure from Evangelicalism     
“I am God, and there is no other; 
I am God, and there is none like me. 
I make known the end from the beginning, 
from ancient times, what is still to come. 
I say, ‘My purpose will stand, 
and I will do all that I please”  
(Isa. 46: 9-10. NIV) 
 
To this great God be glory and honour forever and ever! Amen. 
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